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ABSTRACT
Non-suicidal self-injury (NSI) represents a growing area of concern in a variety of 
clinical settings, yet remains a poorly understood phenomenon. An influx of research on 
the functions of NSI over the past decade has suggested a biopsychosocial emotional 
regulation model of this behavior. This model proposes that self-injurers engage in NSI 
to reduce negative emotions, and presupposes that self-injurers are characterized by 
emotional dysregulation. The present study evaluated the biological component of this 
model by assessing hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenocortical axis (HPAA) functioning in a 
group of self-injurers (n=26) and non-injuring healthy controls (n=28). HPAA 
functioning was assessed via measuring salivary cortisol levels across 65 minutes 
following exposure to an interpersonal rejection stressor or neutral comparison condition. 
Results of the experiment did not support the biological facet of the proposed 
biopsychosocial model. A complex time x condition x group x gender interaction effect 
was found, which was counterintuitive to study hypotheses. However, self-reported 
difficulties with emotional regulation were in the hypothesized direction, with self- 
injurers reporting greater difficulties in most domains. Future research must seek other 
potential lines of evidence in support of the biological aspects of emotional regulation in 
self-injurers.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Over the past two decades, non-suicidal self-injury (NSI) has received an 
increased degree of attention in a number of mediums, including the mainstream media 
(e.g., Marano, 2004) and popular culture (e.g., Reznor, 1994), psychopathology research 
literature (e.g., Favazza, 1996, 1998; Gratz, 2001; Muehlenkamp, 2005; Nock & Prinstein, 
2004; Ross & Heath, 2002; Ross & Heath, 2003), and disciplines outside of the mental 
health field (Hafeez & Goodyear, 2003). More specifically, the study of NSI has grown 
exponentially as an area of research focus in recent years, especially over the past decade. 
Such recent research indicates that this behavior occurs in about 1 -4% of general, non- 
clinical populations (Briere & Gil, 1996; Klonsky, Oltmanns, & Turheimer, 2003), with 
higher rates in adolescents (10-15%; Hawton & Rodham, 2006; Muehlenkamp & 
Gutierrez, 2004; Ross & Heath, 2002) and college students (17-35%; Gratz, 2001; 
Whitlock, Eckenrode, & Silverman, 2006).
Evidence from anthropological findings suggests that self-mutilative practices 
have been engaged in for much of human evolutionary history (Casteret, 1951; Janssens, 
1957). In a more recent historical context, case studies of self-mutilation became more 
prevalent in the medical literature near the close of the nineteenth century and the 
beginning of the twentieth century. However, following Menninger’s (1938) early 
review of the literature concerning self-mutilation, the gap in publications on this topic 
suggests that interest in this phenomenon was largely dormant for some time. The
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attention of the psychiatric community was directed back to this topic about twenty years 
later when “wrist slashing” among psychiatric inpatients gained notoriety (Favazza & 
Simeon, 1995). It was unclear at that time what differentiated self-mutilating behavior 
from suicidal behavior, besides the inevitable consequences of these behaviors. Although 
it is difficult to ascertain the exact function of patients’ self-mutilation from accounts in 
this early literature, the behaviors, and contexts in which they are described, seem 
consistent with modem day accounts of NSI. Therefore, it can be reasonably assumed 
that this literature base represents the origin of the study of NSI in psychiatry and 
psychology.
Kreitman (1977) was the first to devote an entire text to self-injury. His work 
documented one of the first systematic epidemiological studies of NSI, which he termed 
“parasuicide” (a term discussed in more depth in subsequent sections of this paper) 
among United Kingdom residents in Edinburgh over a period of eight years beginning in 
the mid-1960’s. It was at this time that interest in this phenomenon regained prominent 
attention in the psychiatric literature. This area was further developed by subsequent 
work of Ross and McKay (1979) and Pattison and Kahan (1983), which also served to 
increase research and clinical interest in NSI. Since that time, the research literature on 
NSI has expanded substantially, incorporating a variety of theories regarding potential 
etiological and phenomenological models for this behavior.
Defining Non-Suicidal Self-Injury
As noted earlier, self-injury has historically been referred to by numerous other 
labels (e.g., Gratz, 2001; Kreitman, 1977; Linehan, 1993a, 1993b; Simeon & Favazza, 
2001). Indeed, the diversity of labels reflects a central difficulty in conceptualizing this
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behavior within this area of study. Moreover, it reflects the underlying divarication in the 
extant literature regarding definitions of self-injury, in that each label has at times been 
used to describe slightly different variations of this behavior. One primary point of 
disconnect seems to be whether or not failed suicide attempts or self-injurious behavior 
with an intent to die should be included in a definition of self-injury.
Kreitman (1977) coined the term “parasuicide,” defining it as “a non-fatal act in 
which an individual deliberately causes self-injury or ingests a substance in excess of any 
prescribed or generally recognized therapeutic dosage” (Kreitman, 1977, p. 3). Alcohol 
consumption was excluded from the criteria of this definition because there is no standard 
amount of alcohol that is commonly acknowledged as a regular, prescribed, or 
therapeutic dosage. Linehan (1993a) posited that this definition also included failed 
suicide attempts in which there was minimal intent of death, and she adopted the term in 
her own seminal work. Most recently, Walsh (2006) forwarded a definition of self-injury 
as “intentional, self-effected, low-lethality bodily harm of a socially unacceptable nature, 
performed to reduce psychological distress” (Walsh, 2006, p.4). Walsh’s definition is 
useful from a clinical perspective in that it portends a specific functional hypothesis of 
self-injury, i.e., that this behavior serves an ameliorative function for psychiatric 
symptomatology. However, a definition that is functionally specific may be limiting in 
clinical research exploring the potential functions of this behavior.
Other definitions of self-injury have been forwarded in the literature. Like Walsh 
(2006), some have also defined NSI from a functional perspective. For example, Miller 
(1995) proposed that NSI in women (which she termed “Trauma Reenactment 
Syndrome”) is a symbolic reenactment of childhood trauma, citing the wealth of
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literature connecting self-injury with early trauma (e.g., van der Kolk, Perry, & Hermann). 
Favazza (1996) and others (e.g., Muehlenkamp, 2005) have submitted that NSI, with its 
associated features and sequelae, represents a separate psychiatric disorder.
Favazza (1996) proposed what he termed “Repetitive Self-Mutilation Syndrome,” 
and indicated that this disorder would best be classified as an impulse control disorder.
The proposed criteria for Repetitive Self-Mutilation Syndrome included “ (1) 
preoccupation with harming oneself physically; (2) recurrent failure to resist impulses to 
harm oneself physically, resulting in the destruction or alteration of body tissue; (3) 
increasing sense of tension immediately before the act of self-harm; (4) gratification or a 
sense of relief when committing the act of self-harm; and (5) the act is not associated 
with conscious suicidal intent and is not in response to a delusion, hallucination, 
transsexual fixed idea, or serious mental retardation” (Favazza, 1996, p.256). Although 
there are some components of this suggested classification that necessitate refinement, 
one may infer from these criteria that this definition of self-injury assumes that (1) NSI is 
distinct from suicide, and (2) it facilitates the regulation of tension. Self-injury in the 
present study is conceptualized in the context of non-suicidal self-injury. Specifically,
NSI is any form of self-directed behavior that causes or has the potential to cause 
immediate physical (i.e., tissue) damage to the individual without intent to cause death.
Differentiating Non-Suicidal Self-Injury from Suicidal Behavior
Much confusion has arisen regarding the difference between NSI and suicidal 
behavior. This confusion has been promulgated by previous usage of the term 
“parasuicide,” which implies a suicidal component to the self-injury that may not have 
been engaged in to terminate the individual’s life, as well as the use of the term
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“deliberate self-harm” in multiple definitional contexts (e.g., Haw, Houston, & Townsend, 
2002). There is evidence that a correlation between suicidality and NSI exists. Empirical 
research indicates that as much as approximately 40% of self-injurers may experience 
suicidal ideations during episodes of NSI (Favazza, 1996; Pattison & Kahan, 1983), and 
approximately 50-85% of these individuals have attempted suicide at least once in their 
lifetime (Stanley, Winchel, Molcho, Simeon & Stanley, 1992). However, there is also 
evidence to suggest that suicide attempters who self-injure are a unique sub-group 
(Stanley, Gameroff, Michaelson, & Mann, 2001). On the other side of this conceptual 
coin, there is also evidence that self-injurers who attempt suicide differ from their non- 
suicidal counterparts by way of longer histories of NSI and a higher number of NSI 
methods, thus making them a higher risk group in multiple ways (Nock, Joiner, Gordon, 
Lloyd-Richardson, & Prinstein, 2006; Whitlock & Knox, 2007). Parallel to this, NSI has 
been conceptualized as falling along a continuum of self-harm where severity of the 
behavior ranges from low-lethal compulsive NSI (e.g., trichotillomania, onychophagia) 
up to and including suicide (Linehan, 1986). Such a conceptualization suggests that 
while NSI and suicide may be conceptually or categorically related, they are also 
functionally distinct phenomena.
Walsh (2006) summarizes the differences between these two behaviors as being 
primarily in the following areas: (1) intent; (2) level of physical damage and potential 
lethality; (3) behavioral frequency; (4) multiplicity of methodology; (5) helplessness and 
hopelessness; (6) psychological repercussions of a NSI episode. In the following sections, 
the evidence supporting this contention is discussed.
Intent
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Behaviors are frequently defined in terms of their purpose (i.e., attainment of 
reinforcement, reduction of punishment). The success or failure of a behavior in 
fulfilling that purpose is often a primary contingency that maintains it. Shneidman (1985) 
discussed how intent separates NSI from suicide. He contended that suicidality is 
characterized by a desire to terminate psychological pain; the suicidal individual does not 
typically wish to kill the body, but instead to end her or his painful experience of 
consciousness. Conversely, those who engage in NSI may do so as a way of changing 
their experience of consciousness; this may involve ameliorating an excess or paucity of 
emotion (Brown, Comtois, & Linehan, 2002; Conterio and Lader, 1998; Favazza, 1987; 
Linehan, 1993a; Muehlenkamp & Gutierrez, 2004). The intent of both groups is to 
escape from psychological pain; however, the degree to which that pain is averted (i.e., 
temporarily or permanently) is the differentiating factor.
Level o f Physical Damage and Lethality 
There is strong empirical evidence indicating that there are a limited number of 
methods employed in completed suicides. Self-inflicted gunshots, hanging, overdose, 
self-poisoning, and jumping from lethal heights are attributed to approximately 98.6% of 
the deaths that result from suicide, whereas cutting accounts for only about 1.4% (Centers 
for Disease Control, 2002). Because cutting has consistently been shown in both clinical 
and non-clinical populations to be the most common form of NSI (e.g., Favazza & 
Conterio, 1988; Suyemoto, 1998; Walsh & Frost, 2005), there is some indication that the 
majority of those who self-injure tend to use a relatively low-lethal method to engage in 
this behavior. Some authors (e.g., Muehlenkamp, 2005) contend that many 
moderate/superficial self-inflicted injuries incurred by NSI individuals are able to be
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taken care of by the individual without medical attention. Thus, the physical damage 
caused by NSI is likely to be less severe medically and less lethal than suicidal behavior, 
although NSI can clearly become a more lethal behavior as the frequency and severity 
increase (it is important to note that there may be other reasons for not seeking medical 
attention even when such care may be warranted, such as prior experiences with 
pejorative care providers, as argued by Shaw [2002]).
Behavioral Frequency
In light of the above discussion regarding level of physical damage incurred by 
suicidal and NSI behavior, it follows logically that the frequency with which these 
behaviors occur is a differentiating factor. While there are subsets of suicidal individuals 
who remain suicidal for protracted periods of time due to chronic psychiatric disturbance 
(e.g., Major Depressive Disorder, Recurrent; Bipolar Disorder; Borderline Personality 
Disorder), many suicidal behaviors or suicide attempts occur in singularity (Walsh, 2006). 
However, it is important to note that some data suggests that up to 69% of suicide 
attempters have previously engaged in suicidal behavior (Haw, Houston, Townsend & 
Hawton, 2002). Moreover, Klonsky and Olino (2008) report that there may be one subset 
of self-injurers that is characterized by substantially higher levels of suicidality. 
Nevertheless, although suicidality or suicidal ideation may be chronic, suicidal behavior 
is less likely to be so in these individuals. Conversely, Walsh (2006; Walsh & Rosen, 
1988) reports that NSI tends to be chronic, with the typical self-injurer engaging in 20- 
100 episodes over several years.
Multiplicity o f  Methodology
1
Research suggests that suicidal individuals to be single attempters if indeed they 
do make a suicide attempt (Holden & Johns, 1997). Furthermore, those who do engage 
in repeated suicide attempts tend to employ the same method each time. In the case of 
repeat attempters, a number of things may prevent the behavior from resulting in death, 
including both accidental and purposeful discovery (although categorizing pre-death 
purposeful discovery as “suicide” versus NSI remains debatable). Conversely, research 
indicates that many NSI individuals are likely to use more than one method of NSI 
(Favazza, 1992; Favazza & Conterio, 1988; Osuch, Noll, & Putnam, 1999). This may be 
due to circumstance, such as removal of access to preferred NSI method, habituation to 
the sensation produced by each method, or due to personal preference. Alternatively, this 
may reflect a subtypology of NSI, as suggested by latent class analyses forwarded by 
Klonsky and Olino (2008), in which at least 11% of participants reported multiple 
methods of NSI.
Helplessness and Hopelessness
Research suggests that feelings of hopelessness are substantially associated with 
suicidality, and constitute a major risk factor for suicidal behavior in depressed 
individuals (Beck, 1996; Gutierrez, Osman, Kopper, Barrios, & Bagge, 2000; Johns & 
Holden, 1997). Beck and colleagues’ (1979) cognitive theory of depressive illness posits 
that depression is frequently characterized by perceived hopelessness. This hopelessness 
may extend to one’s view of the potential for their suffering to end. As a provenience for 
suicidality, hopelessness reflects a maladaptive or perseverative problem-solving process. 
In this problem-solving process the depressed individual is unable to reframe, revise, or 
restructure their self- and world-schemas to incorporate evidence contradicting their
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perceived hopelessness. In this same vein, helplessness, specifically learned helplessness, 
is a well-established contributing factor for depression and suicidality (see Seligman,
1975, for a review). Suicidally depressed individuals commonly feel as if they are 
beyond being helped (Beck, 1996). Such a perception then further contributes to a view 
of their situation as hopeless, thus further supporting the notion that suicide is the only 
effective solution for ending their suffering. These two facets of suicidality are clearly 
complimentary to each other. Walsh (2006) proposes that self-injurers do not experience 
the same hopelessness that suicidal individuals do because they are engaging in a 
behavior that relieves the distress contributing to hopelessness. It may be that suicidal 
individuals feel little control over their circumstances and their pain, and self-injurers 
may feel some sense of control via their NSI. Walsh (2006) further contends that, 
although self-injurers are clearly not precluded from experiencing depressive cognitions, 
they may be less likely to see the future as completely bleak because the NSI they engage 
in may function to acutely reduce distress.
Psychological Repercussions o f a Self-Injury Episode 
Suicide attempts not resulting in death are frequently followed by a continuation 
or exacerbation of depressive symptomatology (Walsh, 2006). This effect may result 
from the individual’s perception of the attempt as another failure, buttressing their view 
of themselves as inept. Furthermore, the fact that suicide is viewed as the key strategy 
that will eliminate the attempter’s pain suggests that survival of an attempt will not 
reduce the tension leading up to the act. Conversely, NSI is frequently reported to have a 
distress reducing effect (Linehan, 1993a; Nock & Prinstein, 2004, 2005). Although there
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is also shame and guilt that may go along with NSI, there is also a tendency for tension 
and stress to decrease following an act.
Etiology of Non-Suicidal Self-Injury
Much attention in the research literature has been devoted to developing an 
accurate model to explain how NSI develops and is maintained. Early hypotheses 
explaining NSI were based on psychodynamic theories (e.g., Menninger, 1935), but these 
theories have lacked empirical support. More recent theories of NSI are empirically 
grounded in developmental, behavioral, and neurobiological perspectives. Some of these 
theories have recently been integrated by Linehan (1993a) and others (e.g., Chapman, 
Gratz, & Brown, 2006; Brown, Comtois, & Linehan, 2002) into the biopsychosocial 
model of BPD, which has also been used to explain NSI.
Biopsychosocial Model
Linehan’s (1993a) biosocial model remains the most comprehensive explanation 
of NSI. In her reformulation of BPD, Linehan proposed that borderline features, which 
commonly include NSI (Zanarini, Frankenburg, Hennen, & Silk, 2003) are part of the 
sequelae of dysregulation of fundamental emotional regulation processes. These 
processes may include inhibition of inappropriate behavior related to strong negative or 
positive affect, self-regulation of physiological arousal related to affect, refocus attention 
while experiencing intense affect, and the coordination of action for accomplishment of a 
non-mood-based objective via self-organization (Gottman & Katz, 1990). The 
biopsychosocial model posits that such emotional dysregulation originates from a 
transactional relationship between inherent biological characteristics and specific types of 
developmental environments that are invalidating (i.e., the invalidating environment).
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Invalidating environments are typically characterized by people and other factors that 
question, discount, or disregard current and long-term needs, as well as feelings and 
subjective experience of the individual. Continuous invalidation frequently results in the 
individual doing the same to her/himself. The concept of biosocial transactions is 
consistent with a comprehensive model of BPD, and provides a systemic context in 
which to discuss features of this disorder, such as NSI.
This model, which is nicely summarized in a recent review of the NSI literature 
by Klonsky (2007), also suggests that there are secondary effects of dysregulated 
emotions. It is proposed that emotional dysregulation contributes to further dysregulation 
of emotions through dysregulation of environmental factors, which is also supported by 
recent work in an adolescent population by Lloyd-Richardson and colleagues (2007) 
indicating that adolescents who report engaging in this behavior report doing so not only 
to help regulate either affect or an emotional state (i.e. “to stop bad feelings” was one of 
the most frequently endorsed reasons for NSI), but also commonly endorsed motivations 
for NSI that involved a social context that may be related to the initial internal 
dysregulation (e.g., “to get control of a situation,” to get a reaction from someone”). Hilt, 
Cha, & Nolen-Hoeksema (2008) also reported a contextually contingent functional model 
of NSI among adolescent girls consistent with the secondary effects model above. In this 
model, NSI engaged in as a response to internal distress was performed in an attempt to 
regulate em otions via an autom atic negative reinforcem ent m echanism  (see N ock and 
Prinstein, 2004), whereas, NSI in response to stress in interpersonal relationships was 
aimed at achieving social positive or social negative reinforcement. In sum, research and 
theoretical models proposing a secondary effects process suggest that frequently extreme
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or atypical behaviors may contribute to unstable or tentative relationships with others, 
withdrawal of affection from others, or loss of opportunities for personal gain or 
accomplishment. Vulnerability toward invalidating environments may thereby be created 
through this secondary pathway, thus exacerbating the effects of emotional dysregulation 
and perpetuating the potential for future dysregulation.
There are other factors that may contribute to exacerbation of emotion 
dysregulation symptoms. According to the biosocial model, features of emotional 
dysregulation in an individual with a biological predisposition for difficulties with 
emotional regulation may be amplified when the individual is in an environment that is 
perceived as negative (e.g., unsupportive, unstable, or excessively demanding). 
Furthermore, Linehan (1993a) contends that, due to a “higher sensitivity” (Linehan,
1993a, p. 44) to emotional stimuli, such individuals may evaluate their environments, or 
experiences, as being negative more readily than others who do not have such difficulties 
in regulating their emotions. Early research in emotion and emotional expressive and 
attention processes supports the notion that higher emotional arousal is associated with 
greater focus on emotionally relevant aspects of a situation or environment (Bahrick, Fitts, 
& Rankin, 1952; Bursill, 1958; Callaway & Stone, 1964; Comsweet, 1969; Easterbrook, 
1959; Mcnamara & Fisch, 1964). According to Linehan’s (1993a) model of BPD, this 
may be a component of or related to borderline individuals’ quick emotional escalation 
and subsequent slow return to baseline emotional functioning. In short, the biosocial 
model suggests that the myriad BPD behaviors develop as a result of a transaction 
between biological, social, and environmental factors.
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Although NSI is only one of the features of BPD, it is the feature that is of most 
relevance to this discussion of the biosocial model. The biosocial model of BPD 
conceptualizes BPD behaviors as maladaptive attempts by the individual to regulate their 
emotional experience. This conceptualization thus suggests that these behaviors are 
somehow effective in intervening in the present dysregulation, and either result in the 
restoration of homeostasis, or initiate a process that does so. As an emotional regulation 
strategy, NSI appears to meet this criterion. Although the exact mechanism is not clear, 
self-injuring borderlines and other self-injuring individuals report a reduction in anxiety 
and other aversive emotions (e.g., hostility) after engaging in NSI (Liebenluft, Gardner,
& Cowdry, 1987; Ross & Heath, 2003). Others, such as Walsh (2006) cite clinical 
anecdotal evidence based on self-reports from patients that indicate this as well. Thus, 
NSI seems to be effective in providing some intervention in dysregulated affective states 
by either directly or indirectly terminating the dysregulation or the affective state itself.
It is likely that the directness or indirectness of this effect is not ubiquitous and varies 
from person to person.
The biosocial model provides a comprehensive and useful template for explaining 
NSI. As applied to NSI, this model is an important advent for research on this 
phenomenon in that it delineates the conditions and factors through which this behavior 
may develop. The present study approaches the study of NSI from the perspective that it 
serves an emotional regulatory function, a perspective which has been forwarded in the 
biosocial model. Therefore, understanding how the various factors of the biosocial model 
transact and result in this behavior is of paramount importance in understanding the 
premise of the research proposed in this manuscript. In his review and expansion of
13
Linehan’s (1993a) model, Walsh (2006) has proposed that the biopsychosocial theory 
may be segmented into five primary components. These include environmental, 
biological, cognitive, affective, and behavioral. In the following sections, these proposed 
components are reviewed to provide the reader with an overview of how each contributes 
to the biosocial model, and to NSI.
Environmental Components
The environmental factors affecting NSI behavior include elements of the self- 
injurer’s personal and familial history, and components of the current environment. The 
family of origin provides an environment for ongoing learning and development of 
behavioral repertoires for children. NSI is associated with disturbance within the family 
of origin, including familial psychiatric illness and substance abuse (Walsh & Rosen,
1988), abusive and violent family member interactions (Shapiro & Dominiak, 1992), as 
well as suicide and NSI among family members (Favazza, 1996, 1998). Because 
parental/caretaker and peer modeling and socialization of emotion-related coping 
behaviors contributes substantially to children’s acquisition of behaviors (Bandura, 1986; 
Eisenberg, Cumberland, & Spinrad, 1998), observation of self-destructive behavior, 
where there is the potential for modeling of maladaptive coping behaviors, may be 
particularly detrimental. Children who are repeatedly exposed to maladaptive coping 
strategies such as NSI or substance abuse by their caretakers are thus at an increased risk 
for development of these maladaptive coping strategies themselves.
Other life-experiences of NSI individuals also may play a role in the onset of the 
behavior. For example, a wealth of research suggests that there are higher prevalence 
rates of NSI in clinical and non-clinical adults who experience childhood sexual and
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physical abuse than those who do not (Briere & Gil, 1998; Gratz, Conrad, & Roemer, 
2002; van der Kolk, Perry, & Herman, 1991). Separation from, or death of, a primary 
caretaker during childhood also appears to be associated with NSI (Briere & Gil, 1998; 
Gratz et al., 2002; Walsh & Rosen, 1988). Recent work by Gratz et al. (2002) has 
demonstrated that males and females who self-injure are affected differently by familial 
and developmental environments. Gratz and her colleagues reported significant gender 
differences in the way that familial and developmental experiences affect and predict NSI. 
Sexual and physical abuse, maternal emotional neglect, and insecure maternal and 
paternal attachment were significant risk factors for females, while paternal separation 
and physical abuse were highly predictive of NSI in males. This data is consistent with 
Linehan’s (1993a) concept of the “invalidating environment” in which a child’s physical 
and/or emotional needs are discounted, unacknowledged, and/or not attended to. Such an 
environment may elicit progressively stronger expressions of need up to a point of 
extremity at which point those needs still may or may not be responded to. The 
intermittent response to such expressions of need serves to reinforce extreme expressions 
of emotion as a way of getting one’s needs met (Linehan, 1993a). Gratz et al.’s (2002) 
data support this by suggesting that elements frequently present in chaotic family systems, 
especially loss or threat of loss of a parent or other caretaker, significantly predict NSI.
Components of one’s developmental environment also contribute to NSI, 
especially for those who may have experienced chaotic and abusive developmental 
environments (Walsh, 2006). Those who have experienced parental/caretaker separation 
via death or removal from the home during childhood may be more sensitive to loss, or 
the potential for loss, of other relationships later in life. This may be particularly true for
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those who engage in NSI as Gratz 2002 demonstrated. Here, a risk for NSI is present 
especially if the childhood loss impeded their development of healthy and adaptive 
coping skills.
While developmental environments may be important antecedents to the onset of 
NSI, aspects of the current environment may be a key factor in the perpetuation of this 
behavior. Any number of events may serve as a “trigger” for NSI and it is likely that a 
combination of factors (e.g., psychological state, pre-existing stress level, access to 
alternative self-soothing methods, circumstances) is the final determining factor (Favazza 
& Rosenthal, 1990). Psychological states may also be precipitants of NSI. Indeed, 
research indicates that circumstances precipitating NSI typically include aversive levels 
of stress and aversive affective states (Simeon & Favazza, 2001). Difficulties in 
occupational or educational performance, conflict in one’s relationship with an intimate 
partner or close friend, interactions with the legal system, and financial difficulties are 
examples of common stressors that may precipitate an episode of NSI. Any of these may 
include themes of being rejected or abandoned, which are also commonly reported 
themes in the precipitating factors reported by self-injurers (Favazza & Rosenthal, 1990). 
Additionally, Walsh (2006) contends that individuals may be more sensitive to current 
aversive experiences, or, moreover, the threat of current aversive experiences, that are 
similar to those experiences that have historically been aversive for the individual. 
Therefore, someone who experienced physical or sexual abuse as a child may react more 
quickly to the perceived threat of similar abuse as an adult than someone who did not 
experience such abuse, even in normal interpersonal interaction. From this discussion, it 
may be concluded that both the historical/developmental and current environment of an
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individual, as well as the transactional relationship of these factors, may play an 
important role in the onset and course of NS1.
Biological Components
As noted by Linehan (1993a), the biological underpinnings of NSI are likely to be 
heterogeneous. Data in the extant literature implicates the limbic system in the 
pathogenesis NSI. The limbic system, which mediates affective feeling, along with 
memory, learning, and perception, is one of the primary biological subsystems regulating 
emotional processes. Others include the brain stem, which meditates activation of 
purposeful behavior and general arousal, and the cerebral cortex, which functions as a 
mediator of attentional processes, working memory, perception, and volitional control 
(Lewis & Stieben, 2004). Individuals who engage in NSI are believed to have significant 
difficulties regulating their emotional experiences. However, the evidence for these 
problems with emotional regulation has been inferential, derived mostly from data based 
on the self-reported reduction of intense affective states following NSI. It is important to 
incorporate evidence from related literature bases in examining the evidence for 
biological mechanisms of emotional regulation.
There is some peripheral supporting evidence for such biological processes 
suggesting that some NSI individuals respond to treatment with anticonvulsants, which 
are now commonly used as mood stabilizers in Bipolar affective disorders (Chengappa et 
al., 1999; Hirdes et al., 2002). Recent small-sample and case studies have shown an 
association between administration of medications from this class of pharmacological 
agents and decreases in self-injury in Bipolar Disorder and BPD patients (Cassano, 
Latanzi, Pini, Osso, Battistini, & Cassano, 2001; Chengappa et al., 1999). Research in
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bipolar patients indicates that anticonvulsants reduce the reactivity of the amygdala (a 
central component of the limbic system) to emotional stimuli (Drevets et al., 2002; 
Krystal et al., 2002). In short, studies suggest that anticonvulsants exert their effects 
through their potentiation of gamma-aminobutyric acid (GABA; an inhibitory 
neurotransmitter), limitation of electrical activity in the anterior cingulate cortex (a 
component of the limbic system) which is associated with emotional lability, and 
stabilization of the neuronal membrane at the sodium ion channel by inhibition of the 
release of aspartate and glutamate (Blumberg et al., 2000; Chengappa et al., 1999;
Krystal et al., 2002; Theoharides, Dessain, & Shuster, 1992).
This research suggests, first, that commencement of anticonvulsant therapy is 
associated with reduction of NSI in some cases, and second, that there are observable 
reductions in other indices of emotional responsivity (outside the context of NSI) that are 
associated with commencement of anticonvulsant therapy. Furthermore, this research 
suggests that anticonvulsant medications act on those areas of the brain known to be 
involved in emotion and emotion regulation processes. Thus, it may be concluded that 
there is preliminary evidence to support an association between emotional regulatory 
processes at the biological level and NSI. Specifically, when stabilization of biological 
emotional regulation functions is achieved pharmacologically, individuals who engage in 
NSI do so less frequently. Research evaluating the biological mechanisms of emotional 
regulation (and dysregulation), while promising, is still in a relatively nascent stage, and 
some empirical findings suggest that only a subset of self-injurers may respond to 
anticonvulsant treatment (Favazza, 1996). Any conclusions from this data must, 
therefore, be made judiciously. Additional research is presently needed to further
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elucidate the exact relationship between the biological substrates underlying emotional 
regulation and the NSI.
Studies of the biological components of NSI have often also conceptualized this 
behavior as a form of aggression, thus research on aggressive behavior is also of 
relevance to this discussion. Much effort has been focused on identifying significant 
differences in the prevalence of specific neurotransmitters as well as abnormalities of 
neuroanatomical structures that mitigate aggressive behaviors. In this vein, a number of 
neurotransmitters and neurotransmitter substrates have been implicated in the mitigation 
of aggressive behavior. Of these, the serotonergic, noradrenergic, and endogenous opioid 
systems are among the most frequently discussed as possible mitigating substrates.
There are some empirical findings from studies of serotonin levels in self-injurers 
that provide some evidence of reduced serotonergic functioning (see Grossman & Siever, 
2001 for a review). Simeon, Stanley, Frances, Mann, Winchel, & Stanley (1992) 
reported that cerebrospinal fluid (CSF) levels of 5-HIAA were 44% lower in non-suicidal 
self-injurers than controls. This study also found that imipramine platelet binding 
(considered to be an analogue of serotonergic functioning) was significantly lower in 
self-injurers than controls. Similarly, Markowitz (1995) also concluded that NSI was 
associated with lower levels of serotonin in self-injurers. Inferential support for the role 
of serotonin has also come from evidence that selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors 
(SSRI) are sometimes effective in reducing self-injury (Grossman & Siever, 2001), 
although evidence of the iatrogenic effects of SSRIs, such as increases in suicidal 
ideation, have also been well-documented (e.g., Donovan et al., 2000; Grounds et ah, 
1995; King etal., 1991).
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Although different from NSI in some important ways, studies of suicidal behavior 
also bare some relevance to this discussion. Research has shown a relationship, between 
reduced levels of 5-HIAA and suicidal behavior in suicide attempters. Specifically, 
findings from post-mortem studies of brainstem concentrations of serotonin and 
completed suicides have been relatively consistent in demonstrating a relationship 
between low 5-HIAA levels and suicide (Russ, 1992). Additionally, Mann and Malone 
(1997) documented lower levels of 5-HIAA in cerebrospinal fluid of depressed 
individuals who attempt suicide compared with controls from a psychiatric population. 
More recently, Arango et al. (2001) reported a 40% smaller concentration of 5-HTia 
(serotonergic receptor sites) in the dorsal aspect of the raphe nucleus of depressed suicide 
completers when compared to nonsuicidal, nonclinical controls. Furthermore, in related 
research van Heerigen and colleagues (2001) found significantly lower binding potentials 
in frontal 5-Hydroxytryptophan2A (5HT2a) receptors (an index of serotonergic activity) in 
suicide attempters compared to non-clinical controls. Conversely, Mann, Stanley, & 
Malone (1996) reported finding no differences between suicide attempters and non­
clinical controls in serotonin levels; however, this study did find a significant correlation 
between 5-HIAA and both planning of suicide attempts and extent of medical damage 
incurred by suicide attempts. Thus, there is some empirical support for an inverse 
relationship between serotonergic activity and features associated with self-harm 
behaviors, implying that NSI may also be related to low serotonergic functioning.
Evidence of relationships between aggressive behavior and other 
neurotransmitters has also been reported. Research on norepinephrine in animals 
(Eichelman, 1987) has indicated that levels of this neurotransmitter are negatively
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correlated with aggressive behavior. Further evidence of this relationship derives from 
findings that noradrenergic agents that block or reduce the activity of norepinephrine are 
associated with a decrease in aggressive behavior. Similar results have been found in 
human studies, which have used CSF levels of a norepinephrine metabolite (3-methoxy- 
4-hydroxphenylglycol; MHPG) as a reference index, demonstrating that CSF levels of 
MHPG are associated with aggression. Brown, Goodwin, Ballenger, Goyer and Major 
(1979) reported a significant correlation between MHPG levels in CSF and a history of 
aggressive behavior in soldiers with “personality pathology.” However, Traskman, 
Asberg, Bertilsson, & Sjostrand (1981) reported contradictive findings in their sample of 
suicide attempters, where CSF levels of MHPG were not significantly different in their 
sample of depressed and non-depressed controls. It is conceivable that the unique 
attributes of the specific group being examined in this latter study may have contributed 
to their lack of significant findings. Overall, the literature appears to suggest that 
elevations in norepinephrine levels is associated with increases in aggression, however, 
this relationship may be moderated by factors such as individual psychopathology.
The endogenous opioid system (EOS) has also been implicated as a mitigating 
biological factor in NSI (Oquendo & Mann, 2000; Russ, 1992; Winchel & Stanley,
1991). The EOS has been discussed at length as potentially playing a role in the onset 
and maintenance of NSI since many self-injurers report analgesia when they self-injure. 
The role of the EOS in NSI can be explained in terms of operant behaviorism. It has 
been posited that some individuals who engage in NSI may have inherently low levels of 
opiate activity (Oquendo & Mann, 2000; Winchel & Stanley, 1991), and that NSI serves 
as a mechanism for the release of additional opioids into the regions that are deficient.
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This restores the opiatergic “tone” (i.e., a standard level of endogenous opiate activity, 
presumed to be inadequate in such individuals) to an adequate level (Winchel & Stanley, 
1991). Consequently, the NSI is reinforced by the pleasant physiological changes 
produced by the release of endorphins and enkephalins. In line with this model, research 
has demonstrated a significant correlation between severity of NSI and the plasma levels 
of metenkephalins in self-injuring individuals (Winchel & Stanley, 1991). Thus there is 
evidence that the EOS is indeed involved in NSI at some level, although its specific 
contribution to this behavior has yet to be fully elucidated.
Research on pain-sensitivity in self-injurers, an area of biological research 
encompassing multiple neurobiological systems, has expanded beyond specific biological 
substrates to incorporate multi-systemic symptomatology. Specifically, diminished 
sensitivity to pain has also been examined as a potential explanation for chronic NSI 
(Walsh, 2006). When considering both adults and adolescents, approximately 47 to 60% 
of individuals who engage in NSI report analgesia when engaging in this behavior 
(Bohus et al., 2000; Nock & Prinstein, 2005).
Psychophysiological research on pain perception in self-injurers is an emerging 
line of inquiry. Thus far, both Russ and his colleagues (1992, 1994) and Bohus and his 
colleagues (2000) have found lower perception of aversive stimuli in self-injurers. Russ 
et al.’s (1992, 1994) studies examined perception of induced pain in NSI individuals who 
reported no pain during NSI. These researchers found that participants who reported no 
pain during NSI also reported substantially lower levels of pain than both pain-perceptive 
self-injurers and non-self-injuring controls. Additionally, Bohus et al. (2000) studied 
pain perception in self-injurers diagnosed with BPD versus non-clinical controls and
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found markedly diminished perception of pain during both distress and non-distress 
conditions in the BPD group compared to controls. When distressed, borderline 
participants’ pain threshold was even higher than in the non-distress condition (Bohus et 
al., 2000). While such biological studies of self-injurers are promising, and highlight the 
importance of psychobiological processes to NSI, further research is necessary before 
more firm conclusions can be drawn.
Cognitive Components
Walsh (2006) divides the cognitive dimensions of NSI into two categories: (1) 
cognitive interpretations of environmental events; and (2) self-generated cognitions. 
According to cognitive theory, an individual may experience environmental events as 
problematic when they perceived those events to be aversive (i.e., painful, 
overwhelming). This theoretical model further contends that the rationality of one’s 
cognitions also influences one’s perception of environmental events. For example, if one 
believes that they should have had control over an aversive or painful situation that they 
could not have realistically terminated or mitigated, then the already negative perception 
of the situation is likely to be exacerbated. Such cognitive appraisals, especially of 
oneself, can be a trigger for NSI. Self-generated cognitions occur without an identifiable 
external cue, and are presumed to be part of the reservoir of cognitions related to self and 
world. In self-injurers, these cognitions may frequently be derisive (e.g., “Today is going 
to be the worst day I’ve ever had, and tomorrow will be even worse.”). Cognitive theory 
suggests that these cognitions may then become part of one’s self-schema (i.e., the 
meaning-making ‘structure’ one uses to understand oneself), and as such may contribute
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to further vulnerability toward potential misinterpretation of environmental events, and 
thereby also NSI.
Over time, such thoughts can also become a discriminant stimulus for NSI 
through repeated pairing of specific thoughts, or thoughts related to a specific fear (e.g., 
failure, rejection, abandonment) with acts of NSI (Walsh, 2006). If the self-injurer 
responds to a specific cognition invariably by engaging in NSI, then that cognition itself 
may become a cue for self-destructive behavior by creating a strong association between 
the thought and the consequences of the behavior (e.g., relief of negative affect, help 
from others). This associative process may be explained by the following logic-path 
statement: i f  a, then b, and ifb  then c; then also, i f  a, then c. Therefore, an association 
may be made such that the self-injurer believes that when they experience the specific 
cognition (a), NSI is the only viable response (b), and that when they self-injure (b) there 
will be some sort of positive change (c) in the environment (e.g., through caring 
behaviors of others or reduction of aversive circumstances). The connection between (a) 
and (b) is made to achieve (c), which in turn reinforces (a). Such a cycle may explain the 
seemingly self-perpetuating cycle of aversive thoughts precipitating NSI frequently seen 
in self-injurers (Favazza, 1996; Walsh, 2006).
Affective Components
Negative affective states are believed to precipitate NSI because these states are 
perceived as overwhelming or intolerable. As noted earlier, it is also believed that NSI 
functions to ameliorate the distress caused by these affective experiences through a 
mechanism that is not yet clear. A variety of emotions may precipitate NSI episodes. It 
is reasonable to posit that all of these are negative in some way (e.g., depression, shame,
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guilt, anxiety/panic, anger). Many self-injurers report that their NSI functions to 
diminish feelings of distress related to negative affect (e.g., Liebenluft, Gardner, & 
Cowdry, 1987). This has been supported in more recent empirical research by Nock & 
Prinstein (2004, 2005) in samples of adolescents. Briefly, Nock & Prinstein (2004, 2005) 
reported one of the primary and most frequently reported reasons for NSI reported by 
self-injuring adolescent psychiatric inpatients was regulation of negative emotions. This 
research provides important preliminary support for the long-held hypothesis that 
regulation of emotional states is the underlying function of NSI. However, replication 
and further extension of this line of research in other population subsets is needed. 
Additionally, research examining the psychobiological correlates of this self-reported 
reduction in negative affect will provide important data regarding the mechanism by 
which such reductions take place.
Behavioral Components
The behavioral aspects of NSI, and moreover the functions of this behavior, are 
critical in understanding its course and the reasons for its chronicity. These functional 
aspects encompass each of the other components discussed above. Earlier literature 
attempted to explain NSI in behavioral terms by placing it into the framework of operant 
behaviorism. Carr (1977) proposed that, like any other behavioral pattern, NSI functions 
as an operant. As such, it is maintained via systematic reinforcement or punishment from 
the individual’s external or internal environment. Carr’s (1977) model specifically 
distinguishes between two modes of contingent behavioral maintenance: positive 
reinforcement and negative reinforcement. The positive reinforcement hypothesis 
proposes that NSI is maintained through positive (typically social) reinforcement.
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Positive reinforcement is generally provided through an increase in contact with, or an 
increase in the care exhibited by, others in the self-injurers life in response to the self- 
injury. This level of care and concern, or contact, may not be achieved outside of the 
context of episodes of self-injury, thus supporting a continuation and increase on the 
frequency of the behavior. Conversely, the negative reinforcement hypothesis suggests 
that the NSI is maintained though the termination or avoidance of a stimulus that the 
individual perceives as being aversive (Bennun, 1984; Carr, 1977). The escape from the 
aversive stimulus (e.g., an aversive emotional state or aversive life circumstances) 
follows the onset or completion of NSI, and leads to an increase in the behavior because 
of the escape that the behavior results in.
While the above model represents an early attempt to theoretically delineate the 
behaviorally-based functionality of NSI, recent empirical work has provided support for 
this contention. In their research on the functional dimensions of NSI in adolescent 
inpatients, Nock and Prinstein (2004, 2005) proposed a functional model of NSI, which 
posits that these behaviors may serve four functions: automatic-negative reinforcement 
(NSI functions to reduce the discomfort associated with a negative affect state); 
automatic-positive reinforcement (when NSI functions to induce some form of appetitive 
physiological state); social-negative reinforcement (when NSI functions to facilitate an 
individuals avoidance or escape from the demands of interpersonal interactions and 
relationships; and social-positive reinforcement (when NSI functions to facilitate contact 
between the self-injurer and others). These researchers found that the self-injurers in 
their sample were more likely to engage in self-mutilating behaviors when automatic 
and/or social reinforcement were available or provided, thus providing evidence
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consistent with the proposed functional model. Additionally, as noted by Walsh (2006), a 
multitude of events may precipitate an episode of NSI, including interpersonal conflict 
with peers or family, or substance use. Behavioral components of NSI may also include 
preparatory behaviors associated with NSI, such as deciding on the place, time, and 
method of NSI. All of these components may become strongly associated with acts of 
NSI, and thus precipitate a cascade of both internal and external events leading up to an 
NSI episode (Walsh, 2006). The findings of Nock and Prinstein (2004, 2005) therefore 
support the contention that environmental contingencies play a central role in NSI.
NSI tends to elicit rapid, and in some cases intense, reactions from others 
(Barstow, 1995; Clarke & Whitaker, 1998; Conterio & Lader, 1998; Favazza, 1998; 
Gallop, 2002). In the context of BPD, episodes of NSI may be associated with frequent 
and dramatic fluctuations between emotional polarities (Linehan, 1993 a). These 
fluctuations can engender an understandable desire for help of some kind, and NSI can 
elicit attention that may result in obtaining such assistance. Linehan (1993a) notes that 
the extreme behaviors exhibited by individuals with BPD are commonly engaged in as a 
way to “alert the environment to take better care of them” (Linehan, 1993a, p. 69). Here, 
“care” can be operationalized in behavioral terms as reinforcement. Therefore, the 
relationship between the individual and their environment in this context is 
simultaneously discordant and operantly reciprocal. In this respect, the paucity of 
reinforcement that the individual receives from their environment (the antecedent) 
precedes the NSI (the behavior), which in turn precipitates the desired attention 
(consequences), or social reinforcement. Outside of the context of BPD, this process may 
also be observed. If an individual who chronically engages in NSI perceives that
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reinforcement (i.e., attention) is generated primarily through self-injuring acts, then this 
sets the stage for a potentially long-standing learning paradigm. It should be noted that 
use of the word attention in this discussion is in the context of caretaking attention to 
neglected or abused emotional, psychological, or physical needs, and not in the context of 
manipulative attention-seeking behavior.
The preceding behavioral components of NSI only address the way in which the 
behavior is maintained, and not its onset. This component of the model may be explained 
by social learning theory (Bandura, 1977). Based on the operant behavioral principles 
discussed earlier, for any behavior to be acquired by an organism there must be an initial 
reinforcement of some form. Social learning theory, as applied to humans, maintains that 
children acquire their initial behavioral repertoire through observation of the behavior of 
primary caretakers (e.g., parents or others) early in the child’s life. These caretakers 
essentially function as behavioral models for a full range of behaviors, ranging from 
coping skills and strategies to interpersonal behaviors and emotional expression function 
as models for behavior the child. Research suggests that the forum for this initial 
schedule of reinforcement or punishment is quite often the childhood home environment 
of the individual (Birt et al., 1997; Linehan, 1993a; Green, 1978; Wolfe & Birt, 1997; & 
Wolfe & McEachran, 1997).
Consistent with Bandura’s (1977) model of social learning, Suyemoto (1998) 
contended in her review of the NSI literature that social learning leads to the acquisition 
of the behavior in one of two ways. One way is via the experience of abuse by a parent 
or primary caretaker during the individual’s childhood years. This abusive behavior 
provides a salient example of interpersonal interaction, which consists of caustic and
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maladaptive behaviors. The abused individual is then likely to interpret these behaviors 
as appropriate via social referencing, and will consequently replicate them. Second, 
through a classical conditioning paradigm, the individual’s model of care and nurturance 
is paired with aversive physical experiences such as pain and hostility, and aversive 
emotional experiences such as shame, guilt, and anger (Suyemoto, 1998). These two 
paradigms seem to work in concert to initially generate NSI via imitation of parental or 
caretaker behaviors, and then by reinforcing the behavior via regulatory effects (e.g., 
termination of dissociative states, reduced anxiety, attention to needs). This hypothesis is 
supported empirically by research that has demonstrated a positive linear relationship 
between child abuse and neglect and onset of NSI (Green, 1978; Wolfe & McEachran, 
1997).
It seems clear from the research discussed above that there is probably not one 
unitary factor to which the pathogenesis of NSI may be traced. One common thread 
among all etiological models for NSI, however, is that they acknowledge the contribution 
of emotions and emotional experiences to this behavior. Emotions have a clearly 
established role in the course of psychopathology. More specifically, research suggests 
that the regulation or dysregulation of emotions may be a prolific factor in the 
pathogenesis of multiple dysfunctional behaviors (e.g., Gross, 1998; Mennin, Heimberg, 
Turk, & Fresco, 2002). Furthermore, although NSI is more prevalent in some specific 
disorders, this behavior has been observed in a wide variety of psychopathologies. Given 
the commonality among etiological models of NSI (i.e., that NSI may function to regulate 
emotional states or drives) and the diversity of comorbid clinical presentations observed
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in NSI individuals, it may be reasonable to conclude that that NSI does indeed serve an 
emotional regulatory function.
Nonetheless, the available research suggesting a relationship between emotion 
regulation and NSI has been correlational. A review of the extant literature reveals no 
empirical studies that have attempted to establish causality in this posited relationship. 
One method of establishing a causal relationship is through examination of objective and 
observable markers of emotional regulation in self-injurers. Although emotion regulation 
is a multifaceted construct, there are psychobiological indices and analogues that may 
provide valuable information about individual emotion-regulatory capacities. The 
present study was predicated on the assumption that examination of these indices of 
emotion regulation in self-injurers would further our understanding of its role in NSI. In 
the following sections, research pertaining to emotion-regulation and psychobiological 
indices of emotion-regulation is reviewed.
Emotion and Emotion Regulation 
Emotion
Defining Emotion
Although earlier researchers propagated a view of emotions as states of neural 
activation that were situationally disruptive, and not specific to the situation (Hebb, 1949, 
Young, 1943), it seems clear now that emotional behaviors have developed as a function 
of evolutionary necessity. William James (1894) viewed emotions as behavioral and 
physiological response tendencies that functioned to allow a species to adapt to 
significant events across, and as part of, the evolutionary process. The behaviors 
associated with anxiety, anger, sadness, disgust, and happiness help to maintain the safety
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and integrity of the organism, and the survival of the species through their physiological 
and behavioral correlates (Gross, 1998).
More recent empirical and theoretical work is also indicative of the adaptive 
functions that emotions serve. Schwarz and Clore (1983) posited that emotions convey 
data to the organism regarding the current or ongoing fit between the organism and the 
environment. Ekman (1992) noted that emotions appear to address adaptive problems by 
conveying information to the organism regarding their current biological needs. Oatley 
& Johnson-Laird (1987) reported that emotions assist with the decision-making process, 
and Frijda (1986), citing decades of psychophysiological research, concluded that 
emotions facilitate the preparation of an individual for a quick motor response by 
activating the autonomic nervous system. In aggregate, empirical research supporting 
this adaptive activation process has found that emotional responses in humans include 
shifts in behavioral, experiential, autonomic, and neuroendocrine systems (see Lang,
1995 for a review).
Emotions may also be viewed as systemic processes, as suggested by Scherer 
(1994) in his discourse on “modal emotions.” Scherer’s model proposes that an emotion 
is a progressive series of interconnected and coordinated shifts in the states of an 
organism’s physiological systems and subsystems, which may include neural circuits, 
respiratory and circulatory systems, and digestive processes and systems as well. Such a 
shift occurs as a reaction to the organism’s assessment of internal or external stimulus 
events that bare direct relevance to the primary needs of the organism (Scherer, 1994, 
2000). For example, when an organism’s interface with its environment results in the 
organism being prevented from achieving a goal that is needed for survival (e.g., food),
31
the biological systems of the organism that require the goal’s attainment will serve a 
motivational function. In the case of food as the organismic need, the caloric and 
nutritional needs of the organism are biologically and genetically determined based on 
the functionality of those needs. Evaluation of whether a particular need is satiated is 
made by the organism’s biological systems through determining if the availability of the 
resource (e.g., calories) is sufficient to perform the necessary function (e.g., mobility, 
cognition). If the resources are not available or sufficient for the function of the system, 
the physiological systems and subsystems of the organism will work together to alter the 
organism’s behavior as needed to achieve the goal and satiate the need (e.g., directing 
attention to food-related stimuli; Mogg & Bradley, 1998). Although hunger is not 
considered an emotion (Wierzbicka, 1999), there may be labels given to the behaviors 
that accompany hunger (or other aversive drive states, such as pain) in some humans (e.g., 
irritability, anxiety, hostility, sadness), which in turn correspond to the changes in the 
physiological systems that have taken place to motivate the acquisition of food. It is the 
pattern of change that defines the emotion, and even minute variations may be indicative 
of actual differences in the organism’s emotional state.
Across species, emotional behavior may also be viewed as motivated behavior, 
especially in non-human animals and organisms. In this sense, motivation relates to 
action of some form, where the organism seeks to achieve a goal. This may take the form 
of the physiological reaction of an organism to a pleasant or aversive environmental 
change (Bradley, 2001), such as a threat from a predatory organism or the availability of 
a mating partner. In studies of animal behavior, motivated behavior is modulated by both 
direction (i.e., approach or withdrawal) and intensity (i.e., speed or strength of the
32
behavior), each of which vary as a function of the requirements of goal-attainment. In 
this vein, some researchers (Carver & Scheier, 1990) have proposed a view of human 
emotion as an index of the rate at which the current discrepancy between a particular goal 
and the realistic appraisal of one’s proximity to attaining that goal is reduced. Here, a 
positive emotion is indicative of more rapid reduction of the discrepancy, whereas 
negative emotion is indicative of a slower reduction than would be expected. Emotion 
regulation, discussed in subsequent sections, is essentially a derivative of one’s intention 
or action to reduce the discrepancy, but is not seen as an end-product itself.
In humans, such motivated behavior is referred to as emotional behavior, or more 
generally, emotion. While behavioral definitions of emotion facilitate theoretical 
understandings of this construct, there are numerous definitions that have been 
propagated throughout the history of emotion research. Although emotion may seem 
intuitively comprehensible (Bradley, 2001), an agreed upon definition has yet to be 
forwarded. Discussions of emotional behavior in humans are further complicated by the 
need to differentiate between the various temporal, intensiveness, and purposive facets of 
emotion. The differentiation typically required is between emotion, emotion episodes, 
mood, and affect. These constructs are interrelated, and sometimes used interchangeably 
(Gross, 1998); however, their separation may become important in describing the 
phenomenological and subjective emotional experiences of the individual.
An understanding of emotions and emotional experiences is integral to 
comprehending the full range of human behavior. Commonalities in human emotional 
behavior exist across cultures, albeit with different manifestations. It is possible that such 
manifestations are related to differences in cultural experience (Ekman, 1972), thus, the
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importance of taking into account cultural differences in emotion must be considered in 
both research and clinical settings (APA, 2000). In humans there may be cultural 
differences in the expression and elicitation of emotion, which have perhaps historically 
served adaptive functions. Research on emotion has revealed both intercultural 
commonalities and differences. While there appears to be general agreement between 
cultures in identifying the type of emotion being expressed, there are cultural differences 
in judgments about the intensity of the emotional or affective state (Ekman, 1987), as 
well as rules for emotional expression, emotional terminology, and self-reported 
emotional experiences (Matsumoto, 1990, 1993). Clear and consistent differences in 
norms for affective and emotional expression have also been observed between 
collectivistic and individualistic cultures (Eid & Diener, 2001). Moreover, the impact of 
emotions and emotional regulation on health has been found to differ across cultures 
(Consedine, Magai, & Horton, 2004), with higher levels of emotional expression and 
inhibition affecting individual health either beneficially or adversely through a cultural ly- 
dependent contingency. In aggregate, this research supports a view of emotions as being 
evolutionarily adaptive and universal. Viewed in the context of emotion regulation, the 
adaptivity of emotions denotes the evolutionary necessity and adaptiveness of emotion 
regulation. It is likely that a failure to upregulate or downregulate emotions when needed 
would not be germane to survival of most animal species. From an evolutionary 
perspective, emotion dysregulation may then be conceptualized as either a deregulation 
of psychobiological processes or initiation of maladaptive psychobiological processes in 
response to environmental demands. The characteristics, contributing factors, and 
manifestations of such psychobiological deregulation have yet to be explored empirically
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in the literature, and research in this area will be necessary to further our understanding of 
these processes.
Emotion, Mood, and Affect
Distinguishing the constructs of emotion, mood, and affect from one another is 
most commonly oriented toward developing a more accurate understanding of emotion 
through a more precise and comprehensive description of individual emotional 
phenomenology. There is at present no clear concurrence in the psychological literature 
on how to define an emotion, although many theories have been proposed (e.g., Mayer & 
Salovey, 1988; Cole, Martin, & Dennis, 2004). Thus separating emotion from mood and 
affect is challenging. Gross (1998) has differentiated these constructs in the following 
way. Emotions transpire and develop during a relatively limited time-frame, whereas 
emotional episodes extend across longer periods of time and sometimes across multiple 
facets of a given situation. Emotion and affect are sometimes used synonymously; 
however, affect is also sometimes used to describe the behavioral or experiential 
manifestations of an emotion. One common practice-generated depiction of emotional 
experience (e.g., APA, 2000) suggests that affect describes “emotional weather,” whereas 
the term “mood” is used to describe the more persistent or consistent “emotional 
climate.” Describing mood as the emotional climate (APA, 2000) portends a sustained 
and/or persistent state of emotional experience for an individual, which not only includes 
multiple aspects of a single situation, but is present across multiple situations. A further 
clarification proposed by both Davidson (1994) and Fiedler (1988) is that cognitive 
processes are more susceptible to the influence of moods than are actions.
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Earlier, Davidson (1994) differentiated between emotion and mood by stating that 
(1) moods are considered to be brief, whereas emotions are longer lasting; (2) emotions 
are thought to be accompanied by specific facial expressions, while moods are not; and (3) 
emotion is preceded by a readily recognizable antecedent event, whereas the antecedent 
precipitating a mood is not always apparent. Furthermore, emotions are thought to be 
experienced in response to antecedent events that are rapid and unexpected in their acute 
onset, whereas moods develop in response to longer-lasting, and slower progressing 
events.
The foregoing definitions of these constructs are useful on multiple levels. First, 
they help to unify the language by which researchers and clinicians alike describe the 
same emotional phenomena. Additionally, they clarify the constructs in some important 
ways. Most importantly perhaps, discussion of these constructs in terms of their temporal 
parameters and levels of intensity seems to point toward a functionally-based 
differentiation of these constructs. As noted above, a discussion of emotional processes 
and behaviors must incorporate a discussion of the functions they serve.
The Function of Emotions and Affect
Davidson (1994) has proposed that emotion differs from mood in function. 
Emotions occur during situations when some form of action is needed to facilitate the 
organism’s adaptation to the circumstances, with concomitant autonomic activity (e.g., 
arousal or suppression/reduction). Conversely, mood functions to modulate information­
processing and therefore also cognition; attention is directed more selectively to some 
cognitive content and limited to others.
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As noted earlier, Frijda (1994) has proposed that emotion has two aspects, each of 
which serves different functions. The first is the appraisal of events as relevant and either 
pleasant or unpleasant. This cognitive appraisal answers the question of whether an event 
needs to be attended to and acted upon to obtain a goal or protect the interests and 
integrity of the organism. The second aspect of emotion is the elicitation of a behavioral, 
physiological, and/or experiential response to the event, which is related to protective and 
survival functions within the organism. It is the functionality of these facets of emotion 
that highlights the important roles emotions serve.
Functionally, the appraisal of events as relevant/irrelevant, and pleasant/ 
unpleasant serves to alert the organism to the nature of an event relative to the organism’s 
own interests (e.g., safety). The event-appraisal aspect of emotions can be considered a 
relevance signaling mechanism, which proposes that an emotion is an index of 
comparison between an end-goal and the current state. Concordance and discord 
between an end-goal and current state is signaled to the action system by emotion. This 
model presupposes that generalized, flexible action plans are formulated by a 
combination of neural circuitry and learning history of the organism. This combination 
may be conceptualized as the organism’s action system. This system prepares and 
executes internal or external goal-oriented activity. The function of such preparatory and 
executive behavior is the remuneration of any discord or facilitation of further 
concordance.
The second aspect of emotion Frijda (1994) proposes is response elicitation. Here, 
emotion is viewed as a source of stimulation for initiating the behavior required to 
manage emotional events. Indeed, specific emotions directly relate to environmental
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events. Fear functions to initiate self-protection or to prevent the event from occurring or 
recurring through minimizing exposure or reducing activity until a threat is no longer 
imminent; anger functions to influence a threat or a threatening other to cease the 
threatening behavior. In this way, emotions function to influence or modify the 
interaction between individual and environment, but do not modify the environment itself.
The data and models discussed above are indicative of the importance of emotions 
and emotional behavior across, species, culture, and individuals. The explanations of 
emotional processes that have been forwarded in the literature thus far and their 
supporting data are of relevance to more than just academic discourse. Empirically based 
principles that govern emotional behavior, especially the regulation and dysregulation of 
emotion, could be applied to the modification of maladaptive manifestations of such 
behavior. NSI, which appears to be associated with states of emotional dysregulation 
(Linehan, 1993a), may be one such detrimental manifestation. Although there does 
appear to be an association between NSI and emotion dysregulation, the current literature 
contains only correlational evidence of such a connection. Further understanding of 
emotional regulatory processes is necessary. In the following section, models and 
supporting research for emotion regulation are reviewed.
Emotion Regulation and Dysregulation
The study of emotion regulation was preceded by the study of the human coping 
response to “stress.” The focus of this research was centered on the theory that 
organisms exhibit similar physiological responses to different stress-inducing stimuli, or 
“stressors” (Seyle, 1956). A stress response is viewed as an individual’s attempt to cope 
with a challenge, be it physical, psychological, or both. Coping has generally been
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conceptualized as a process involving cognitive and behavioral attempts at the 
modulation of both explicit exogenous and endogenous demands that are interpreted by 
the individual as subjectively strenuous or as extending beyond the limits of the 
individual’s available resources for handling the demands of the situation (Lazarus & 
Folkman, 1984). Research has identified different types of coping, distinguishing 
between “emotion-focused coping” and “problem focused coping” (Gross, 1998, p. 274). 
The former is aimed at reducing the intensity of a negative emotion, and the latter is 
aimed at solving a problem.
In conceptualizing coping as a stress response, and stress responses as attempts to 
regulate emotions elicited by internal or external stimuli, coping itself may be thought of 
as a form of emotion regulation. However, this description of emotion regulation is too 
simplistic to accurately characterize the processes of emotion regulation as it is 
understood today. It is important that a clear definition of emotion regulation and the 
underlying components involved in this process are established.
Defining Emotion Regulation
Emotion regulation has been defined and described in a multitude of works by 
various authors (e.g., Campos, Campos, & Barrett, 1989; Cicchetti, Ackerman, & Izard, 
1995 Fielder, 1989; Fox, 1994; Linehan, 1993a; Mayer & Salovey, 1995). Most recently, 
Cole and her colleagues (2004) forwarded an operational definition of emotion regulation 
as the changes that are associated with an activated emotion (regardless of what the 
activated emotion is) such as alterations in physiological functioning and overt behavioral 
changes. Such changes may also involve psychological mechanisms (e.g., cognitions) of 
the emotion itself. This conceptualization of emotion regulation views the emotion either
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as a regulator or as being regulated. Emotion as regulating involves changes that are due 
to the activated emotion (e.g., changes in the interpersonal environment resulting from 
the expression of anger or sadness). Emotion as regulated involves changes in the 
intensity, valence, and/or duration of the emotion that has been activated resulting from 
behavioral efforts by the individual including interpersonal (e.g., an individual engages in 
behavior that makes a sad friend smile), or intraindividual efforts (e.g., an individual 
engages in self-soothing behavioral or cognitive strategies). The paucity of data 
supporting this conceptualization of emotion regulation represents a gap in the extant 
literature.
Emotion Dysregulation and Psychopathology
The idea that dysfunctional or maladaptive emotion regulatory processes are a 
main component of psychopathology is a generally accepted and supported perspective 
among researchers (Gross, 1998). This development is reflected in recent theoretical 
work, which has adopted an emotion regulation framework for conceptualizing various 
psychological disorders such as Generalized Anxiety Disorder.
Deficits in emotion regulation can be seen as falling into one of two categories 
(Cicchetti, Ackerman, & Izard, 1995). One category is the inability to “downregulate” 
intense emotional experiences, the second category is difficulty with “upregulating” 
emotions. Difficulties with downregulating are characterized by a high frequency of 
emotional behaviors (e.g., facial expressions, verbalizations, gross and fine psychomotor 
behavior) related to the experience or expression of emotion that are disproportionate (i.e., 
in duration or intensity) to the eliciting stimulus. This problem is typically incurred due 
to an inability to effectively utilize self-soothing strategies. Difficulty with
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“upregulating” emotions or emotional behavior, involves the problematic, chronic 
suppression of emotional experience or expression. As discussed in subsequent sections, 
these difficulties have been identified by other notable researchers (e.g., Linehan, 1993a) 
as central to more severe forms of psychopathology relevant to the present study, such as 
Borderline Personality Disorder.
However, emotion dysregulation is not limited to the etiology of severe 
manifestations of psychopathology. Mennin, et al., (2002) propose an emotion regulation 
conceptualization of Generalized Anxiety Disorder. They posit that individuals with 
GAD experience emotions more intensely and more aversively than non-clinical 
individuals and that these negative emotions may be associated with aversive 
interpersonal consequences (e.g., rejection, isolation) that are difficult to understand or 
identify. The worry experienced by those with GAD may be conceptualized as a form of 
cognitive control, whereby the individual attempts to resolve the problematic experience 
by moderating these intense and aversive emotions. This pattern of cognitive functioning 
is typical in GAD, and is sometimes conceptualized as avoidance behavior.
The aforementioned cognitive pattern is common, though not endemic to GAD.
A similar pattern may be noted among individuals who engage in NSI. As an example, it 
has been demonstrated that NSI often occurs in response to intense negative emotional 
experiences, such as anger (Brown et al., 2002). It is plausible that NSI functions as a 
form of control, much like the worry in GAD, to resolve the aversive emotional 
experiences. However, in this strategy the individual attends to anxiogenic stimuli (i.e., 
the object of worry) rather than to the acute aversive emotional experience. This results 
in perseveration to the ineffective, anxiety-inducing stimulus as the only problem solving
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approach, which in turn leads to perpetuation of the anxiogenic sequelae. Furthermore, 
effective action-tendencies are blocked by avoidance of the aversive emotional 
experience. Failure to attend to aversive emotions may consequently lead to 
amplification of the emotional experience (i.e., the intensity and frequency with which 
neural impulses are transmitted) through an effort of the physiological protective 
mechanisms of the organism to modify the organism’s exposure to the perceived 
environmental threat. In short, failure to acknowledge the experience of a fear response 
(1) does not make it dissipate; and (2) does not negate the presence of the anxiogenic 
stimulus that engendered it. Consistent with this proposal, Mennin, et al. (2000) reported 
that those in their study who met criteria for GAD reported more intense experiences of 
emotions, as well as greater difficulties with acceptance, identification, and description of 
their emotional experiences. Self-soothing of negative emotions was also impaired in 
these individuals when compared to non-clinical controls, suggesting a further connection 
with poor regulatory control of emotions.
Further evidence for Mennin et al.’s (2002) model has been published in the mood 
induction literature. It has been demonstrated that individuals with GAD exhibit 
increased worry and anxiety-related autonomic responses, and decreased acceptance of 
current emotional states after exposure to anxiogenic auditory stimuli (e.g., music) than 
nonanxious controls (Mennin, 2000); and such individuals develop catastrophic worry 
more readily when negative mood is induced (Startup & Davey, 2001). Together, these 
lines of research provide evidence that emotion dysregulation may play a role in multiple 
forms of psychopathology beyond the context of BPD where it is most frequently 
discussed.
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Much of the psychopathology research literature on both emotion dysregulation 
and NSI has historically focused on Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD). Indeed, 
BPD is the only DSM disorder that is characterized explicitly by patterns of emotional 
dysregulation (APA, 2000), despite evidence for such dysregulation in other disorders 
(e.g., Mennin et al., 2002). Because of the high incidence rates of NSI in BPD patients 
(up to 80%, Zanarini et al., 2003), these two clinical phenomena are often portrayed as 
being inextricably linked. Anecdotal evidence suggests that NSI is sometimes viewed as 
a hallmark sign of BPD. Indeed, NSI has even been referred to as the “behavioral 
specialty” of individuals with BPD (Gunderson & Ridolfi, 2001). Recent literature 
(Zanarini et al., 2003), however, suggests that at least 20% of borderline individuals do 
not engage in NSI, and, moreover, that this behavior is not a stable trait across time in 
borderlines. Ergo, such stereotypical statements have not necessarily garnered empirical 
support.
Linehan’s (1993a) continuing work on the treatment of chronically suicidal and 
self-injuring borderline patients understands both BPD and NSI as a disorder of emotion 
regulation, with the NSI acting as an emotion regulation strategy. Linehan’s biosocial 
model presupposes that borderlines “are emotionally vulnerable” (Linehan, 1993a, p.43), 
that they lack the requisite skills to regulate their emotions, and that there are 
environmental factors that amplify this deficit and its manifestations. Based on this 
model, NSI may function as a method of changing subjective internal factors or 
environmental factors that are threatening to the individual’s emotional or physical 
integrity. Because many borderline individuals experience even low levels of emotional 
arousal as overwhelming, NSI may function as an acute, albeit maladaptive, intervention
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to reduce emotional arousal by disrupting physiological processes related to the 
generation of emotion. The sensations induced by NSI (whether aversive or merely novel) 
may direct attentional resources away from the acute stressor and toward a more pressing 
stimulus.
Borderline individuals also frequently report experiencing dissociation before, 
after, or during NSI episodes (Linehan, 1993a). Himber’s (1994) qualitative study of 
self-injuring female inpatients has provided one of the most detailed qualitative accounts 
of the subjective phenomenology of NSI in this respect. Specifically, 100% (n=8) of 
participants in this study reported experiencing dissociation in conjunction with NSI 
episodes. These experiences included “altered sensations, the sense of separateness from 
their bodies, memory disturbances and distortions in their agency” (Himber, 1994; p.
622). Dissociation may be reinforced by the amelioration of an acutely stressful stimulus 
through reduction of emotion-related neurotransmission below the perceptual threshold. 
Consequently, dissociation may be conceptualized as a method of downregulating an 
aversive emotional experience, although this phenomenon is sometimes reported to be 
aversive itself (e.g., Himber, 1994). The exact relationship between NSI and dissociative 
experiences has yet to be fully elucidated. Nonetheless, it is clear that there is a 
relationship between these two phenomena in at least a subset of self-injurers. Further 
research on this relationship may help to extend our understanding of NSI and its 
functions.
Altering the acute environmental stimuli that precipitate or perpetuate an aversive 
emotional experience is another function sometimes subserved by NSI. Environmental 
changes such as reduced acute demands of others or of situations may occur as a result of
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NSI through common consequences of this behavior, such as the seeking of requisite 
medical care for or by the self-injuring individual. In this way, the individual may reduce 
his or her exposure to an aversive stimulus (e.g., abdicating or transferring responsibility 
for self-care; removing oneself from responsibility of the activities of daily living) via 
admission to a hospital or other medical treatment facility. Furthermore, the individual 
may modify their emotional environment. In the case of BPD patients especially, NSI 
may function to elicit previously perceived unexpressed concern or care from relatives, 
friends, or partners. Similar to increasing tolerance in chemical dependency, increasingly 
extreme behaviors may be required to elicit the same responses from others that were 
initially educed by less severe actions. It is also this pattern of functioning that may 
contribute to self-injurers being erroneously viewed or categorized as borderline patients, 
with insufficient regard given to the actual idiographic clinical presentation. 
Psychobiological Aspects o f Emotion Regulation
The role of the central nervous system (CNS) in emotion regulation can be 
viewed as transpiring at multiple, sequential levels (i.e., the top-down processing model). 
The top-down processing model may be considered a transactional model in that the 
neural circuits and cortical pathways responsible for the regulation of emotional 
experiences interact with each other through perpetual bidirectional inhibitory and 
excitatory processes and responses. This top-down view also makes clear the 
simultaneously independent and interdependent nature of these central neural pathways. 
Different subsystems within the CNS may receive and process different incoming data 
(e.g., from the environment) or different parts of that data, or a singular set of incoming 
information may elicit diverse responses across different subsystems (Gross, 1998). The
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specific neural circuitry involved in emotion regulation remains unclear. However, Mega 
and Cummings’ (1994) model of subcortical activity regulation suggests that substrates 
found between the limbic structures and the prefrontal cortex imbue incoming 
information with “emotional meaning,” as well as serving a modulating function.
Neuroscience has advanced our understanding of emotion regulation to a great 
extent. From a strictly neurobiological perspective, emotion regulation takes place at the 
systemic level through reciprocal afferent/efferent projections across neural circuits. 
These cross-circuit projections facilitate reciprocal regulation of each system by the 
others. As discussed in subsequent sections, the hypothalamus is an integral structure in 
the neurobiology of emotion regulation. The hypothalamus, along with the brain stem 
exert regulatory influence on the cortex through specific neurotransmitter substrates (e.g., 
serotonergic, noradrenergic, and dopaminergic) and dispersion of neuropeptides (Tucker, 
Derryberry, & Luu, 2000). The actions of the brain stem are moderated by the limbic 
system, which simultaneously directs cortical resources (i.e., receptors in the cortex and 
prefrontal cortex) toward incoming stimulation from the environment (Lewis & Steiben, 
2004). Peripheral supportive evidence for this has also come from brain imaging studies 
of individuals with unipolar and bipolar depressive illnesses, who are thought to 
experience difficulties with emotion regulation in various forms.
The foregoing research indicates that mood disordered individuals exhibit 
irregular glucose metabolism and regional cerebral blood flow in the limbic system and 
prefrontal cortex (Baxter, Phelps, Mazziotta, Schwartz, Gemer, & Selin, 1985; Drevets et 
al., 1997; Mayberg, Lewis, Regenold & Wagner, 1994; Nobler et al., 1994; Soares & 
Mann, 1997), suggesting evidence of an association between pathophysiology in these
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regions and overt indices of emotion dysregulation. These systems work in concert to 
provide a continuous feedback loop through which evaluative decisions about emotional 
behavior are made rapidly and adjusted according to incoming sensory information and 
environmental demands. When a disruption in these systems is encountered, research 
indicates that typical regulatory functions cannot take place in the same efficient manner.
The prefrontal cortex has also been implicated in emotion regulation. The 
prefrontal cortex is responsible for regulating subsystems lower on the neural hierarchy 
by exerting an inhibitory influence on instinctive, or stereotypical, behavioral response 
repertoires. This inhibition allows for processing of current or new incoming stimulus 
information that is then used to formulate conscious and purposeful action (Tucker et al., 
2000). Some support for this proposed model of involvement of the prefrontal cortex has 
derived from lesion studies (Gross, 1998). Studies in which part of the prefrontal cortex 
is incised or ablated have found physical disruptions or ruptures in this structure in adult 
brains are associated with behavioral impulsivity and dysregulation of affect (Kolb & 
Taylor, 1990; Rolls, Homak, Wade, & McGrath, 1994; Stuss & Benson, 1986; Tucker, 
Luu, & Pribram, 1995). There is also research in the developmental literature (e.g., 
Dawson, Panagiotides, Klinger, & Hill, 1992; Diamond, 1991) suggesting that changes in 
the structure of the prefrontal cortex during infancy are associated with the appearance of 
signs of emotion regulation (e.g., self-soothing techniques). The prefrontal cortex, it 
seems, is integrally related to the capacity of an individual to upregulate or downregulate 
their emotional behavior.
A corpus of research has been conducted regarding the neurobiology of emotion 
regulation and dysregulation in mood disorders. Studies of psychological factors
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associated with emotional lability, such as impulsivity and aggression, which are partially 
attributable to serotonergic metabolites, specifically 5-hydroyindoleacetic acid (5-HIAA), 
further support the proposed biological underpinnings of these aspects of BPD (Skodol, 
Siever, Livesly, Gunderson, Pfohl, Widiger, 2002a). Additionally, research on mood- 
congruent learning, recall, retrieval, and judgment (cf. Mayer & Salovey, 1988 for a 
thorough review of this literature) provides further theoretical support for a role of 
emotion dysregulation in identity disturbance. If borderline individuals are unable to 
determine and label their mood or emotional experience due to lability or behavioral 
inconsistency, then retention, recall, and retrieval of items such as personal preferences 
may also prove difficult, and may influence their perception of experiences. Moreover, 
chronic negative affect and emotionality may leave the borderline individual more 
vulnerable to recall and cognitive magnification of the aversive aspects of personal 
experiences, thus perpetuating the cycle of negative emotions. It is logical to presume 
that such disruptions, if chronic, may contribute to oscillations between emotional 
extremes in an effort to attain emotional homeostasis. Whether that emotional stability is 
attained through healthy strategies such as mindfulness-based skills (Linehan, 1993b; 
Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 1999), or through maladaptive means such as NSI, varies 
from person to person. However, it is clear that underlying psychopathology is likely to 
complicate emotional-behavioral response tendencies.
In sum, emotion regulation seems to play a vital part in organismic survival 
through its role in the stress response. As research has documented, emotion 
dysregulation is associated with functional impairments that can impede survival. In 
humans, emotion dysregulation has been implicated as a key contributing factor for the
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development of a variety of forms of psychopathology, many of which are associated 
with NSI. Explanations for the role of emotion dysregulation have come from a variety 
of extant bodies of research, most recently the neuroscience literature base. The neural 
pathways of emotional regulation lie in the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenocortical axis, 
which is responsible for activating an organism’s biological response to environmental 
threats and stressors (Kandel, Schwartz, & Jessel, 2000; Lovallo & Thomas, 2000). 
Appropriate activation of these responses is adaptive and necessary; however, abnormal, 
or dysregulated, patterns of psychobiological response to stress (e.g., exaggerated or 
protracted stress responses) may be detrimental to the physical and psychological 
integrity of the individual in a number of ways as discussed earlier. It is unclear what the 
relationship of NSI is to emotion dysregulation. One method of examining this is 
through observation of the psychobiological stress response system in self-injurers. A 
review of this neural system is provided in the following sections.
Summary of Cortisol and Hypothalamic Pituitary Adrenocortical Axis Functions
The Adrenocortical System 
Hypothalamic-Pituitary-Adrenocortical Axis
At its most basic level, the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenocortical (HPA) axis is a 
neuroendocrine circuit (Zeigler & Herman, 2002). The relationship of this circuit to 
organismic functioning, however, is complex affecting psychological, physiological, and 
immunological processes. The HPA axis encompasses the adrenal gland, hypothalamus, 
and pituitary gland. Excitatory afferent nerve projections converge on this circuit from 
the hippocampus and the hypothalamic parvocellular paraventricular nucleus (PVN).
This circuit is responsible for regulating the secretion of glucocorticoids into the blood
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stream as a component of an organismic stress response. As part of this stress response, 
cortisol secretion increases in preparation for management of the stressor or threat. This 
stress response has been observed to be nearly identical, neuroanatomically and 
neurochemically, in both animals and humans (McGaugh & Cahill, 1997).
Biosynthesis and Functionality o f Cortisol
Cortisol is one of two known glucocorticoids, but is the only glucocorticoid 
produced in humans (Lovallo & Thomas, 2000). Cortisol is considered a lipophilic 
adrenal steroid, and has a low molecular weight (Kirschbaum, n.d.). Like other adrenal 
steroids, cortisol is biosynthesized from low-density lipoprotein (LDL) cholesterol. It is 
secreted in pulses that are modulated by the frequency and amplitude of pituitary-based 
secretions of adrenocorticotropin hormone (ACTH). The center of secretory modulation 
of cortisol lies in the neural triad of the hypothalamus, pituitary gland, and hippocampus. 
The impulse for secretion originates in the hypothalamic PVN, which houses a large 
number of neuronal cells specialized for the production of corticotropin releasing factor 
(CRF). CRF, an orexigenic neuropeptide, is transported to the anterior pituitary gland via 
the pituitary stalk (Vale, Spiess, Rivier, & Rivier, 1981). Pro-opiomelanocortin, a 
complex protein produced by corticotrophic cells in the anterior pituitary where CRF 
conjuncts, is subsequently broken down by the transported CRF into both beta-endorphin 
(an opioid agonist) and ACTH. These substances are then released into the bloodstream 
and commence circulation through the body. Circulation of ACTH permits its 
transportation to the adrenal cortex, at which point it stimulates cortisol synthesis; 
cortisol is consequently secreted into the bloodstream. This process occurs both in 
spontaneity and via stimulus-response paradigms (i.e., as a biological reaction to
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biochemicals or environmental stimuli; Kirschbaum & Helhammer, 1989; Van Cauter, 
1988).
The present study seeks to examine changes in salivary cortisol levels as an index 
of emotion regulation via its specificity as a biomarker of HPA axis functioning. A 
description of the molecular binding processes involved in the production and 
metabolism of cortisol is conducive to understanding the components of its distribution 
throughout the body. Understanding this binding process also elucidates the 
physiological mechanism by which cortisol is transported to saliva and is able to be 
measured therein. Cortisol shares a binding receptor with aldosterone (another adrenal 
steroid known as a mineralocorticoid). As noted by Arriza et al. (1997), this shared- 
receptor contributes substantially to the multifarious functions of cortisol in the human 
central nervous system (CNS). As described above, blood serves as the vehicle for the 
transportation and distribution of secreted cortisol, allowing it to penetrate all biological 
tissues. Upon secretion, most (approximately 90%) of the cortisol released binds to 
transcortin (also referred to as cortiocosteroid-binding globulin; CBG), albumin 
(Kirschbaum & Hellhammer, 1989), or to erythrocyte (red blood cell) membranes 
(Hiramatsu & Nisula, 1988). The majority of glucocorticoid receptors are located in the 
hippocampus, which is a primary point of corticoid regulation as well as the structure 
primarily responsible for the negative feedback component of glucocorticoid regulation 
(Jacobson & Sapolsky, 1991). This secreting-binding process leaves approximately 5- 
10% of cortisol unbound, or “free,” in circulation. Unbound cortisol is transported via 
the kidneys to the urinary tract and subsequently into urine. This unbound portion is also 
transported into saliva via the parotid gland (Lovallo & Thomas, 2000).
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There is consensus in the literature that effective adrenocortical system, or HPA 
axis, functioning is a prerequisite for healthy and adaptive responses to stress. This 
system responds to stressors through a tri-faceted pathway (de Kloet, 1991). This 
pathway begins with the pituitary gland and hypothalamus, which receive biochemical 
stimulation via neurotransmitters and neuropeptides. The limbic system conducts 
afferent and efferent neural messages between the hypothalamus and the cerebral cortex. 
Finally, the brain stem conducts internal and external (i.e., sensory) stimulation to the 
hypothalamus. Effective HPA axis functioning includes an ability to generate an 
elevation in cortisol at the onset of a threat or stressor (i.e., upregulation), as well as to 
initiate a decrease in cortisol production to facilitate a return to baseline levels at the 
termination of the threat or stressor (i.e., downregulation). Such functions are a necessity 
for adaptation to everyday life events through preparing the organism to negotiate the 
demands of the external or internal environment.
In this vein, Stansbury and Gunnar (1994) have noted that cortisol in the HPA 
axis acts in conjunction with other physiological systems to extract the energetic 
resources necessary for a response to environmental challenges. Cortisol also regulates 
the immunological system, the endogenous opioid system, and central and peripheral 
catecholamine systems (Kandel et al., 1991; Lovallo & Thomas, 2000) thereby 
facilitating the maintenance of poly-systemic homeostasis. Furthermore, the presence of 
both glucocorticoid and mineralocorticoid receptors in the amygdala, hippocampus, and 
hypothalamus suggests that, in addition to ACTH and CRF, cortisol’s neural-hormonal 
activity also influences emotional functioning, memory, and learning processes (Lovallo 
& Thomas, 2000; Stansbury & Gunnar, 1994).
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The preceding description contributes to the conceptual basis the present study in 
that receptor location is related to receptor activity, that is, a receptor’s activity will affect 
(i.e., facilitate or impede) the functioning of the area of the brain in which it is located 
(Kandel et al., 1991). The cortisol and mineralocorticoid receptors in the amygdala are 
likely to affect emotional functioning and emotional behavior. Researchers have posited 
that the effects of glucocorticoids are facilitated by the actions of glucocorticoids on 
steroid receptors in the reticular formation of the brain stem (Stansbury & Gunnar, 1994). 
Moreover, research suggests that when glucocorticoids are elevated in stress-response 
quantities, there are definitive effects on hippocampal functioning, such as delayed and 
immediate recall (Lupien et al., 1998). There are transitory decreases in long-term 
neuronal potentiation, which may be connected with variability in working memory 
functioning (e.g., variability observed diumally and at post-stress intervals). Additionally, 
there is evidence that hippocampal neurogenesis is inhibited, and that dendritic 
degeneration may occur (Lovallo & Thomas, 2000; Lupien et al., 1998; McEwen, 1997). 
The degradation of neural pathways through dendritic degeneration may impede the 
process of regulating the functions served by those pathways.
Factors Affecting Cortisol Secretion
Research has established that cortisol is secreted in a diurnal cycle (i.e., circadian 
rhythm) regulated by the hypothalamic suprachiasmic nuclei, which is dependent on 
ACTH secretion (Stansbury & Gunnar, 1994). Within the diurnal cycle, the peak in basal 
cortisol secretion occurs during the last few hours of nocturnal somnolence until 
approximately 30 minutes after awakening, exhibiting an increase from daytime baseline 
of 50-100% (Schmidt-Reinwald et al., 1999; Wust et al., 2000). There is remarkable
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intra-individual consistency in this pattern of secretion, indicating that cortisol may be a 
preferred index of HP A axis functioning (Pruessner et al., 1997; Schmidt-Reinwald et al., 
1999). Research has revealed that this rhythm emerges around three months of age in 
humans, and is fully attained by approximately two years of age (Stansbury & Gunnar, 
1994).
Despite the documented stability of cortisol secretory rhythm, there are some 
additional physiological conditions which may alter the typical pattern of cortisol 
secretion across the diurnal cycle. These include both pregnancy and ingestion of oral 
contraceptives. Both of these conditions alter the synthesis of CBG in the liver, such that 
higher levels of this substance are produced, thus making available a greater supply of 
CBG for cortisol to bind to. Because the liver is unable to metabolize cortisol molecules 
that are CBG-bound, cortisol levels in plasma are elevated. Nonetheless, the available 
research on cortisol levels in pregnancy has historically been mixed at best.
Earlier researchers reported null findings in comparisons of cortisol assays for 
pregnant versus non-pregnant women (Guechot et al., 1981, 1982; Landon et al., 1984; 
Peters et al., 1984). However, more recent research (Nierop, Bratsikas, Klinkenberg, 
Mater, Zimmerman, & Ehlert, in press) indicates that women in the third trimester of 
pregnancy exhibit higher baseline levels of salivary cortisol and a greater degree of 
cortisol reactivity compared to those in the second trimester and non-pregnant women. 
Furthermore, this research suggests that cortisol recovery time (i.e., time required for 
return to baseline levels) was significantly protracted for women in the second trimester 
of pregnancy compared to non-pregnant women, although it did not differ significantly 
from that observed in third trimester women. These findings partially buttress earlier
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reports in the literature (e.g., Bustamante & Crabbe, 1984; Stahl & Doemer, 1982; Vining 
et al., 1983) of elevated cortisol levels during the third trimester. Kirschbaum and 
Hellhammer (1989) contend that such elevations are the result of biomolecular supply 
and demand principles. An increase in plasma progesterone levels occurs during both 
pregnancy and oral contraceptive intake, leading to an increase in the number of 
molecules (of cortisol and progesterone) competing for the same CBG and target cell 
binding sites. Hence, there is greater bio-demand, but unchanged bio-supply, creating a 
circumstance in which some molecules are naturally excluded from the binding process 
and remain unbound.
In addition to physiological factors, psychosocial factors such as socioeconomic 
status, educational level, and ethnic origin also appear to influence the secretion of 
cortisol. Bennet, Merritt, and Wolin (2004) examined waking cortisol peak (30 minutes 
after awakening) and baseline levels in 63 non-Hispanic Caucasian and African 
American males and females. These researchers also examined the independent 
contribution of educational level on cortisol variation. After adjustment for education 
and managerial status, results indicated that higher levels of cortisol secretion were found 
in Caucasians. Additionally, those with higher levels of education had significantly 
higher cortisol peak levels after adjustment for ethnicity and BMI. Bennet et al. (2004) 
further reported no significant between-groups differences in overall cortisol secretion for 
the Ethnicity x Education interaction. However, additional analyses revealed that African 
Americans with lower educational levels had significantly lower cortisol levels at 
awakening than any other group (i.e., lower educated Caucasian, higher educated 
Caucasian, and higher educated African American). After 30 minutes, however, lower-
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educated African Americans were only significantly different from higher-educated 
Caucasians; whereas lower-educated Caucasians were now significantly different from 
higher-educated Caucasians. All significant interactions and non-significant differences 
remained after controlling for perceived level of stress. The source of these differences is 
not clear, and these findings must be replicated before any conclusions may be drawn. 
However, these findings are of relevance to present research in that the population from 
which the sample was drawn was comprised of generally homogenous ethnic origins (i.e., 
European).
Cortisol and Psychological Stress
Inconsistent and contradictive findings within the literature have made the utility 
of cortisol as a biomarker for psychological stress somewhat unclear. Some researchers 
(e.g., Hjortskov, Garde, Orback, & Hansen, 2004) have suggested that such 
inconsistencies may be the result of substantial variability in (1) types of psychometric 
instruments used to assess mental stress; (2) study design, or design-related issues (e.g., 
controlling for extraneous variables such as oral contraceptive use); or (3) choice of 
cortisol derivative used in statistical analyses.
In their brief review of the literature, Hjortskov et al. (2004) examined studies that 
included both cortisol and measures of self-reported psychological stress. The authors 
identified 73 studies, of which 14 met stringent criteria for inclusion in their review. 
Hjortskov et al. (2004) set an a priori criterion of 75% agreement between all studies as 
being indicative of consistency of evidence for or against a relationship between cortisol 
and self-reported psychological stress, with anything less than 75% being indicative of 
ambiguity. Four studies (27%; i.e., Ockenfels et al., 1995; Schulz et al., 1998; Steptoe,
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Cropley, Griffith, & Kirschbaum, 2000; Zeier, 1994) reported a positive relationship, and 
two studies (13%; i.e., Steptoe et al., 1998; Yang et al., 2002) reported a negative 
relationship. Eight studies (60%), however, (i.e., Burton et al.,1996; Evans & Steptoe, 
2001; Fischer et al., 2000; Fischer et al., 2002; Fox, Dwyer, & Ganster, 1993; Hanson, 
Maas, Meijman, & Godaert, 2000; Pruessner et al., 1999; van Eck et al., 1996) reported 
no relationship. The authors concluded that there are several reasons why a clear 
relationship between cortisol and self-reported stress may not be discernible at present. 
For example, in addition to design and procedural explanations, many studies of stress 
and cortisol relationships have examined work-related stress and/or stressors, or have 
examined cortisol response to on-demand performance of mental tasks (e.g., mental 
arithmetic). Some researchers (cf. Adam & Gunnar, 2001; Frankenhauser et al., 1986) 
have posited that there is a prerequisite level of stress required for activation of the HPA 
axis, which would likely not be met by common work-related stress. Operating from this 
theory base, the low to moderate mean levels of stress reported in many of the studies 
evaluated by these authors would have been insufficient for HPA axis activation 
(Hjortskov et al., 2004).
It is clear that a basic question must be asked regarding whether or not cortisol is 
a valid index of stress. Based on the research described above, it may be reasonably 
postulated that there is a relationship between psychological stress and cortisol levels. 
However, this research does suggest that there is potentially a threshold at which cortisol 
secretion is activated and/or elevated. It is possible that individuals who experience 
chronic emotional or psychological stress develop a lower threshold for cortisol 
activation over time in response to that stress. It is also possible that individuals who
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utilize maladaptive coping strategies for handling stress, such as NSI, have an inherently 
lower threshold for cortisol activation, thus leading to a cortisol response that is 
exaggerated in either intensity, duration, or both.
Cortisol and Psychopathology
Research over the past two decades has provided consistent evidence of a 
relationship between various clinical disorders and cortisol. It is important to note that 
the relationship between cortisol and psychopathology is not exclusive, but rather is a 
function mediated by HPA axis disruption or functionality (e.g., Davidson et al., 2002). 
Cortisol is not considered a precipitant of psychopathology, but is an index of systemic 
dysfunction that may be associated with, or manifested in, various forms of psychological 
disturbance. However, chronic elevation and inhibition of cortisol may be a perpetuating 
factor for psychopathology in that these endocrinological states have the potential to 
produce adverse immunological and physiological effects (e.g., immunodeficiency, 
parasomnia, anxiety, and other stress-related health problems). Such effects have clear 
implications for psychological functioning as well.
There is a relatively strong literature base that links cortisol levels with some 
forms of psychopathology, particularly among individuals with depression or anxiety 
disorders. Clinical research on the relationship between cortisol and psychological 
functioning first centered on depressed patients (Stansbury & Gunnar, 1994).
Aggregated research of the relationship between cortisol and depression has indicated 
that, when compared with non-clinical individuals, depressed individuals exhibit inflated 
cortisol responses to stimulation of ACTH and higher plasma and urinary levels of free 
cortisol secretion during diurnal rhythmic secretion periods (Davidson, Lewis, & Alloy,
58
2002; Drevets, Price, Bardgett, Reich, Todd, & Raichle, 2002; Garlow, Musselman, & 
Nemeroff, 1999). With few exceptions (Birmaher et al., 1996), it is now well-established 
that there is a disruption of HP A axis functioning in mood disorders. This is perhaps 
most prolific in Bipolar Disorder (Young, 2004), as evidenced by higher basal levels of 
cortisol, and suppression failure in dexamethasone suppression tests (Carroll, 1981). It is 
posited that HPA axis disruption is the result of a dysregulation in the reciprocal 
connective mechanisms of the HPA axis, where depressed individuals do not exhibit 
suppression of precursor hormones when administered cortisol exogenously (Young et al., 
1991). Several studies also suggest that a pattern of HPA axis hyperactivity may 
precipitate disruption of the feedback mechanism in depressed patients (Davidson et al., 
2002; Soares & Mann, 1997; Young, 2004), such that hypercortisolemia develops, 
creating a psychoneuroimmunological vulnerability in these individuals. Similar 
adrenocortical disruptions may also be associated with other related and frequently 
comorbid disorders, such as Anorexia Nervosa (Stansbury & Gunnar, 1994). Thus, there 
is evidence that disorders in which dysregulation of emotional and emotion-related 
behavior are present may be characterized by a common theme of abnormal 
psychobiological stress responses.
While the literature pertaining to mood disorders is relatively clear, that pertaining 
to other forms of psychopathology is mixed (Heim & Nemeroff, 2001). For example, 
Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (OCD) patients have been shown to exhibit basal 
hypercotisolemia. However, Panic Disorder patients tend to exhibit normal basal levels 
of cortisol (Heim & Nemeroff, 1999), whereas those diagnosed with Posttraumatic Stress 
Disorder (PTSD) have been shown to exhibit hypocortisolemia (Yehuda, 2000). There
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has been a failure to replicate this latter finding in earlier studies by other researchers 
(Lemieux & Coe, 1995; Maes et al., 1998), despite recent supporting evidence from 
Neylan et al. (2005), who found that PTSD symptom severity significantly predicted 
lower pre-dexamethasone awakening cortisol levels in traumatized police officers. 
Furthermore, Gerra et al. (2000) reported increases in ACTH levels but not cortisol levels 
in children diagnosed with GAD who were exposed to an anticipated laboratory stressor, 
thus contributing further ambiguity to an already equivocal literature.
Perhaps of greatest relevance to the present study is a nascent line of research 
(currently consisting of a single case study) examining salivary cortisol in NS1 among 
individuals with BPD. In a brief report presented as a letter-to-the-editor, Sachsse, von 
der Heyde, and Huether (2002) described the diurnal cycle of urinary cortisol secretion in 
a female borderline patient. This case study revealed an atypical pattern of cortisol 
excretion in this patient, characterized by substantial fluctuations in nocturnal excretion; 
her mean nocturnal excretion was also lower than normative levels. Interestingly, a 
pattern of excretion and correlated behavior emerged such that periods of consistently 
low nocturnal secretions were followed by periods of consistent elevations in cortisol 
excretion; excretion levels above 20 nanomolecules/liter were associated with NS1 
episodes that involved “one or more acts of self-mutilation” (Sachsse et al., 2002, p. 672). 
Immediately following the NSI episode, nocturnal urinary cortisol levels returned to the 
lower end of her baseline measurements and remained at this level for “several days.” 
This small case example represents the first attempt to investigate the relationship 
between NSI and biological indices of stress regulation. Expansion of this line of inquiry 
in much larger samples is necessary for this relationship to be elucidated.
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The research cited above provides important supporting data for the premise that 
dysregulation of emotion is an integral component of psychopathology. Evidence from 
neuroendocrinological studies has revealed consistent differences in HPA axis 
functioning of individuals with mood disorders, which are commonly and frequently 
characterized by disruption of typical emotional processes and behavior. NSI is a 
characteristic that is found in many forms across the spectrum of clinical disorders.
There appears to be an association between dysregulated emotional behavior and the 
occurrence of NSI, however to date only correlational evidence exists. More empirical 
approaches to examining the relationship between NSI and emotion dysregulation are 
needed. One such approach is observation of psychobiological correlates of the human 
stress response (e.g., cortisol) after initiation of the stress response system. Stress 
induction has been conducted in laboratory procedures for over five decades in stress- 
related research, and has evolved in effectiveness over that time. The following section 
reviews the research documenting the development of various stress-induction 
procedures, as well as the evidence for their effectiveness with various populations.
Salivary Cortisol and Stress Induction
Research using animal models lends support to the hypothesis that there could be 
stressor specific paths to cortisol secretion (see Weiner, 1992). In their recent meta­
analysis, Dickerson and Kemeny (2004) proposed a theory of cortisol response that is 
rooted in a social self-preservation system. The function of this system is to continuously 
monitor the individual’s environment for threats to their social esteem or social status. 
This system coordinates psychological, physiological and behavioral responses to
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manage these threats through specific biological processes including activation of the 
HPA axis.
In their proposal of the social self-preservation system, Dickerson and Kemeny (2004) 
provided a thorough review of the stress-induction and cortisol secretion literature base. 
Their review revealed that the type of stressor as well as the degree of control participants 
had over the stressor were the factors with the greatest influence on cortisol secretion. 
Dickerson and Kemeny (2004) compared the effects produced on cortisol secretion by 
different types of laboratory stressors in different quantities (i.e., some studies included a 
single stressor; some included two or more stressors). In aggregate, the data in this 
literature base pertaining to stress induction and salivary cortisol suggests that conditions 
that included social-evaluative threat, (i.e., where performance was captured on 
permanent record, an evaluative audience was present, or a person offering negative 
social comparisons was present) is associated with significantly higher effect sizes for 
cortisol responses. Specifically, both conditions with and without social evaluative threat 
(SET) elicited significant cortisol increases. However, conditions with SET produced 
significantly greater cortisol increases than those without. Additionally, different 
numbers of types of SET resulted in progressive increases in effect size for cortisol 
responses. In an applied sense, larger effect sizes translate to a stronger cortisol response. 
Studies with a single SET type (e.g., person offering negative social comparisons, 
performance captured on videotape) produced an effect size of 0.23, while those with two 
SET types produced and effect size of 0.86. These differences suggest a dose-dependent 
relationship of sorts, with a higher number of SET stressors being associated with a more 
substantial effect. Qualitatively, the presence of an evaluative audience and negative
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social comparison both yielded higher effect sizes than inclusion of a videotape 
component; and the presence of an evaluative audience was equivalent to a negative 
social comparison (p= 0 .2 0 ).
Furthermore, data from the Dickerson and Kemeny (2004) study indicated that 
controllability was strongly related to cortisol responses. Cortisol responses for 
uncontrollable tasks produced a larger effect size (d=0.52) than controllable tasks 
(^=0.16; p< 0.01). However, there appears to be no progressive increase in effect size 
with the inclusion of multiple uncontrollable elements, suggesting little if any advantage 
of adding additional uncontrollable elements (p=0.18). SET was not significantly 
different from uncontrollability (p >0.20) for predicting cortisol response, suggesting that 
these are both significant independent predictors. SET combined with uncontrollability 
accounted for 26% of variance in cortisol after time of day was controlled for, and 
represented a significant increase beyond time of day alone (p<0.01).
Dickerson and Kemeny (2004) also reported that neither motivated performance tasks 
(active performance tasks with the potential for evaluation along a self-relevant domain) 
nor passive performance tasks alone without SET or uncontrollability elicited significant 
cortisol responses. However, experiments that involved a motivated performance task 
combined with both SET and uncontrollability yielded the largest effect size (d=0.92). 
Moreover, motivated performance tasks combined with SET and uncontrollability 
yielded a higher effect size than motivated performance tasks with ether of these 
elements alone. Hence, the combined SET-uncontrollable condition resulted in the 
highest effect size of any condition. Statistical analyses suggested that SET and
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uncontrollability mediated the relationship between stressor task category and cortisol 
response.
Taken together, this examination of the relative importance of specific factors of 
laboratory stressors (as related to cortisol secretion) revealed that both the perception of 
the controllability of the stressor by the participant, as well as the type of stressor 
administered, are crucial. Moreover, the analysis provided by Dickerson and Kemeny 
(2004) strongly indicate that combining these factors in the right permutation, such that a 
stressor is both perceived as uncontrollable and is socially evaluative will produce a 
cortisol response that is nearly a full standard deviation above the mean resting level. 
Congealed, these data permit the conclusion that there is evidence of the effectiveness of 
laboratory stressors in producing strong cortisol responses. Finally, the results of 
Dickerson and Kemeny’s (2004) analysis delineate a prudent route for future research 
involving induced stress with salivary cortisol as an outcome measure.
In addition to cortisol response, Dickerson and Kemeny (2004) examined the pattern 
of post-stressor cortisol responses. In aggregate, research indicates that cortisol levels are 
two times higher during the period of 0-20 minutes post-stressor than 21 -40 minutes, and 
continued to decline at 41 -60 minutes post-stressor. Across studies, cortisol responses 
were significantly higher than baseline during the 0-20 minute and 21-40 minute periods, 
but not at 41-60 minutes post-stressor.
During the 0-20 minute post-stressor period, performance tasks combined with SET 
and uncontrollability elicited significant cortisol response (c/=0.85). Furthermore, 
performance tasks combined with either SET or uncontrollability alone also elicited a 
significant cortisol response (d= 0.25). A significant elevation in cortisol was still present
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during the 21-40 minute post-stressor period for performance tasks combined with SET 
and uncontrollability (rf=0.74; /?<0.01). However, performance tasks combined with 
either SET or uncontrollability alone no longer elicited a significant cortisol response 
(d=0.0S). Finally, a significant cortisol elevations remained significant during the 41-60 
minute post-stressor period for performance tasks combined with SET and 
uncontrollability (d= 0.28; p<0.05); and performance tasks combined with either SET or 
uncontrollability alone remained non-significant (t/=-0.21).
In sum, the duration of a laboratory stressor does not appear to predict effect sizes of 
cortisol responses at any of the three intervals. The inclusion of a socially evaluative and 
uncontrollable component seems to have an impact on the recovery process, as well as on 
the magnitude of the initial cortisol response. However, the persistence of cortisol 
elevations after a combination SET uncontrollable task is mostly the result of the greater 
peak response they produce. In consideration of these data, it may be inferred that those 
laboratory stressors that yield the most robust initial cortisol responses would include 
both a social-evaluative component and an uncontrollability component. Furthermore, it 
may be inferred that there is indeed a relationship between an initial cortisol response and 
the duration of the cortisol response (i.e., the amount of time required for cortisol to 
return to a level that is not significantly different from baseline).
There are a number of potential alternative explanations for these results that exist 
and which must be considered before any firm conclusions may be drawn. As noted by a 
number of researchers (e.g., Egger, Davey, & Smith; Field, 2003; Thompson & Pocock, 
1991), such potential explanations relate to a number of concerns regarding the 
trustworthiness of meta-analytic procedures. First, it is possible that artifacts of the
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studies, or the construct under investigation, contributed to the effects reported. In the 
case of laboratory-induced stress and its effect on salivary cortisol, sources of artifact 
may include the subjective distress experienced by the participants in the studies, the 
reliability of the instrumentation and measurement Additionally, publication bias, in 
which meta-analysts select only publications from peer-reviewed journals and exclude 
dissertation research and studies presented at conferences, may exaggerate effects by 
precluding the inclusion of research that revealed null results. This bias toward 
publication of only significant results (i.e., the “file-drawer” problem) exhibited by both 
researchers (Dickersin, Min, & Meinert, 1992; Rosenthal, 1979) and editors (Hedges, 
1984) has been noted for over two decades. Omission of unpublished research may 
indeed affect the results of aggregated data, as this data may produce effects that are 
substantially lower than that of published research (Shadish, 1992). The methodology 
employed for a meta-analysis is another factor that may influence effect sizes. A full 
review of approaches to meta-analysis is beyond the scope of this critique; however, 
research indicates that effects may be inflated due to varying control of Type I error rates 
depending on the number of studies included in the analysis (Field, 2000). It is important 
that meta-analytical researchers address these concerns statistically, and report them in 
their results to allow evaluation of the procedural soundness.
These potential confounds were addressed by the authors in their description of the 
methodology they employed. Additional analyses from the Dickerson and Kemeny 
(2004) meta-analysis indicated that participants’ distress ratings were not a significant 
predictor of cortisol response effect size, suggesting that these were independent of 
social-evaluation, type of task, and controllability factors. Additionally, it is unlikely that
66
publication bias contributed to these results, given that both peer-reviewed and 
unpublished dissertations were included in the analyses; and publication status was not a 
significant predictor of cortisol response effect size. Dickerson and Kemeny (2004) also 
analyzed the contribution of authorship to the effects due to a large number of studies 
deriving from a single laboratory. Results revealed that although Kirschbaum and 
Hellhammer authored 9% of the studies in this meta-analysis, authorship did not predict 
cortisol response effect size significantly when controlling for time of day and type of 
stressor.
The authors’ description of their selection, instrumentation, and measurement 
methodology indicates that there was substantial consistency in the sample and 
methodological characteristics; all studies included in the analysis used “healthy” 
participants, and all used salivary cortisol as an outcome measure. Studies in the meta­
analysis were differentially coded for time of day to allow for ANCOVA to be conducted 
with this factor as a covariate. Finally, the methodology employed for conducting this 
meta-analysis has been demonstrated in statistical simulation research (Field, 2000) to be 
equivalent in its control of the Type I error rate when large samples (100 or more) are 
used; Dickenson & Kemeny (2004) report an n of 208 studies. Evaluation of the way in 
which the authors addressed the factors that may mitigate the results of a meta-analysis 
suggest a sound and empirically-supported scientific methodology was employed based 
on the best statistical technology currently available. Thus, it is reasonable to conclude 
that the results of the Dickerson and Kemeny (2004) meta-analysis are valid. The 
soundness of the meta-analysis as determined by the present methodological evaluation
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also speaks to the applicability of these results to research paradigms involving the 
investigation of salivary cortisol and laboratory stressors.
The Present Study
There is a substantial corpus of research comprising the NSI and emotion 
regulation literatures. The emotion-regulation model of NSI is one of the most widely 
accepted hypotheses; however, this model is supported primarily by self-report anecdotal 
accounts of the phenomenology of self-injurers. While the nature of this evidence does 
not discount its validity, a better understanding of the mechanisms underlying the 
emotional dysregulation experienced and reported by self-injurers is necessary.
Elucidating the psychobiological stress response of self-injurers may provide 
empirical support that is critically needed for the emotion regulation model of NSI.
Much of the phenomenology of NSI and self-injurers does appear to point toward the 
validity of an emotion regulation hypothesis. Corroborating data from an alternative 
source is necessary for progress to be made in the further development and refinement of 
this approach to understanding NSI. Aggregated supportive data for the emotion 
regulation model may prove to be invaluable to the development of new and more 
specific psychobiologically-based treatment modalities. A better understanding of the 
biological aspects of the emotional response system will contribute data that could 
potentially be applied in both psychotherapeutic and psychopharmacological modalities. 
To the knowledge of the primary investigator, there is no published research examining 
the psychobiological effects of acute emotional distress in self-injurers.
An effective investigation of psychobiological factors involved in emotion 
regulation necessitates that both the requisite theoretical foundation for such research has
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been developed based on empirical data, and that the requisite technology be available for 
such scientific inquiry. The research summarized in the preceding sections has 
established that both of these criteria have been met by the current body of literature.
First, research pertaining to NSI has progressed substantially over the past two decades.
A number of explanatory models have been forwarded, ranging form drive-based 
psychodynamic, to behavioral contingency, and, of course, emotion regulation models of 
this phenomenon. When considered together, a common theme of regulation, particularly 
self-regulation, emerges from these models. This theme is echoed by clinical self-reports 
of many self-injurers as well as empirical research using psychometric measurements 
(Linehan, 1993a; Nock & Prinstein, 2004; Walsh, 2006).
The second component of the present thesis, emotion regulation, has also received 
substantial attention in the past two decades (Gross, 1998). Models of emotion regulation 
have also been developed during this time, and appear to have congealed into a 
psychobiological information-processing model, which contends that physiological and 
environmental stimuli inside of and external to the individual are evaluated on an 
ongoing basis. This model submits that these stimuli and responses are incorporated into 
a template for satiation of the needs of the individual. Emotional behavior, and its 
physiological correlates, reflect the modification of the individual’s response to such 
incoming information, and are thereby regulated via this evaluative process. Research 
from the field of neuroscience, as well as emotion regulation in general, supports the 
contention that there are psychobiological indices of emotion regulation that are 
observable in the aforementioned correlates (Kandel et al., 1991; Lovallo & Thomas, 
2000). The culmination of such research indicates that the HPA axis and its afferent and
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efferent projections are the core o f emotional functioning and stress responses in the 
brain (Gross, 1998; Lovallo & Thomas, 2000).
Furthermore, a prolific quantity of research has amassed documenting the 
correlation between levels of stress and secretion of glucocorticoids as part of a 
physiological response to stress initiated by the HPA axis. Research has identified 
cortisol as the primary glucocorticoid involved in this HPA axis response to stressors 
(Kirschbaum & Hellhammer, 1989, 1994). This research has also established that the 
level of unbound cortisol found in saliva is a valid estimate of plasma levels of cortisol 
(Yao, Moss, & Kirillova, 1998). The data from these lines of research indicate that the 
technology to evaluate HPA axis functioning via the cortisol response indeed exists and 
is translatable into clinical research.
With regard to measurability of psychobiological markers of emotion regulation, 
the stress-response and general psychophysiological research literatures support the 
contention that effective technology exists. There is ample research suggesting that 
saliva-based biological samples of multiple hormones (e.g., cortisol, progesterone, 
testosterone) are accurate estimates of plasma levels of these biochemicals (Kirschbaum 
& Hellhammer, 1989, 1994). Advances in biological sample assaying methodology have 
also been developed aggressively over the past 10 years, permitting greater precision in 
cortisol measurement particularly. The radioimmunoassay procedure has been the 
dominant technique since the mid 1960s (Deuss, Allolio, Feltes, & Kaulen, 1984; Katz & 
Shannon, 1964; Walker, Riad-Fahmy, & Llewelyn, 1978); however, newer methods 
involving nonisotopic techniques (e.g., fluoroimmunoassay) have improved both the 
sensitivity and convenience of measuring salivary cortisol (Yao et al., 1998). Thus, the
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technology for measurement of salivary cortisol has been demonstrated to be available, 
reliable, and precise.
The present review has evaluated data from multiple related bodies of research. 
When examined within the framework of a mutual context, these literature bases point 
toward recent notable progress in developing our understanding of the factors associated 
with NS1, especially the psychobiological facets of this phenomenon. The present review 
presents a theoretical foundation for exploring the role of emotion regulation in NSI in a 
novel way. Furthermore, this review provides ample empirical evidence from the 
psychobiological research literature suggesting that there are valid, reliable, and 
measurable biomarkers of emotion regulation. Perhaps most importantly, in bringing 
together these literatures, the present review has highlighted an overlooked gap in the 
literature. Specifically, with the exception of one case study examining self-mutilation in 
a borderline individual, no research has investigated the relationship between 
psychobiological indices of emotion regulation and NSI. Moreover, although the 
technological means exist to do so, there has been no experimental investigation of this 
relationship. This gap represents an important missing component of support for the 
emotion regulation model of NSI.
The primary purpose of the present study was to evaluate the validity of the 
emotion regulation model of NSI using cortisol secretion following induced psychosocial 
stress as an index of HPAA functioning in NSI individuals compared to non-NSI 
individuals. The primary investigator proposed that this data would diminish the gap in 
the literature on psychobiological functioning in self-injurers by evaluating hypothesized 
differences in cortisol responses between these two groups. Aggregated stress-
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induction/cortisol research suggests that the most effective laboratory stressors with the 
strongest effects on cortisol secretion are those that are both (1) perceived as 
uncontrollable by the participant, and (2) evaluative in nature (Dickerson & Kemeny, 
2004). Therefore, the present study employed a social rejection stressor paradigm that 
has been employed successfully in several previous studies (Blackhart, Eckel, & Tice, 
2007; Maner, Dewall, Baumeister, & Schaller, 2007; Nezlek, Kowalski, Leary, Blevins, 
& Holgate, 1997; Twenge & Campbell, 2003), and is commonly used (Baumeister, 
Brewer, Tice, & Twenge, 2007) in research, examining biological and psychological 
stress responses. Furthermore, in the present study cortisol response was conceptualized 
as the quantity of cortisol secreted at each post-stressor measurement interval.
Hypotheses
Hypothesis 1
NSI group participants will exhibit significantly greater initial increases in 
salivary cortisol from baseline measurement than Control group participants. This was 
determined by the difference in the number of nanomolecules of cortisol per deciliter 
(pg/dL) of saliva following the post-conversational task baseline versus subsequent, post­
stressor measurement points.
Hypothesis 2
NSI group participants will exhibit significantly higher levels of self-reported 
problems with emotional regulation than Control group participants, as determined by 
significantly higher scores on all six subscales of the Difficulties in Emotion Regulation 
Scale (DERS).
Hypothesis 3
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DERS total scores will correlate significantly and convergently with salivary 
cortisol quantum at measurement points at which the quantum is significantly different 
from baseline.
Hypothesis 4
PANAS positive affect (PA) and negative affect (NA) scores for both groups will 
correlate significantly at each measurement point with salivary cortisol level differences 
from baseline, with PA scores correlating inversely, and NA scores will correlating 
convergently.
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CHAPTER II
METHODS
Participants
A total of 55 participants completed this study, including 26 self-injuring 
participants and 29 participants who reported having never engaged in any form of self- 
injury. One control group participant was omitted from analyses because it was 
discovered (after she had already participated in the study) that she had actually reported 
a single episode of self-injury during adolescence. Thus, a total of 54 participants were 
included in the analyses. Although recruitment strategies (as described below) were 
designed to recruit a diverse sample that included non-student participants, all 
participants in this study were inevitably derived from the student population at the 
University of North Dakota.
The entire sample (n=54) was comprised of 61.1% (n=33) males and 38.9% 
(n=21) females. Participants were predominantly Caucasian (94.4%; n=51), with 3.7% 
(n=2) reporting their ethnicity as Asian, and 1.9% (n=l) reporting their ethnicity as 
Native American. Participants’ ages ranged from 18-47 years old (M=20.69; SD=4.65). 
Most (65.4%) participants in this study reported being in their first two years of college.
When analyzed individually by group, NS1 participants (n=26) were typically in 
their early 20’s (M=20.85; 50=5.66) mostly female (57.7%), and mainly Caucasian 
(96.2%), with 3.8% (n=l) reporting Asian ethnicity. Almost three-quarters (72%) were 
in their first two years of college. Control group participants had a comparable mean age
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of 20.54 years (SD=3.57), which was not significantly different from NSI participants 
(r(52)= .24; p =.81). Control participants were also typically in their first two years of 
college (59.2%), predominantly male (78.6%) and Caucasian (92.9%), with 3.6% of 
control participants reporting Native American (n=l) and Asian (n=l) ethnicities.
Pearson chi-square analyses were conducted for sex proportions in the full sample 
and sample subgroups. Confidence intervals (0=99% ) were calculated using an online 
statistics calculator (GraphPad®) that employs the Wald method, as recommended by 
Agresti and Coull (1998) for smaller samples. These analyses revealed no significant 
differences between or within groups for participants’ sex, with one exception: chi-square 
analyses revealed a statistically significant difference in the proportion of males (78.6%; 
C l 9 9 = 53.69 - 92.51) versus females (21.4% C/.99= 7.49 - 46.31) in the Control group (y2 
[1, 53] = 7.46; p=.006). It is likely that this disparity is related to the exclusion criteria 
for this study (described below). In short, potential female participants had two 
additional exclusion criteria that were not applicable to males, specifically pregnancy and 
oral contraceptive use. It is possible that the restriction of oral contraceptive using 
women from participating in this study disproportionately biased recruitment of 
participants for this study, resulting in fewer women than men in the Control group.
Participants were asked to rate their family’s socioeconomic status on a scale 
from l(“very poor”) to 7 (“extremely wealthy”). NSI group participants (M= 4.42;
SD= 1.03) were not significantly different than Control group participants (M= 4.36; 
SD=J3) on this measure (/(52)= .27; p  = 79). Additionally, participants were asked to 
rate the quality of their current friendships on a scale from 1 (“no close friends”) to 5 
(very strong/close friendships). An independent-samples t-test revealed no statistically
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significant difference between NSI (M= 4.08; SD=.7A) and Control participants (M= 4.43; 
SD=.63) for this psychosocial measure (t(52)= -1.87; p  =.067).
Procedures
Recruitment Procedure
Participants were recruited via three methods. First, at the beginning of each of 
three academic semesters, students in undergraduate psychology courses were given the 
opportunity to earn extra credit in one of their psychology courses by voluntarily 
participating in a psychological screening procedure. Informed consent was obtained 
from all participants prior to administration of assessment protocols. During this 
screening procedure, all consenting participants were administered a demographic 
questionnaire (the “About Me” questionnaire), and a modified version of the Deliberate 
Self-Harm Inventory (DSHI; Gratz, 2001; see “Measures” below). Second, participants 
were also recruited via scheduled screening sessions in the University of North Dakota 
(UND) Department of Psychology, during which time participants came to an advertised 
study location, and volunteered to complete the screening measures described above for 
extra credit. Data from all screenings were aggregated and analyzed to identify eligible 
participants.
The study was also advertised on informational posters displayed throughout 
campus, in a variety of locations (e.g., grocery stores, coffee shops) in the surrounding 
community, and online on the UND website. These posters and the online posting 
contained a phone number to call for the information about the study, as well as 
information regarding some basic aspects of the study, including compensation and 
approximate duration.
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Potential participants were screened for eligibility through a combination of data 
review and telephone interviews. Screening data were reviewed using frequency 
analyses of variables that represented study pre-requisites (e.g., NSI history) to identify 
potential participants who met study criteria. Participants meeting preliminary eligibility 
criteria (n=372) were contacted for brief telephone interviews to determine their full 
eligibility. During telephone contact with pre-identified eligible participants, all 
participants were re-assessed for current oral contraceptive use and mood, anxiety, and 
eating disorder diagnoses. Participants who had initiated contact via telephone or e-mail 
in response to an advertisement were also administered the DSHI during the telephone 
interview to determine their eligibility (n=9).
During the telephone screening, participants deemed eligible for the study were 
given a brief description of the tasks involved in the study, were informed of all 
requirements of the study and were told they would be compensated for their time. 
Participants were informed that at the time of their participation, they would be given a 
choice of being compensated with either four (4) hours of research credit; or $20.
To minimize the effects of extraneous factors known to affect cortisol levels, participants 
were specifically instructed to abstain from (1) consuming any stimulants (e.g., caffeine, 
methamphetamines, amphetamine) or alcohol, (2) engaging in any strenuous 
exercise/physical activity (defined as any activity that leads to an increase in respiration 
and/or heart rate) 24 hours prior to the experiment; (3) consuming anything but water two 
hours prior to the experiment; and (4) using any tobacco or nicotine products 1 hour prior 
to the experiment. Participants were informed that they would be asked about their 
consumption of all of these items prior to being allowed to participate in the experimental
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session, and that failure to comply with these instructions would result in their not being 
allowed to participate. Participants were also informed that the saliva-hormone assay 
would detect if they had adhered to the pre-experiment requirements, and that if they 
were not honest about this information, the extra credit they received from participating 
in the study would be deducted from their course grade or they would be asked to return 
the financial compensation they were given. Participants were provided with a telephone 
number they could call to cancel their participation prior to the experiment, or to ask 
questions about the experiment or the pre-experiment regimen.
The primary investigator attempted to contact the 372 eligible people for this 
study via telephone or e-mail. A voicemail message with brief information about the 
purpose of the call and the study, as well as a contact phone number for the primary 
investigator, was left for anyone who did not answer their phone and who had a 
voicemail box. Eleven additional people who called the study hotline were screened via 
telephone. Several (i.e., at minimum of 5) attempts were made to contact participants 
who were identified as potentially meeting criteria for the NSI group, whereas only one 
attempt was made to contact potential control group participants because of the 
substantial disparity in the number of potential control group versus NSI group members. 
A total of 135 NSI-eligible participants were contacted (30.3% [n=41] signed up) and 237 
controls were contacted (19.4% [n=46] signed up). Of those with whom contact was 
attempted via telephone, 64 (17.2%) refused to participate either in the study or the 
screening, including 18 (13.3%) participants from the NSI pool, and 46 (19.4%) 
participants from the Control pool.
Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria
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Research suggests that both cortisol reactivity and baseline levels of cortisol 
secretion are altered by pregnancy and oral contraceptive ingestion (Kirschbaum & 
Hellhammer, 1989). Additionally, a strong body of empirical evidence has documented 
abnormal patterns of cortisol secretion and HPAA activity in: (1) individuals with mood 
disorders (Birmaher et al., 1996; Board et al., 1956; Young, 2002; 2004) particularly in 
individuals with Bipolar Disorder (Young, 2004); (2) individuals with anxiety disorders, 
especially Panic Disorder (Bandelow, Sengos, Wedekind, Huther, Broocks, Hajak, & 
Ruether, 1997; Stones, Groome, Perry Huckelbridge, & Evans, 1999) and PTSD, in 
which cortisol levels may either be higher (Baker et al., 1999; Bremner et al., 1997; 
Bremner et al., 2003) or lower (Mason, Giller, Kosten, Ostroff, & Podd, 1986; Yehuda, 
Southwick, Nussbaum, Giller, & Mason, 1991; Yehuda, Teicher, Levengood, Trestman, 
& Seiver, 1994) than normal depending upon the stressor; and (3) individuals reporting 
restrained eating (Anderson, Shapiro, Lundgren, Spataro, & Frye, 2002; McLean, Barr, & 
Prior, 2001).
Participants met criteria for the NSI group if they (1) endorsed at least two 
episodes of NSI in their lifetime and at least one episode of NSI during the 12-month 
period preceding the time of screening. Participants met criteria for the Control group if 
they (1) reported no history of any form of NSI. Due to the preceding evidence presented 
above and discussed earlier in this paper, participants for both groups were also required 
to meet the following criteria: (1) deny current pregnancy; (2) report negatively for 
current use of oral contraceptives; (3) deny a diagnosis of any mood disorder within the 
past month; (4) deny a history of any anxiety disorder within the past month; (5) deny a
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history o f a diagnosis o f any eating disorder in their lifetime; and (6) deny a history of 
treatment for any eating disorder in their lifetime.
In total, 27 (7.3%) of those who were screened via telephone (n=372) were 
disqualified because they reported current oral contraceptive use. This included 13 (9.6%) 
otherwise qualified self-injurers, and 14 (5.9%) otherwise qualified healthy controls. 
Additionally, two (<1%) of those who were screened via telephone (both from the NSI 
participant pool) were disqualified because they reported a history being diagnosed with a 
mood disorder within the past month. Another five (1.3%; also from the NSI pool) of 
those who were telephone screened were disqualified because they reported a lifetime 
history of an eating disorder diagnosis or eating disorder treatment. This resulted in a 
potential NSI participant pool of 115 persons.
Five to ten participants were scheduled to participate in each experimental session. 
The mean attrition rate (both formal cancellation and no-shows) was 2 participants per 
session, with an average of 1.5 cancellations and 0.5 no-shows per session. Of the 20 
experiments that were scheduled, 8 (40%) were cancelled due to attrition below the 
required number of participants (<4 participants). On two occasions, a decision was 
made to use a trained confederate for the group conversational task when a no-show 
occurred on days when only four participants were scheduled and confirmed. Of those 
who provided a reason for canceling or no-showing, the most frequently provided reasons 
were “a family emergency” and schedule conflicts with places of employment. The 
number of participants actually participating in each experimental group session ranged 
from four to six (M=4.49; SD=. 69). There was not a significant between-groups
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(Rejected vs. Neutral) difference in the number participants participating in the 
conversational task groups during each experiment (f(52)= .57; p=.57).
One participant from the NSI group was dismissed from the study because she 
had begun taking oral contraceptives between the time she was initially screened and the 
date of her participation. Nine participants acknowledged that they had consumed 
products likely to contain caffeine (e.g., sodas, chocolate) and two participants 
acknowledged alcohol consumption within the 24-hour restricted time period. Two 
participants acknowledged that they had eaten less than two hours prior to the study 
rather than abstaining for the two preceding hours as instructed.
All of the aforementioned participants, except the one who was dismissed, were 
allowed to participate in the experiment to maintain the minimum number of participants 
needed to run the experiment (i.e., 4 participants). To account for the potential effects of 
participants’ non-adherence to pre-experimental restrictions on factors that can affect 
cortisol secretion patterns, follow-up repeated measures ANOVAs were performed using 
only those participants who reported adherence to pre-experimental restrictions. 
Experimental Procedures
The timeline for the segments of the experimental procedures used in this study 
are depicted graphically in Figure 1 at the end of this section below. Research strongly 
suggests that one of the most crucial factors to consider in experimental designs 
involving measurement of cortisol is the diurnal variation in secretion (Lovallo & 
Thomas, 2000), thus all experimental sessions were conducted between 2:00 p.m. and 
5:00 p.m. When participants arrived for the experimental session, they were asked to 
sign an informed consent form describing the purpose, requirements, benefits, and risks
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involved in the study (see Appendix I). Participants were also instructed to turn off their 
pagers and cell phones. After completing the consent form, participants also completed a 
health questionnaire inquiring about their activity and use and consumption of specific 
substances in the past 24 hours (Blackhart et al., 2007; see Appendix VI; “Short Health 
History Form”). Research assistants examined the health form to ensure that all pre- 
experimental guidelines were followed. Research assistants reminded the participant 
using specific instructions that they would lose their extra credit or financial 
compensation if it was determined that they were not honest in the information they 
provided on the Short Health History Form.
After completing the Short Health History Form, participants were asked to 
complete a group of questionnaires including the Symptom Checklist-90-Revised (SCL- 
90-R), Difficulties in Emotional Regulation Scale (DERS), Social Interaction Anxiety 
Scale, and the Borderline Personality Inventory (BPI) to collect data regarding the 
participant’s current level of emotional functioning and distress.
The next part of the session consisted of a relaxation segment, lasting 
approximately 20 minutes. This segment was incorporated into the study to allow for a 
reduction of any sympathetic nervous system activity that may have been induced by (i.e., 
habituation to) (1) the novelty of the environment; (2) the novelty of the situation; or (3) 
distress associated with completing psychometric questionnaires. During this segment, 
participants were asked to listen to specific selections of classical music chosen for their 
relaxing tone, tempo, and rhythm. These selections consisted of Antonio Vivaldi’s 
Concerto N° 1 in E Major Largo E Pianissimo Sempre, Allegro Non Molto, Allegro I, 
and Adagio Molto. Participants were also provided with two magazines, one related to
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business in Minnesota and one about arts and crafts (e.g., knitting, crocheting), and 
instructed to do nothing but read these magazines and listen to the music during this 
period. No problems were encountered with participants falling asleep during this period. 
At the end of the relaxation segment, the first saliva sample (Tl) was collected and the 
first Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; TIP) was administered.
Next, all participants were brought into a main room of the laboratory and given 
instructions in a group format. Participants were asked to create a name tag for 
themselves to wear during this segment using a marker and a self-adhering label. 
Participants were instructed to engage in a group discussion (referred to from this point 
forward as the “conversational task”) regarding social activities on and off campus for 
approximately 15 minutes. Participants were given a printed list of conversation topics 
and related topical questions to use as a means of initiating or generating conversation.
All conversation topics and questions are listed in Appendix VII.
After the 15 minutes had elapsed, the primary investigator or a research assistant 
inteijected in the conversation, and informed participants that they would then be asked 
to separate into different areas or rooms of the laboratory and select two other people 
from the group that they would most like to work with during the next segment of the 
experiment (the “selection task”). The participants were informed that they would get to 
work with at least one other person, and possibly both that they selected. Once they were 
separated into their original laboratory rooms, participants were asked to provide a 
second saliva sample (T2), completed a second PANAS (T2P), and make their selections 
using a researcher-created form (“Experiment Selection Form”, see Appendix VIII). 
Approximately three minutes after the selection task was completed, each of the
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participants was given one of two sets of feedback based on their condition assignment 
by the primary investigator or a research assistant. If participants were assigned to the 
“Neutral” condition, they were told the following by the primary investigator or a 
research assistant:
“I  need to talk to you about your participation in the next task o f the experiment. 
We accidentally made a mistake and assigned you to the wrong group, so because o f our 
mistake, you ’ll have to complete the rest o f the experiment on your own. ”
If participants were assigned to the “Rejected” condition, they were told the following by 
the primary investigator or a research assistant:
“I need to talk to you about your participation in the next task o f the experiment. 
When people made their selection, no one indicated that they wanted to work with you. 
This is kind o f unusual and it's never happened before, but consequently you ’ll have to 
complete the rest o f the experiment on your own. ”
Approximately three to five minutes after receiving feedback, participants were asked to 
provide the third saliva sample (T3) and to complete the third PANAS (T3P).
After providing the T3 saliva sample, participants were provided with a pen and a 
piece of blank white paper and asked to draw a house. Participants were informed that 
they would be given 10 minutes to complete this task. After the 10-minute period had 
elapsed, participants were asked to provide the fourth saliva sample (T4) and to complete 
the fourth PANAS (T4P); five minutes was allotted for this. Participants were 
subsequently given 10 minutes each to draw a tree, a person, and a car, with five minutes 
allotted after each drawing task for the collection of T5/T5P, T6/T6P, and T7/T7P, 
respectively. When participants had provided all saliva samples and completed all
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PANAS questionnaires, they were asked to complete a questionnaire designed to function 
as a manipulation-check (see Appendix III; “My Experience”).
Debriefing
Following collection of the final saliva sample and administration of manipulation 
check, participants were fully debriefed. The primary investigator, project manager, or a 
research assistant read the debriefing statement aloud to all participants (see Appendix II; 
“Debriefing Form”). To maintain experimental control, participants were not permitted 
to take a copy of the debriefing form with them. An explanation was provided in the 
debriefing statement for the use of deception, and a verbal apology was given to all 
participants for misleading them.
Following debriefing, participants were asked to complete a self-affirmations 
exercise (adapted from Teaster, 2004; see Appendix IV, “Positive Self-Statements”) in 
effort to alleviate any negative self-thoughts that may have been activated as a result of 
participation. Participants were then screened for current suicidal and self-injurious 
ideations using the first five items of the BSS, plus an additional item inquiring about 
non-suicidal self-injurious ideations structured in the same format of the BSS items. The 
primary investigator or the project manager carefully reviewed the BSS form to 
determine the participant’s risk level for suicide or NSI (see “Risk Determination and 
Management Procedure” below for a description of the risk determination procedure). If 
participants were determined to not be at risk for NSI or suicide, they were provided with 
an extra credit slip or financial compensation, and were dismissed from the experiment.
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2:00 p.m.
| Consent
| Screening
!
| Psychometric Assessment
I
| 20 minute Relaxation
I
| Post-Relaxation Saliva Sample
I
| “Conversation Task”
I
| T1 Sample (baseline)
I
| “Selection Task”
I
| Participant Feedback/Stressor
I
| T2 Sample (3-5 minutes post stressor)
I
| Drawing Task 1
I
| T3 Sample (20 minutes post stressor)
I
| Drawing Task 2
I
| T4 Sample (35 minutes post stressor)
I
| Drawing Task 3
I
| T5 Sample (50 minutes post stressor)
I
| Drawing Task 4
I
| T6 Sample (65 minutes post stressor)
I
| Experimental Manipulation Assessment
I
| Debriefing
I
| Risk A ssessm ent
5:00 p.m.
Figure 1. Timeline for Experiment Segments
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As noted in the Procedures section, the “My Experiences” questionnaire was 
administered to participants to determine the effect of the deception in the experimental 
manipulation. This questionnaire asked three key “Yes/No” questions, and allowed room 
for an explanation if the answer was “Yes”:
1. Did you believe, at any time, that the experiment dealt with anything other than 
what the experimenter had described to you?
2. Did this affect your behavior in any way?
3. Were you given any information about the experiment by anyone other than the 
researchers prior to coming here today?
Across the full sample, 51.9% (n=28) reported that they believed at some point that the 
experiment dealt with something other than what they had been told. Qualitatively, main 
themes included things such as “The ways people adapt to new situations and new 
people” and “How people react when they are stuck in a room for several hours.”
Qualitative review of participant’s free responses to these questions indicated that 
some of those who reported disbelief may have correctly guessed what the experiment 
was about, or what the deception had been. Furthermore, 22.2% (n=12) of participants 
reported that some element of the experiment influenced their behavior in some way.
The statements written by participants are depicted in Table 1. Finally, 100% of 
participants reported that they had not been given any information about the experiment 
by anyone other than the principal investigator.
Participants assigned to both conditions were deceived in the experiment; however, it 
was most important that participants in the Rejected condition were convinced by the
E xperim ental M anipulation  C heck
87
deception. Examined by condition, 55.2% (n=16) of Rejected participants, and 48%
(n=12) of Neutral participants reported believing that the experiment pertained to
something other than what they had originally been told. The differences in these
proportions were not statistically significant (x 2 [1,53]= .28; p=.6). Furthermore, only
6.4% (n=9) of those in the Rejected condition, and 5.6% (n=3) of those in the Neutral
condition reported that this had affected their behavior in some way.
In sum, there were some participants in both conditions who believed that they were
being deceived, but this percentage of participants was low in both groups and none
correctly identified what the deception truly was. Although these qualitative data suggest
the deception was not accurately detected, these data suggest that the experimental
manipulation may not have been completely effective or believable. The feedback
participants were given during the manipulation was a necessary, but not sufficient factor
Table 1. Explanations of Experiment-Induced Behavior Changes Given by Participants 
‘‘I  got really pissed off. I  was tired o f spitting in the stupid cup. I  don’t like to draw. ”
“Increased nervousness and suspicion about the experiment. ”
“Causes headaches probably due to the no caffeine. ”
“Just toward the end it got to be old and repetitive, just got a little warm and bored. ”
“Sure made me hungry... ”
“More anxious to get out o f here. ”
“I became frustrated and bored. ”
“The pre-experiment kept me from eating so as the experiment wore on, I grew hungrier and 
therefore less patient. "
“ /  didn ’/ feel left out or feel lowered self-esteem. ”
“It made me tired and a little lonely, not gonna lie. ”
“I really haven’t thought too much about how to make friends and where to make friends. But 
after today's study, I may now start to think more about how friends are made. ”_________________________________
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for the requisite deception. Effective delivery of the feedback in a believable manner by 
research personnel was also necessary. However, the only control put in place for this 
factor was the training of research assistants in how to deliver the experimental 
manipulation. Thus, the results of this study must be considered in this context.
Risk Determination and Management Procedure
The risk determination and management procedure (RDMP) was used to establish 
each participant’s risk level based on their responses to the modified BSS, and provide 
further assessment and management based on that assessment as needed. First, 
participant’s responses to the BSS screening items were reviewed. If a participant’s 
responses were “1” or “2” on items 3, 4, or 6 of the BSS, or if a participant endorsed a 
“1” on three out of five of the suicide screening items, then further assessment by the 
project manager or primary investigator was initiated. Finally, an a priori decision was 
made to initiate further assessment if a participant exhibited any overt behavioral 
indications of acute distress (i.e., distress that may be reasonably assumed to impair their 
functioning). These indications included tearful affect, clearly unsteady gross or fine 
psychomotor behavior, or distress-oriented verbal expression. When participants met any 
of these criteria (n=8), the primary investigator took the following steps to ensure the 
participant’s safety:
1. The participant was assessed for acute suicidality, acute self-injuriousness, and 
risk factors for both of these by the primary investigator, or project manager in 
consultation with the primary investigator. This assessment was aimed at 
determining their risk level (see Appendix V; “Risk Screening”), current coping
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resources (e.g., social support, currently seeing a trusted psychotherapist) and 
potential for carrying out any active ideations.
2. Low Risk Participants. If the participant is determined to be at a low risk for 
suicide or non-suicidal self-injury, the primary investigator or project manager 
provided the participant with a referral resource handout, and a recommendation 
for therapy. Six participants were determined to be at this risk level.
3. Moderate Risk Participants. If the participant is determined to be at a moderate 
risk for suicide or non-suicidal self-injury, the primary investigator or project 
manager gave the participant the option of contacting a support person (e.g., 
friend, family member) and requesting to get together immediately (preferably the 
friend will meet the student at the research lab or at Corwin/Larimore). If a 
support person was not immediately available, the student would have been asked 
to collaboratively construct a safety plan for remaining safe from self-injury, be 
provided with mental health resources, and encouraged to seek treatment. All 
participants determined to be at moderate risk were able to create a safety plan, 
and contact a support person while in the lab. Two participants were determined 
to be at this risk level.
4. High Risk Participants. Although no participants were determined to be at high 
risk, if a participant had been determined to be at a high risk for suicide or non- 
suicidal self-injury, the primary investigator or project manager would have 
determined if the participant had a supportive social contact in their life. If so, the 
primary investigator or project manager would have requested that the participant 
contact that person. The lab supervisor, Dr. Jennifer Muehlenkamp, would also
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have been contacted while the participant contacted her/his support person and 
would have come to the lab to conduct a further assessment and ensure the student 
is connected with support services of some type prior to leaving the lab. The 
student would not have been permitted to leave the lab alone. Should an 
immediate support person not be available, the UND crisis team would have been 
contacted. No participants were determined to be at this risk level.
5. Imminent Risk Participants. Although no participants were determined to be at 
imminent risk, if a participant had been determined to be at a imminent risk for 
suicide or non-suicidal self-injury, the primary investigator or project manager 
would have requested that the participant remain in the lab, and asked that a 
research assistant contact Dr. Muehlenkamp. During this time the primary 
investigator or project manager in consultation with the primary investigator 
would have contact the UND crisis team and assist the student in speaking with 
the team. The participant would not have been permitted to leave the lab without 
speaking with a member of the UND crisis team. No participants were 
determined to be at this risk level
Measures
Psychometric Instruments
Deliberate Self-Harm Inventory
The Deliberate Self-Harm  Inventory (DSHI; Gratz, 2001) is a  17-item self-report 
inventory, which is behaviorally based. It was selected for use in the preset study 
because of the specificity of its item content and because of the relatively stable 
psychometric properties reported by its developer (see Gratz, 2001). Each item contains
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an initial yes/no question regarding a specific self-damaging behavior, followed by five 
follow-up questions. This instrument includes multiple response formats, including 
primary items with dichotomous answer choices (e.g., “Have you ever intentionally (i.e., 
on purpose) cut your wrist, arms, or other area(s) of your body (without intending to kill 
yourself)?”), and follow-up items with a free response answer format (e.g., “How old 
were you when you first did this?”; “How many times have you done this?”). Gratz 
(2001) reports a high degree of internal consistency (a = 0.83).
The version of the DSHI used in this study for both screening and experimental 
procedures was slightly modified. In this modified version, participants were given 
categorical choices for indicating the last time that they engaged in any endorsed NSI 
behavior (i.e. l=within the past 2 weeks; 2= 3-4 weeks ago; 3=over 1 month but less than 
2 months ago; 4=2 months to less than 3 months ago; 5=3 months to less than 4 months 
ago; 6=4 months to less than 5 months ago; 7=5 months to less than 6 months ago; 7=6 
months to less than 9 months ago; 8=9 to 12 months ago; 9=More than 12 months ago), 
rather than a space for providing a subjectively worded answer. The goal of this 
modification was to minimize the number of potentially eligible participants who would 
be lost based solely on either an unintelligible response or a failure to respond to the item 
altogether. While some screening participants may still have chosen not to respond to 
this item, the proposed modification was aimed at minimizing the effort required to 
provide a response (i.e., by only having to circle an answer instead of write one out).
The validation study sample for the original version of the instrument consisted of 
159 undergraduate students in Psychology courses at the University of Massachusetts, 
Boston (Gratz, 2001). Item total correlations for each item in the preliminary validation
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study were as follows: Cutting, rb = 0.63; Burning with a cigarette, rb = 0.34; Burning 
with a lighter or match, rb = 0.49; Carving words into skin, rb = 0.47; Carving pictures 
into skin, rb = 0.45; severe scratching, rb = 0.51; Biting, rb = 0.54; Rubbing sandpaper on 
skin, rb = 0.14; Sticking pins, needles, staples into skin, rb = 0.65; rubbing glass into skin, 
rb = 0.35; Breaking bones, rb = 0.12; Banging head, rb = 0.57; Punching self, rb = 0.44; 
Interference with wound healing, rb = 0.49; Other forms of NSI, rb = 0.36; Dripping acid 
on skin, rb < 0.01; Using bleach or oven cleaner to scrub skin, rb < 0.01.
Product-moment test-retest correlations were based on a sample of 93 participants 
who took part in the second administration of the DSHI. Over an intervening period of 2- 
4 weeks, the DSHI demonstrated a test-retest reliability of .68 (p < 0.001), with a 
concomitant high correlation (r = 0.92; p  < 0.001) between the number of NSI behaviors 
that were endorsed by participants on the first and second administrations.
With regard to convergent and discriminant validity, the DSHI dichotomous items 
demonstrated a correlation of .40 (p < 0.01) with the Borderline Personality Organization 
Scale (BPO; Oldham, et al., 1985); the frequency assessment items of the DSHI 
correlated at 0.48 (p < 0.001) with the BPO. The DSHI correlated moderately (r = 0.43; 
p  < .001) with the NSI item of the DIB-R (Zanarini et al., 1989), and moderately (r = 
0.35; p  < 0.001) with the NSI item of the Suicidal Behaviors Questionnaire (SBQ; 
Linehan, 1981). The DSHI also demonstrated a correlation of 0.49 with a history of 
mental health service utilization; a history of suicide attempts was correlated 0.20 and 
0.21 with the dichotomous and frequency items of the DSHI respectively. Overall, the 
DSHI has yielded adequately to excellently stable psychometric properties. Thus, its use 
in the present study was determined to be advantageous. For the present study, reliability
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analyses revealed an internal consistency reliability of a= 75, and an inter-item 
correlations ranging from r = -.25-.69.
Beck Scale for Suicidal Ideation
The Beck Scale for Suicidal Ideation (BSS; Beck, Steer, & Ranieri, 1988) is a 
commonly used 19-item self-report instrument, with 5 preceding screening questions, 
designed to assess presence and severity of suicidal ideation. The screening items are 
used to facilitate rapid completion of the scale for nonsuicidal individuals. Items on the 
BSS are rated on a three-point scale (0, 1, or 2); hence, total scores may range from 0 to 
48. Beck and colleagues (1985, 1988) report no specific cut-off scores for this instrument. 
However, recent research (Cochrane-Brink, Lofchy, & Sakinofsky, 2000) has identified 
that a cutoff score of 24 may be useful in helping to determine when hospitalization of a 
suicidal individual is medically necessary. Beck & Steer (1993) report that the BSS 
addresses five primary factors of suicidality: Intensity of Suicidal Ideation, Active 
Suicidal Desire, Planning, Passive Suicidal Desire, Concealment. This instrument has 
demonstrated adequate to good internal consistency, with values for all scales ranging 
from a=0.7 to 0.84 (Beck & Steer, 1993; Holden & DeLisle, 2005). Recent data also 
suggest that this instrument has high sensitivity (100%) and specificity (90%) as a 
suicidality screening tool (Cochrane-Brink et al., 2000). In the present study, items 1-5, 
20, and 21 were administered. The first five items (i.e., the critical items) of the BSS 
were employed as a method of assessing imminent suicide and self-injury risk. An 
additional item inquiring about non-suicidal self-injurious ideations were added to these 
items. Items 20 and 21 were used to collect data regarding history of suicidal behavior. 
Symptom Checklist-90-Revised
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The Symptom Checklist-90-Revised (SCL-90-R; Derogatis, 1994) is a self-report 
instrument originally developed by Derogatis (1977) for clinical and research settings.
As such, it is widely used in both clinical research and clinical practice. This instrument 
contains 90 items that pertain to different forms and features of psychological functioning. 
Participants rate the degree to which they have experienced each item during the past 
seven days, including the current day, on a five-point, Likert-type scale (“0” = Not at all; 
“4”= Extremely). The SCL-90-R is comprised of nine subscales that reflect nine 
symptom dimensions (Somatization, Obsessive-Compulsion, Interpersonal Sensitivity, 
Depression, Anxiety, Hostility, Phobic Anxiety, Paranoid Ideation, Psychoticism), and 
three globall scales (Global Severity Index, Problem Severity Distress Index, Problem 
Symptom Total; Derogatis, 1994).
The SCL-90-R has demonstrated sound psychometric properties. Derogatis (1994) 
reports test-retest reliability coefficients ranging from .80-.90 based on his validation 
study. However, an earlier study by Horrowitz and colleagues (1988) found test-retest 
reliability coefficients ranging from .68-.83 over a ten week period. Additionally, 
internal consistency coefficients reported in the literature have ranged from a =.77-. 90 
(Derogatis, Rickels, and Rock, 1976; Horrowitz, 1988). Furthermore, a wealth of 
literature has established the convergent, discriminant, concurrent, and predictive validity 
of the SCL-90-R (Asberg, Kragh-Sorensen, Mindham, & Tuck, 1973; Boleolucky & 
Horvath, 1974; Derogatis, 1994; Derogatis et al., 1976; Koeter, 1992; Peveler & Fairbum, 
1990; Wiznitzer, 1992). Internal consistency for individual SCL-90-R subscales in the 
present study ranged from moderate to excellent; Depression a =.87; Anxiety a =.79; 
Isolation a =.92; Somatization a =.76; Phobia a =.90; Obsessive Compulsion a =.84;
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Hostility a =.73; Psychoticism a =.65; Paranoia a =.59. The SCL-90-R was used in the 
present study as a method of determining participants’ global level of level of 
psychopathology and distress.
Social Interaction Anxiety Scale
The Social Interaction Anxiety Scale (SIAS; Mattick & Clarke, 1998) is self- 
report measure of social anxiety that specifically addresses anxiety that is related to 
interaction in social situations. This instrument contains 20 items pertaining to various 
aspects of social interactions in groups. Each item inquires the degree to which a feeling, 
behavior, or cognition (e.g., “I have difficulty making eye-contact with others.”) 
characterizes the respondent, and is rated on a five-point Likert-type scale (“0” = Not at 
all; “4” = Extremely). The total score is calculated by summing the value of each item. 
Higher scores reflect higher levels of social anxiety.
The SIAS has sound psychometric properties. Mattick, Peters, & Clarke (1989) 
and Mattick & Clarke (1998) reported test retest reliability of .92 for a 4-week interval, 
and 0.92 for a 12-week interval in a combined sample of undergraduates, community 
participants, and untreated socially phobic, agoraphobic, and simple phobic individuals.
In the same vein, Heimberg, Mueller, Holt, Hope, and Liebowitz (1992) reported good 
levels of internal consistency (a=.88-.83) in Australian samples. Similarly, Osman, 
Gutierrez, Barrios, Kopper, & Chiros (1998) reported an internal consistency of a=.90 for 
their sample of 200 undergraduate university students. Additionally, internal consistency 
for the SIAS is excellent (a=.94, total sample; a=.93 for individuals with social phobia). 
The strength of internal consistency in the present study was comparably high (a=.92). 
This scale has also demonstrated high convergent validity (r=.73; Peters, 2000) with the
96
Social Phobia Scale (Mattick & Clarke, 1998), another measure of social anxiety. 
Furthermore, Brown, Turovsky, Heimberg, Juster, Brown, & Barlow (1997) reported a 
high level of discriminant validity for the SIAS. In their sample of 165 anxiety 
disordered patients, Brown et al. (1997) reported that the SIAS correctly classified 86% 
of socially phobic patients (n=50), thus suggesting this instrument is a reliable measure of 
social anxiety. In the present study, the SIAS was employed as a method of assessing the 
effects of social anxiety on cortisol responses given that the stressor will be based on 
social interactions.
Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale
The Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale (DERS; Gratz & Roemer, 2004) is a 
36-item self-report instrument that assesses multiple facets of emotional regulation. Each 
item requires that the participant indicate what percent of the time they experience each 
item (e.g., “When I’m upset, I have difficulty controlling my behaviors.”) using a 1-5 
Likert-type scale. Response choices range from 1 (“almost never;” 0-10%) to 5 (“almost 
always;” 91-100%). The DERS is comprised of six scales: Nonacceptance of Emotional 
Responses, Difficulties Engaging in Goal-Directed Behavior, Impulse Control 
Difficulties, Lack of Emotional Awareness, Limited Access to Emotion Regulation 
Strategies, and Lack of Emotional Clarity. The DERS has demonstrated good 
psychometric properties, with 4-8 week test-retest reliability of .88 for the DERS total 
score, and coefficients ranging ffom .57 to .89 for individual subscales. Total scale 
internal consistency for the DERS is excellent (a=.93), as is individual scale reliability 
(as > .80). In the present study, the DERS was included as a method of establishing 
convergence between biological and self-report measures of emotion regulation, and an
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internal consistency alpha of a=.95 was obtained for the total scale with the current 
sample.
Borderline Personality Inventory
The Borderline Personality Inventory (BPI; Leichsenring, 1999) is a 53-item self- 
report instrument that assesses features of Borderline Personality Disorder based on 
Kemberg’s (1975) Borderline Perosnality Organization model. This instrument uses a 
true/false response format, and is comprised by five subscales: Identity Diffusion, 
Primitive Defense, Fear of Closeness, Impaired Reality Testing, and Cut-20. The last 
subscale consists of those items that were found to best discriminate between borderline 
patients and “neurotic” and schizophrenic patients (Leichsenring, 1999). The BPI yields 
excellent overall internal consistency (a=.91) and one-week test-retest (r=.87) reliability. 
Additionally, all five subscales yield good to excellent internal consistency (as=.68-.85) 
and one-week test-retest (as=.73-.89) reliability. Leichsenring (1999) reports levels of 
diagnostic sensitivity ranging from .85-.89, and diagnostic specificity ranging from .78- 
.89, thus suggesting the utility of this instrument in classification. This instrument is 
generally recommended for the purpose of screening participants for BPD or prominent 
borderline features, and was used for that purpose in the present study. Internal 
consistency in this sample was a=.81.
For the present study, the total scale score and the “Cut-20” subscale score were 
used as indicators of psychopathology. The Cut-20 is the subset of 20 items that best 
discriminates between BPD patients and “neurotic” and schizophrenic patients. Cut-20 is 
an atheoretical, empirically derived score comparable to the total score of Diagnostic 
interview for Borderlines (Gunderson et al., 1989). Liechsenring’s (1999) validation data
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for the BPI suggests that a score of >10 on Cut-20 reliably discriminates a BPD patient 
from a clinical non-BPD individual.
Positive and Negative Affect Schedule
The Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 
1988) is a 20-item self-report instrument that assesses an individual’s current level of 
both positive and negative affect by asking the individual to rate, using a five-point 
Likert-type scale (1= Not at All; 5= Extremely), the degree to which each item on the 
scale describes their current affective state.
The instrument has two subscales: the Positive Affect (PA) subscale and Negative 
Affect (NA) subscale. The PA subscale assesses the extent to which a participant is 
currently experiencing positive emotion, and is comprised of ten adjectives describing 
positive emotional experiences (e.g., enthusiastic, pleasant). Higher scores on the PA 
scale are theorized to reflect higher levels of positive affect or emotion. Similarly, the 
NA subscale evaluates the degree to which a respondent is experiencing negative emotion. 
It is comprised of ten adjectives describing negative emotion (e.g., jittery, afraid). Higher 
scores on the NA subscale are theorized to reflect higher levels of negative affect or 
emotion. The PANAS has demonstrated excellent internal consistency, with a=.89 for 
PA, and a=.85 for NA (Crawford & Henry, 2004).
Biological Measures
Salivary Cortisol
Salivary cortisol is a valid and consistent measure of serum levels of free cortisol 
(Kirschbaum & Hellhammer, 1994). Saliva samples were collected using a two 
milliliter-capacity plastic passive-drool Salivette, obtained from Salimetrics, LLC.
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Plastic straws approximately 4 to 5 centimeters in length were used to facilitate 
movement of saliva into the vials for sampling. Participants were instructed to either 
chew on a piece of straw, or to make a chewing motion with their mouth, as needed if 
saliva flow was not readily available; both of these procedures are recommended by the 
testing company. All saliva samples were stored in a freezer at a temperature of 20° C.
Cortisol levels in saliva samples were determined through a highly sensitive 
enzyme radioimmunoassay (Salimetrics, PA) conducted by Salimetrics, LLC. This assay 
uses 25 ul of saliva per determination, has a lower limit of sensitivity of 0.003 ug/dl, 
standard curve range from 0.012 to 3.0 ug/dl, and average intra-and inter-assay 
coefficients of variation 3.5 % and 5.1 % respectively. Method accuracy, determined by 
spike and recovery, and linearity, determined by serial dilution are 100.8 % and 
91.7%. Values from matched serum and saliva samples show the expected strong linear 
relationship, r (63) = .89, p  < 0.0001. As a measure of quality control in the present study, 
double assays were extracted from 83.3% of the total number samples. Single assays 
were performed on baseline measurement samples, while 100% of post-baseline samples 
were double assayed. For those samples that were double assayed, the mean cortisol 
value (pg/dL) was used for statistical analyses.
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CHAPTER III
RESULTS 
Data Analyses
An alpha-level of .01 was set for all independent samples t-tests and analyses of 
variance. An alpha-level of .05 was adopted for all correlational analyses. As suggested 
by Stevens (2002), for analyses in which sphericity could not be assumed, Greenhouse- 
Geisser corrected values were employed.
Nonsuicidal Self-Injury Characteristics
Participants in the NSI group reported engaging in a variety of forms of NSI. The 
total number of types of NSI that participants endorsed ranged from 1 (30.8%; n=8) to 11 
(3.8%; n=l) types (M -3.35 types; S0=2.16). This mean, although slightly higher than 
that found in recent samples of adolescents by Lloyd-Richardson, Perrine, Dierker, and 
Kelley (2007), is consistent with other prior research indicating a multiplicity of 
methodology of NSI (e.g., Favazza, 1992; Favazza & Conterio, 1988; Osuch, Noll, & 
Putnam, 1999). Over one-quarter (26.0%; n=7) of the NSI participants endorsed two 
types of NSI, and almost half (42.3%; n=l 1) endorsed three or more forms of these 
behaviors. The most common types of NSI behaviors were cutting (66.7%; n = 16), 
severe scratching (43.5%; n=10), subcutaneous insertion of sharp objects (43.5%; n=10), 
punching self or objects (40.9%; n=9), and burning (34.8%; n=8).
NSI group participants reported ages of onset for any NSI behaviors ranging from 
11 to 19 years, with a mean age of onset of 14.81 years (SD= 2.25 years). Within
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individual types of NSI, age of onset ranged from 11-47 (M= 15.58 years; SD= 4.38). 
Participants who reported cutting behavior were most likely to report a history of NSI 
requiring medical attention (13.6%), although this did not differ significantly from the 
proportions of NSI participants reporting other forms of NSI that required medical 
treatment. Frequency of NSI across all types ranged from 2 to 54 or more episodes 
(M=14.36 episodes; 579=13.4), with a multimodal frequency of 4 and 6 episodes.
Psychological Variables
Independent-samples t-tests were conducted to examine potential between group 
differences on the SCL-90-R subscales and the BPI total score and Cut-20 subscale score 
(see measures). Subscale scores derived for the SCL-90-R are standardized T-scores 
based on norms from population subsets (e.g., clinical outpatients, clinical inpatients, 
nonpatients). Given that some participants may have currently been in outpatient 
treatment while others may not have been, thus requiring different norms for 
such groups, raw scores on the SCL-90-R were used in the aforementioned t-tests. 
Analyses of SCL-90-R raw scores revealed no significant between-group differences on 
any scales; although a trend toward significance (i.e., .01 < p  <.05) was observed for 
scores on the Anxiety subscale (t{52)= 2.19; p=.035), with NSI participants scoring 
higher (M=3.42; 579=4.29) than control participants (A/=l .43; SD= 1.81).
Independent-samples t-tests of BPI subscale scores revealed a significant 
difference for the 20-item cutoff subscale (Cut-20; f(52)=4.05; pc.OO1), with NSI 
participants (M= 4.27; 5/9=3.01) outscoring Control participants (M= 1.46; 579=2.01). 
Tests of between-groups differences for BPI Total scores were also significant 
(/(36)=3.34; p=.002). NSI participants (M= 12.71; 579=5.10) scored significantly higher
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on BPI Total scores than Control participants (M= 7.35; 50=4.69). The means were well 
below the Cut-20 cutoff for both groups, even though they were significantly different. 
Nonetheless, this finding is consistent with an emotion dysregulation model of NSI 
considering the wealth of literature establishing BPD as a pervasive disorder of the 
motion regulation system and the high prevalence of NSI in individuals diagnosed with 
BPD (e.g., Linehan, 1993; Skodol et al., 2002a; 2002c), although both groups scored well 
below clinical cut-off score of 10.
Independent-samples t-tests were also conducted to determine if SIAS scores 
differed significantly between groups. These analyses revealed no significant differences 
for the SIAS between NSI and control groups, with mean scores of 18.62 and 17.43 for 
the NSI and control groups, respectively (/(52)= .37; p  =.71). Furthermore, no significant 
between-groups difference was found on SIAS scores for participants assigned to 
different conditions (r(52)= -.23; p  =.82).
Descriptive analyses of the modified version of the BSS revealed that 19.2% (n=5) 
of the NSI group endorsed a current “weak desire” to self-injure themselves, with the 
remaining 80.8% reporting no desire to self-injure. Broken down by cell, 60% (n=3) of 
those endorsing any current urge to engage in NSI on the BSS at the end of the 
experiment had been assigned to the Rejected condition, and 40% had been assigned to 
the Neutral condition. This difference in proportions was not statistically significant (x2 
[1,25] = .094;/t=.76).
Notes on Cortisol Analyses 
Baseline Measurement
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Fehm-Wolsdorf, Groth, Kaiser, and Hahlweg (1999), note that baseline cortisol 
samples collected at the beginning of an experiment reflect stressful events occurring 
prior to the experiment because of the cortisol response curve, which maximizes at 20-30 
minutes following a stressful event. It was possible that cortisol levels in samples 
collected earlier could have been affected by pre-experiment stress; or that the levels in 
these samples were affected by stress induced before the manipulation (e.g., by 
answering questions about psychological distress). Thus, for all cortisol analyses in the 
present study, the post-conversational task sample (the second sample collected overall) 
was used as the baseline measurement (rather than the post-relaxation baseline) for these 
analyses for two reasons. First, cortisol response, as conceptualized in the present study, 
was most accurately characterized by the difference in cortisol volume between the post­
stressor (i.e., rejection/neutral feedback) measurement points and post-conversation task 
measurement point immediately preceding the stressor (i.e. the post-conversational task 
sample). Second, use of this particular measurement point was aimed at controlling for 
any potential inflationary effects of social interaction on cortisol levels, and was deemed 
a better choice than employment of statistical controls, such as including this 
measurement point in a multiple analysis of covariance. The use of a second, pre-stress 
sample as a baseline measurement has been employed successfully in previous 
psychophysiological research involving analyses of cortisol and prolactin responses to 
5HTia and 5HT2A receptor agonists (Leone et al., 1998); heart rate, skin conductance, 
and skin temperature in response to alcohol (Newlin & Thomson, 1991); prolactin 
response following orgasm (Brody & Kruger, 2006); heart rate and blood pressure 
response to medication (van Stegeren, Everaerd, & Gooren, 2002); and oxygen
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consumption and exercise performance during stress tests (Harris, LeMaitre, Mackenzie, 
Fox, & Denvir, 2003).
Outliers
It is well established in the statistical literature that extreme scores may inflate (or 
deflate) measures of central tendency, thus rendering inferential conclusions based on 
these statistics less accurate (Winer, 1971). Box plot analyses conducted for cortisol data 
in the current study revealed multiple outliers in each of the four cells for most time 
intervals (see Table 2 below for the exact number of outliers by cell, time interval, and 
type of outlier [high or low]). Experts have proposed multiple methods for handling such 
data anomalies, including (1) leaving outlying data points in the data set; (2) removing 
outlying data points from the data set; and (3) replacing outliers with more representative 
values derived from the data set. The latter of these (outlier replacement, rather than 
removal or inaction) was selected for cortisol analyses for three reasons.
First, the present study was a theory-driven pilot study, with no directly 
comparable data from which to conclude that any outlying data points were anomalies 
versus representative of the full range of cortisol secretion patterns in self-injurers. Thus 
omitting the outliers from this data set had the potential to unnecessarily restrict the range, 
possibly leading to a statistical mischaracterization of the actual data. Second, the cell 
sizes for the present study were relatively small to begin with, and the potential loss of 
the number of outliers that would have been omitted was likely to unnecessarily 
compromise power, given that there were options available for transforming the data, 
which would preserve cell size and power. Finally, the outlying data points extended far 
enough beyond the upper and lower bounds of this data set that the probability that this
105
minority of data points had an effect on the measures of central tendency for the majority 
of the data was at least moderate. Thus, the principal investigator decided to employ a 
Windsorization method of data transformation (Winer, 1971) for cortisol analyses, which 
allowed for retention of the high and low outlying data points via replacing these data 
with the values of the upper and lower bounds found within the larger sample.
Hypothesis 1
Hypothesis 1 was tested using a 2 (GROUP) x 2 (CONDITION) x 5 (TIME) 
repeated measures ANOVA. Groups in this general linear model included self-injuring 
and control; conditions included “neutral” and “rejected;” and time was based on six 
measurement points: pre-stressor baseline (Tl), 3-5 minutes post-stressor (T2), 20 
minutes post-stressor (T3), 35 minutes post-stressor (T4), 50 minutes post-stressor (T5], 
and 65 minutes post-stressor (T6). The factor “TIME” was measured in units of mean 
cortisol level differences from baseline (CDbase) measurement, with each value equating 
to the difference between the cortisol level at the respective measurement point and the 
baseline cortisol level. For example, TIME 1 equals the difference in cortisol level 
between Tl and T2; and TIME 2 equals the difference in cortisol level between Tl and 
T3.
An initial series of repeated measures ANOVAs (Series 1) was performed on the 
full sample. Table 4 (below) depicts mean cortisol levels and standard deviations for NSI 
and control group participants separated by condition at each measurement point. Figure 
2 (also below) depicts this same data in a graphical format, documenting mean changes 
across time for each group in each condition. A test of requisite statistical assumptions
indicated that sphericity had been violated (x2= 94.49; p< .001; 8Greenhouse-Geisser= -494).
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Table 2. Number of Outliers Replaced by Cell, Time Interval, and Outlier Type
T2-T1 T3-T1 T4-T1 T5-T1 T6-T1
Total Total Total Total Total
(High/Low) (High/Low) (High/Low) (High/Low) (High/Low)
NSI 3 2 1 1 0
Rejected (3/0) (2/0) (1/0) (1/0) (0/0)
Control 3 2 2 2 1
Rejected (1/2) (2/0) (2/0) (1/1) (0/1)
NSI 2 1 2 0 0
Neutral (1/1) (1/0) (2/0) (0/0) (0/0)
Control 1 2 1 1 1
Neutral (1/0) (2/0) (1/0) (1/0) (1/0)
Therefore, Greenhouse-Geisser corrected ^ -values were used for significance tests of 
within-subjects effects for CDbasc scores.
Results of Series 1 ANOVA revealed no significant between-subjects main effect 
for Group (F(l, 50)=.578; p=A5\ ri2=.011). However, as depicted in Table 3, a 
significant within-subjects main effect was found for Time (F(2.18, 109.13)=45.179; 
/K.001; T|2 = .62). Across both groups and conditions, CDbase scores for T2-T1 were 
significantly higher than CDbase T3-T1 (p=.001), CDbaSe T4-T1 (p<.001), CDbase T5-T1 
(p<.001), and CDbase T6-T1 (p<.001). CDbase scores for T3-T1 were significantly higher 
than CDbase T4-T1 (p<.001), CDbase T5-T1 (p<.001), and CDbase T6-T1 (/X.001). 
Additionally, CDbasc scores for T4-T1 were significantly higher than CDbasc T5-T1 
(/K.005) and CDbase T6-T1 (/K.001). However, CDbase scores for T5-T1 were not 
significantly different from CDbaSe T6-T1 (p=. 173).
In sum, the main effect found for Time suggested that regardless of group or 
condition assignment, participants’ change in cortisol levels (CDbase) was, on average, 
both positive and significantly higher at the first post-stressor measurement point than at 
any of the subsequent measurements points. Results of Series 1 ANOVA also suggested 
that the subsequent CDbase scores progressively decreased following the stressor, with 
each CDbase being significantly lower than the previous score, with the exception of the 
T5-T1/T6-T1 comparison, which indicated a nonsignificant difference in these CDbase 
scores. Interestingly, all CDbase scores subsequent to the first post-stressor measurement 
point were negative, indicating that the mean cortisol levels at these measurement points 
were below the baseline measurement point. This finding is curious and warrants further 
exploration.
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Table 3. Series 1 Windsorized Mean Cortisol Difference (CDbase) Scores 
for NSI and Control Groups by Time Interval Across Groups and 
Condition
Time
Interval
Mean CDbase 
Scores (pg/dL ) SE
T2-T1 ,01332bcde .0041
T3-T1 -.00117cde .0036
T4-T1 -,01721de .0038
T5-T1 -.02613 .0042
T6-T1 -.03228 .0043
Notes: All differences are significant at p<.001; a=difference is significantly higher than T2-T1; 
b= difference is significantly higher than T3-T1; c= difference is significantly higher than T4-T1; 
d= difference is significantly higher than T5-T1; e= difference is significantly higher than T6-T1
Results of Series 1 repeated measures ANOVA also revealed a significant between- 
subjects main effect for Condition (F( 1, 50)=10.54; p=.002; ti2=. 174).
Across all times and groups, the CDbase score for those participants assigned to the 
Neutral condition (M=-.00254 pg/dL; SE= .00459 pg/dL) was significantly greater than 
that of Rejection condition participants (A/=-.02285 pg/dL; SE= .00426 pg/dL). Because 
both of these means are negative, it may be inferred that the robust effect of each 
condition resulted in a decrease in cortisol across time and group; however, the larger 
negative mean of the Rejection condition suggests that this group’s cortisol levels 
decreased further on average than those participants in the Neutral condition. Although 
no formal a priori hypothesis was made regarding this effect, this finding was
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counterintuitive, in that it was expected that cortisol levels would increase in those 
participants who were “rejected.”
A significant 2 (Condition) x 5 (Time) interaction effect was also found (F(l .98.
109.13) =7.75; p=.001; rj2=. 13), such that, for participants in the Rejected condition, T2- 
T1 CDbase scores were significantly greater than CDbase T3-T1, CDbase T4-T1, CDbase T5- 
Tl, and CDbase T6-T1. Additionally, participants assigned to the Neutral condition 
evidenced significantly greater (F(1.98, 109.13)=7.75; p=,001; r/2=A3) CDbase scores than 
participants in the Rejected condition at T6-T1. The a priori hypotheses of the present 
study did not directly speak to this comparison; however, this finding is nonetheless 
counterintuitive. The cortisol difference scores for both Neutral and Rejection 
participants were also negative at the T6-T1 juncture, indicating that both groups tended 
to experience decreases in cortisol levels. Consequently, this latter finding suggests that 
participants in the Neutral condition tended to have smaller decreases in cortisol than 
participants in the Rejection condition.
Furthermore, a significant 2 (Group) x 5 (Time) interaction effect was also found 
(F(1.98, 109.13)=5.19; p=.007; tj2=.094), such that, for participants in the NSI group, 
T2-T1 CDbase scores were significantly greater than CDbase T5-T1, CDbaSe scores. For 
Control participants, T2-T1 CDbase scores were significantly greater than T4-T1, T5-T1, 
and T6-T1 CDbase scores.
Of most relevance to Hypothesis 1, Series 1 repeated measures ANOVA revealed 
no significant 2 (Group) x 2 (Condition) x 5 (Time) interaction effect (F(1.98,
109.13) =.86; p=A3\ ?/2=.017). Thus, Hypothesis 1 was not supported by the results of 
these analyses.
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It was possible that extraneous variables such as caffeine or alcohol consumption 
contributed to a lack of significant findings in these analyses. Therefore, a follow-up 
repeated measures ANOVA (Series 2) on a reduced data set in which the 11 participants 
who reported having been non-adherent to pre-experimental dietary restrictions (no 
participants reported being non-adherent to pre-experimental behavioral restrictions) 
were removed. Similar to Series 1 ANOVAs, a violation of the sphericity assumption
was indicated (x2-  90.04; p< .001; fxjreenhouse-Geisscr= .432). Thus, Greenhouse-Geisser
corrected p-values were also used for Series 2 significance tests of within-subjects effects 
for CDbase scores.
Consistent with the initial ANOVA, the results of Series 2 ANOVAs revealed no 
significant between-subjects main effect for Group (F(l, 39)=.244;p=.62; rj2=.006).
Also in accordance with initial analyses, Series 2 ANOVA revealed a robust, significant 
within-subjects main effect for Time (F( 1.94, 75.68)=39.38;p<.001; r/2=.502), with a 
pattern of CDbase scores that was identical to that of Series 1 in both proportion and 
degree of significance (all /v<.005). As found in Series 1 ANOVA, Series 2 analyses 
revealed a significant between-subjects main effect for Condition (F(l, 39)=8.04; p=.007; 
T72=.171). Across all times and groups, the CDbase score for those participants assigned to 
the Neutral condition (A/=-.00329 pg/dL; SE- .00519 pg/dL) was significantly greater 
than that of Rejection condition participants (M=~.02337 pg/dL; SE= .00482 pg/dL).
Once again, both o f  these means are negative, indicating that the effect o f  each condition 
resulted in a decrease in cortisol across time and group.
Also consistent with Series 1 ANOVA, Series 2 ANOVA revealed a significant 2 
(Condition) x 5 (Time) interaction effect (F(1.73, 75.67)=9.88; /X.001; rj2=.202). The
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pattern of CDbase score differences were identical to that of Series 1 ANOVA. Similarly, 
“neutral” participants demonstrated significantly greater (p<.01) CDbase scores than 
“rejected” participants for T6-T1. However, in contrast to Series 1, no significant 2 
(Group) x 5 (Time) interaction effect (F( 1.73, 75.67)=3.94;p=.03; 72=.092) was found.
Finally, tests of within-subjects interaction effects revealed no significant 2 (Group) 
x 2 (Condition) x 5 (Time) interaction effect (F( 1.73, 75.67)=1.11;p=.33; ?/2=.028).
Thus, even with the potential effects of caffeine and alcohol on cortisol controlled for, 
these data were not supportive of Hypothesis 1. It is also important to note that 
controlling for these factors involved omitting a subset (n=l 1) equal to about one-fifth of 
the total sample (n=54) from statistical analyses, which further lowered the power of this 
design.
Due to the potential effects of covariance from external factors on cortisol 
responses, a 2 (Group) x 2 (Condition) x 5 (Time) repeated measures ANCOVA for 
CDbase scores was also conducted using SCL-90-R Anxiety scores and Gender as 
covariates. It was hypothesized that holding both of these factors constant would result 
in the significant differences hypothesized in Hypothesis 1. A p -value of .05 was set for 
this test.
Results of this ANCOVA indicated that neither SCL-90-R Anxiety scores 
(F(2.20, 105.81 )=2.34; p=. 11; ti2=.046), nor Gender (F(2.20, 105.81 )=1.38; p=.26; 
r|2=.028) was significantly related to cortisol responses. This analysis also revealed a 
significant between-subjects main effect for Condition (F(l, 48)=10.50; p=.002; r|2=. 18). 
Across all times and groups, the CDbase score for those participants assigned to the 
Neutral condition (M=-.023 (ig/dL; SE= .00464 pg/dL) was significantly greater than that
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of Rejection condition participants (A/= -.00233 pg/dL; SE= .00431 pg/dL).
Furthermore, a significant 2 (Condition) x 5 (Time) interaction effect was also found 
(F(2.20, 105.81 )=9.19; /?<.001; r|2=.16), such that Rejected participants (A/=-.05246 
pg/dL; SE= .00585 pg/dL) had significantly lower CDbasc scores at T6-T1 than Neutral 
participants (M—.01208 pg/dL; SE= .0063 pg/dL) at T6-T1(F(1, 48)=10.50; p=.002;
p2=.18).
Finally, identical to Series 1 and 2 ANOVAs, repeated measures ANCOVA 
revealed no significant 2 (Group) x 2 (Condition) x 5 (Time) interaction effect (F(2.20, 
105.81)=.63; p=.55; ?/=.013). Thus, even when potential covariates were held constant, 
Hypothesis 1 was not supported by the results of these analyses.
Hypothesis 2
Between-groups differences in DERS scores were tested using MANOVA with 
Bonferroni correction to control for Type I error rates, which are known to be inflated 
when between-groups differences are analyzed for multiple potentially related dependent 
variables. A p-value criterion of .01 was set for all analyses. NS1 participants scored 
significantly higher than control group participants on Nonacceptance of Emotional 
Responses (F(l, 52)= 8.63; p  =.005), Lack of Emotional Awareness (F(l, 52)= 9.43; p  
=.003), Limited Access to Emotion Regulation Strategies (F(l, 52)= 8.75; p  =.005), and 
Lack of Emotional Clarity (F(l, 52)= 9.82; p  =.003). The between-groups difference for 
Impulse Control Difficulties indicated a strong trend toward significance (F(l, 52)= 4.21; 
p  =.045), with NSI participants scoring higher than control group participants. The 
between groups difference for the Difficulties Engaging in Goal-Directed Behavior 
subscale was not significant (F(l, 52)= 1.31; p  = 26). Mean scores and standard
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deviations of DERS subscales, and effect sizes for be tween-groups differences are 
displayed in Table 4.
Hypothesis 3
Hypothesis 3 was contingent on the results of Hypothesis 1. Because there was not a 
significant interaction effect between Group, Time, and Condition, Hypothesis 3 could 
not be tested as stated. Thus, a post hoc revision of Hypothesis 3 (Hypothesis 3a), 
proposing that DERS subscale scores would correlate significantly and positively with 
CDbase scores was forwarded. An additional post hoc hypothesis (Hypothesis 3b) 
proposed that, because cortisol secretion is an index of HPAA functioning, which is in 
turn an index of emotional reguladon/dysregulation, raw cortisol levels would correlate 
significantly and positively with DERS in the full sample and sub-samples. Hypotheses 
3a and 3b were tested using Pearson bivariate product-moment correlations.
Hypothesis 3 a
Results of correlational analyses for the full sample revealed no significant 
correlations between any of the DERS subscales and any CDbase scores: CDbase T2-T1 
(all/w>.10); CDbase T3-T1 (all ps>M); CDbase T4-T1 (all ps>.39); CDbase T5-T1 (all 
ps>.28); and CDbase T6-T1 (all / m> .13). Similarly, no significant correlations were found 
between any of the DERS subscales and any C D t e e  scores in the Control group: C D base 
T2-T1 (allps>. 12); C D base T3-T1 (all ps>.\7); C D basc T4-T1 (allps>.28); C D base T5-T1 
(all ps>. 12); and C D base T6-T1 (all ps>.21).
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Table 4. Series 1 Windsorized Mean Cortisol Difference (CDbase) Scores (pg/dL )for NS1 and Control Groups by
Condition
T2-T1 T3-T1 T4-T1 T5-T1 T6-T1
NSI
Rejected .0077 -.0067 -.0276 -.0484 -.0394
(SD) (.0258) (.0215) (.0251) (.0306) (.0240)
Control
Rejected .0229 -.0001 -.0294 -.0407 -.0720
(SD) (.0423) (.0305) (.0339) (.0401) (.0326)
NSI
Neutral .0109 .0060 -.0067 -.0789 -.0036
(SD) (.0084) (.0199) (.0243) (.0295) (.0415)
Control
Neutral .0121 -.0001 -.0092 -.0136 -.0199
(SD) (.0303) (.0294) (.0293) (.0201) (.0267)
Figure 2. Series 1 Windsorized Mean Cortisol Difference Scores ((ig/dL) for NSI and Control Groups by
Condition Across Time
T2-T1 T3-T1 T4-T1 T5-T1 T6-T1
NSI-R 
- CON-R 
NSI-N 
•  CON-N
Notes: NSI-R= NSI Rejected; CON-R= Control Rejected; NSI-N= NSI Neutral; CON-N= Control Neutral
Table 5. Mean Scores and Standard Deviations for Difficulties in Emotion 
Regulation Subscales____________________________________
NSI
(SD)
Control
(SD)
D
NONACCEPTANCE 12.31** 8.43 .79
(6.49) (2.5)
STRATEGIES 14.58** 10.57 .79
(6.47) (2.97)
AWARENESS 16.35** 12.18 .83
(5.7) (4.21)
CLARITY 10.81** 7.96 .85
(4.14) (2.35)
IMPULSE 9.35* 7.29 .55
(4.99) (1.76)
GOALS 13.92 12.18 .31
(5.37) (5.79)
Notes: *p<.05;** p<.01
Correlational analyses of the NSI sample revealed a significant correlation (r=.427; 
p=.03) between the DERS Difficulties Engaging in Goal-Directed Behavior subscale and 
CDbase T3-T1. All other correlations in this subsample analysis were nonsignificant: 
CDbasc T2-T1 (all ps>.23); CDbase T4-T1 (all ps>.07); CDtee T5-T1 (all /w>.31); and
C D bas(; T 6-T 1 (a ll ps~>.2\).
Hypothesis 3b
Correlational analyses of mean raw cortisol levels and mean DERS subscale 
scores in the full sample revealed no significant relationships among these variables: T1
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(all ps>.0 7 T2 (all ps>.07); T3 (all /w>.08); T4 (all ps>.23); T5 (allps>.06); and T6 (all 
ps>.26). Analyses of Control group participants revealed a significant correlation (r=- 
.394; p<.038) between the DERS Difficulties Engaging in Goal-Directed Behavior 
subscale and raw cortisol level at T3, suggesting that greater difficulties with goal- 
directed behavior were associated with lower cortisol levels 35 minutes post-stressor for 
Control group participants. All other correlations in this subsample analysis were 
nonsignificant: T1 (all /w>.08); T2 (all /«>.10); T4 (all /w>.18); T5 (all /«>.14); and T6 
(all ps>. 12). Finally, bivariate analyses of the NSI sample revealed no significant 
relationships between raw cortisol data and DERS subscales: T1 (all ps>.06); T2 (all 
/v>.14); T3 (all ps>.\ 1); T4 (all ps>.\ 1); T5 (all ps>.22); and T6 (all /«>.15).
Hypothesis 4
Hypothesis 4 was tested using a series of Pearson bivariate product-moment 
correlations to evaluate the strength of the relationship between mean PANAS positive 
affect (PA) and negative affect (NA) scores and respective salivary cortisol level 
differences (C D b ase) at each of the five post-stressor measurement points in both groups 
and both conditions. Individual correlational analyses were not significant for NSI 
Rejected (all ps>.067); NSI Neutral (all ps>.086); Control Rejected (all /?.?>. 135); or 
Control Neutral (all /v>.131). Thus, Hypothesis 4 was not supported by these analyses, 
suggesting that there was not a unique relationship between post-baseline differences in 
cortisol secretion and PA or NA in any of the cells in this study.
Post-hoc Hypotheses and Analyses
In addition to the above hypotheses, two post-hoc hypotheses were tested. First, a 
2 (Group) x 2 (Condition) x 5 (Time) interaction effect for PANAS NA and PA scores
118
was hypothesized. Specifically, it was hypothesized that NSI Rejected Participants 
would have significantly higher mean differences from baseline in negative affect and 
significantly lower mean differences from baseline in positive affect than participants in 
other cells at each post-baseline measurement point. Second, a 2 (Group) x 2 (Condition) 
x 2 (Gender) x 5 (Time) interaction effect for CDbase scores was hypothesized and tested.
Positive Affect
Repeated measures ANOVAs were performed on the full sample. The results of 
these ANOVAs are presented below in text and in Table 5 and Figure 3. Similar to 
ANOVAs for cortisol data, a test of requisite statistical assumptions indicated that
sphericity had been violated (x2= 35.51; p< .001; Scireenhouse-Geisser= -732). Therefore,
Greenhouse-Geisser corrected p-values were once again used for significance tests of 
within-subjects effects for P A  score differences from baseline (P A D b asc  scores).
Results of A N O V A  for P A N A S  P A D b ase  scores revealed no significant between- 
subjects main effect for Group (F( 1, 50)=.64; p=A3; r\2=.013) or Condition (F(l,
50)=1.91;p= .\l t]2=.037). Conversely, a significant within-subjects main effect was 
found for Time (F(3.31, 165.82)=5.74; p=.001; q2 = .103). However, none of the inter­
interval differences was significant at a priori levels (allps_> .012).
Results of this ANOVA also revealed no significant interaction effects for 2 
(Group) x 2 (Condition) (F (l, 50)=.13;p=.72; q2=.003); 2 (Group) x 5 (Time) (F (2.93,
146.40)=.61;p=.60; q2=.012); 2 (Condition) x 5 (Time) ( F ( 2.93, 146.40)=.38; p= 76; 
q2=.008); 2 (Group) x 2 (Condition) x 5 (Time) (F (2.93, 146.40)=.54;p=.65; q2=.011) 
comparisons.
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Table 6. Mean PANAS Positive Affect Score Differences (PADbase) for NSI and Control Groups by Condition
T2-T1 T3-T1 T4-T1 T5-T1 T6-T1
NSI
Rejected -2.43 -1.86 -3.57 -3.43 -4.29
(SD) (4.69) (4.11) (4.40) (4.01) (4.56)
Control
Rejected -2.67 -1.87 -3.73 -4.20 -5.13
(SD) (3.20) (5.28) (4.32) (5.97) (6.50)
NSI
Neutral -.25 -1.17 -2.0 -1.75 -2.50
(SD) (1.91) (2.76) (2.63) (2.70) (3.63)
Control
Neutral -2.46 -.62 -3.62 -2.69 -2.69
(SD) (3.20) (3.45) (4.21) (.0201) (4.85)
Figure 3. Mean PANAS Positive Affect Score Differences (PADbase) for NSI and Control Groups by Condition
NSI-R
CON-R
-±-NSI-N
CON-N
Notes: NSI-R= NSI Rejected; CON-R= Control Rejected; NSI-N=NSI Neutral; CON-N= Control Neutral
Negative Affect
Repeated measures ANOVAs were also performed on the full sample for PANAS 
NA data. The results of these ANOVAs are presented below in text and in Table 6 and 
Figure 4. Here too, the requisite statistical assumptions indicated that sphericity had been
violated (%2= 90.77;p< .001; fioreenhouse-Geisser= .602). Therefore, Greenhouse-Geisser
corrected p-values were used for significance tests of within-subjects effects forNA score 
differences from baseline (NADbase scores). Results of the ANOVA for PANAS NADbase 
scores revealed no significant between-subjects main effect for Group (F(l, 50)=. 103; 
p=. 75; r|2=.033), or Condition (F (l, 50)=19; p=.67; r|2=.004). The test of the within- 
subjects main effect of Time was also nonsignificant (F(2.41, 120.38)=3.31; p=.032; 
q2=.062). Results of this ANOVA also revealed no significant 2 (Group) x 2 (Condition) 
(F(l ,  50)=.59;p=.45; r|2=.012); 2 (Group) x 5 (Time) (F(2.41, 120.38)=. 1.69;p=. 18; 
r|2= 033); 2 (Condition) x 5 (Time) (F(2.41, 120.38)=1.69;p=.18; r ^ . 022); or 2 (Group) 
x 2 (Condition) x 5 (Time) (F(2.41, 120.38)=.522;p=.63; q2=.01) interaction effects.
Gender Interactions
A repeated measures ANOVA was also performed on the full sample with gender 
included as a between-subjects factor (in addition to Group and Condition) to test for 
main and interaction effects of this variable on CDbase scores, which may not have been 
detected in the ANCOVA discussed earlier. As with all previously described ANOVAs, 
the sphericity assumption was violated (y?= 72.55; p< .001; Soreenhouse-oeisser= -554), and
Greenhouse-Geisser corrected p-values were used for significance tests of within-subjects 
effects for CDbase score differences (see Figure 5 below for Gender comparisons).
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Results of this post hoc ANOVA for CDbaSe scores revealed no significant 
between-subjects main effect of Gender (F( 1,46)=2.02; p=.16; r|2=.042). Additionally, 
no interaction effects were found for Gender x Condition (F(l, 46)=.22; p=.65; t|2=.006), 
or Gender x Time (F(2.22, 101.99)=.73; p=.50; rj2=.016) comparisons. However, a 
significant three-way interaction effect was found for Gender x Group x Time (F(2.22,
101.99) =5.43; /7=.004; q2=.l 1). This interaction indicated that: (1) mean CDbase scores 
for NSI males were significantly higher at T2-T1 than T4-T1, T5-T1, and T6-T1 CDbase 
scores; (2) mean C D baSe scores for Control males were significantly higher at T2-T1 than 
T4-T1, T5-T1, and T6-T1 C D base scores; and (3) mean C D base scores for Control females 
were significantly higher T2-T1 than T6-T1. This comparison also indicated that mean 
CDbase scores for NSI females were significantly higher than mean CDbase scores for 
Control females at T6-T1; and that mean CDbase scores for Control males were 
significantly higher at T3-T1 than T6-T1.
Although a three-way Group x Condition x Time was not found (F(2.22,
101.99) = 1.26; p=.29; tj2=.027), a four-way interaction effect was found for the Gender x 
Group x Condition x Time comparison (F(2.22, 101.99)=5.61; p=.004; rj2=. 11). This 
interaction revealed that: (1) mean CDbase scores for NSI Rejected females were 
significantly higher than Control Rejected females at T6-T1; and (2) mean CDbase scores 
for Control Neutral males were significantly higher than Control Rejected females at T4- 
Tl, T5-T1, and T6-T1.
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Table 7. Mean l1 AN AS Negative Affect Score Differences (NADhase) for NST and Control Groups by Condition
T2-T1 T3-T1 T4-T1 T5-T1 T6-T1
NSI
Rejected 1.36 -.21 -.21 <.0001 -.36
(SD) (2.37) (1.97) (1.72) (1.88) (2.24)
Control
Rejected 1.20 -.40 .47 .73 1.07
(SD) (1.90) (1.99) (1.77) (2.34) (3.08)
NSI
Neutral .83 .0833 .50 <.0001 -.0833
(SD) (3.46) (3.20) (3.40) (1.35) (2.68)
Control
Neutral .0769 <.0001 -.23 .23 .23
(SD) (.95) (.71) (.73) (.73) (1.01)
Figure 4. MeanPANAS Negative Affect Score Differences (NADbase) for NSI and Control Groups by Condition
T2-T1 T3-T1 T4-T1 T5-T1 T6-T1
NSI-R
CON-R
NSI-N
CON-N
Notes: NSI-R=NSI Rejected; CON-R= Control Rejected; NSI-N=NSI Neutral; CON-N= Control Neutral
Figure 5. Mean C D baSe Scores (jig/dL) by Gender by Time Across Condition
T2-T1 T3-T1 T4-T1 T5-T1 T6-T1
CHAPTER IV
DISCUSSION
Non-suicidal self-injury, in all of its various forms, is a dangerous and poorly 
understood behavior. Despite the myriad explanations that have been forwarded, the 
exact etiology and functions of NSI remain debatable. The most comprehensive, and 
arguably most viable, explanatory theory in the study of this clinical phenomenon has 
historically been the biopsychosocial model. Although some peripheral evidence has 
been found to support the biological component of this model (e.g., Cassano, Latanzi, 
Pini, Osso, Battistini, & Cassano, 2001; Chengappa et al., 1999), this aspect of the 
theorem has nonetheless remained without direct and systematic empirical support.
The present study aimed to examine one potential avenue of biological emotional 
dysregulation in self-injurers by assessing HPAA functioning using analysis of cortisol 
secretion as a proxy measure. The guiding principle of this research was that, if a 
biological difference in stress response was observed in individuals who engage in NSI 
compared to healthy individuals who do not, this would contribute to a more complete 
understanding of NSI by providing evidence of a specific biological factor that may 
mitigate this behavioral pathology. This research was aimed at providing evidence of the 
convergence of self-report and biological indices of emotional regulation, so that the 
relationship between emotional dysregulation and NSI could be better understood.
The data reported in this paper were evidentiary of support for some hypotheses, 
but not for others. The primary hypothesis of this study was that, when exposed to an
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uncontrollable, socially evaluative interpersonal situation in which they were rejected, 
individuals who engage in NSI would exhibit significantly higher levels of cortisol from 
baseline than psychologically healthy individuals experiencing the same rejection. The 
ANOVAs conducted to evaluate this hypothesis found no supporting evidence of such an 
effect. This remained true even when accounting for the potential effects of alcohol and 
caffeine consumption via removal of potentially contaminated samples.
Although none of the hypothesized quantitative differences in cortisol were 
significant a number of interesting qualitative patterns were observed in these data. First, 
examination of Figure 2 indicates a somewhat contra-hypothetical finding. As 
hypothesized, there were initial increases in cortisol levels for participants in each cell 
following the stressor. However, the highest increases were found in the Control 
Rejected cell, and the lowest increases were found for the NSI Rejected cell. It was 
proposed that NSI Rejected participants would exhibit the highest initial cortisol 
secretions. Conversely, these results seem to indicate that this cell scored just slightly 
lower on average than even those participants in both groups assigned to the Neutral 
condition.
Although it was comprised of non-significant between-groups differences, the 
above pattern merits exploration. These differences are not likely to be accounted for by 
differences in interpersonal sensitivity or social anxiety, as NSI participants actually 
reported slightly, but not significantly (p=.7\ ), higher scores on the SIAS. The NSI 
Rejected cell evidenced lower CDbase scores at T2-T1 than all other cells, including 
Control Rejected participants, however the difference was not significant. Another 
intriguing, though not significant, pattern was observable in the data in Figure 2. NSI
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participants (irrespective of condition) tended to exhibit progressive decreases in CDbase 
scores across time up to 50 minutes post-baseline, followed by a slight increase in 
cortisol response at 65 minutes post-baseline; whereas Control participants (regardless of 
condition) exhibited a progressive decrease in CDbase scores that continued for the 
duration of the experiment. Furthermore, the largest decreases in CDbase scores were also 
in the NSI group, with the NSI Neutral cell evidencing the largest drop at C D haSe T5-T1. 
This is a complex pattern of data that does not easily lend itself to a simple explanation.
Examination of the data suggests two primary possibilities for the pattern of 
results described above. One possibility is that the normal cortisol response to stress was 
inhibited or blunted in these self-injurers. Indeed, HPAA dysfunction may be 
characterized by either a hyper- or hypocortisolemic response. Another potential 
explanation is that the cortisol response in self-injurers is delayed. This would be 
supported by the gradual rise that was observed across NSI participants in both 
conditions. In this vein, it’s possible that the measurement simply failed to capture a 
difference in cortisol response because the timing of collections ended at 65 minutes 
post-stressor and the cortisol response window is far more protracted for self-injurers. 
Nonetheless, any inferences in this regard are attenuated by a lack of significance and 
remain strictly hypothetical.
The cortisol data in the present study may interface with the emotion regulation- 
biopsychosocial model in a unique way, and theoretically portend other biological 
mechanisms for NSI to function. Although cortisol secretion patterns are proximally 
reflective of emotion regulation vis-a-vis HPAA functioning, and theoretically should be 
different in self-injurers than psychologically healthy controls, other biological systems
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may be dysregulated in those who engage in NSI. In fact, while the HPAA is a central 
mechanism for emotional regulation, it is certainly not the only tract for this process. For 
example, emotion regulation also involves the orbital-frontal cortex, anterior cingulate 
cortex, and the amygdala; disruption in any of these circuits has been associated with 
impulsivity and violence in some prior research (Davidson, Putnam, & Larson, 2000). 
Previous pharmacological research has also documented that the mechanism of action of 
some anticonvulsant compounds in Bipolar disordered patients operates through 
reduction of amygdala reactivity to emotional stimuli (e.g., Drevets et al., 2002; Krystal 
et al., 2002) and limitation of electrical activity in the anterior cingulate cortex. At the 
molecular level, anticonvulsants appear to work by potentiating the inhibitory 
neurotransmitter gamma-aminobutyric acid (GABA) and stabilizing the neuronal 
membrane at the sodium ion channel through inhibiting the release of aspartate and 
glutamate (Blumberg et al., 2000; Chengappa et al., 1999; Krystal et al., 2002; 
Theoharides, Dessain, & Shuster, 1992). This research suggests that any of these 
neurochemicals may offer an alternative to cortisol as biological mechanisms (or 
biomarkers) of emotional dysregulation in individuals who self-injure.
Furthermore, there is evidence to suggest that an association exists between 
beginning anticonvulsant treatment and decreases in the frequency of NSI in certain 
patient populations (Cassano, Latanzi, Pini, Osso, Battistini, & Cassano, 2001; 
Chengappa et al., 1999). For example, in Chengappa and colleagues’ study of 
Topiramate (an anticonvulsant) for the treatment of mania, the authors reported an 
ancillary finding of “near abolition of self-mutilation” (Chengappa et al., 1999, p.5) in 
two of their Bipolar Disordered participants who were diagnosed with comorbid BPD.
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Similarly, Cassano et al. (2001) reported that administration of Topiramate was 
associated with three-month cessation of NSI in a BPD/Bipolar Disorder woman after 
two weeks of medication, and a subsequent nine-month cessation of NSI following 
resumption of this anticonvulsant. Interestingly, the NSI cessation occurred in absence of 
any change in depressive symptoms. This is contrasted with work by Colman, Newman, 
Schopflocher, Bland, and Dyck (2004) that found depression to be a primary predictor of 
“repeat parasuicide,” although this latter study employed an International Classification 
of Diseases-9 definition that also includes suicide attempts. Nonetheless, this research 
suggests a biological component to emotion dysregulation may be operating in NSI, but it 
also suggests that other systems may be more integral to the relationship between this 
behavior and emotion regulation than the HPAA. For example, dysregulation (excesses 
or deficiencies) of electrical activity in the orbital-frontal or cingulate cortexes during 
distress could disrupt executive functioning, and lead to increased impulsive behaviors 
and reduced inclinations toward self-preserving behaviors. In this vein, future research 
examining activation of these neural regions using either fMRI or PET imaging of NSI 
individuals during tasks inducing frustration or negative affect may be useful in 
furthering the understanding the neural correlates of emotion regulation/dysregulation in 
NSI.
Alternatively, research has also indicated that chemical stimulation of the central 
nucleus of the amygdala by glutamate, the secretion of which is inhibited by 
anticonvulsant compounds, is associated with pronounced cardiovascular reactivity and 
gastroenterological activity (e.g., ulceration, gastric acid production). These effects of 
glutaminergic stimulation are associated with poor regulation of (i.e. chronic) anxiety and
131
fear. Indeed, the dense array of corticotropin releasing hormone (CRH) receptors and 
nerve tracts in the amygdala make this structure vulnerable to influxes of CRH (DeSouza, 
Insel, Perrin, Rivier, Vale, & Kuhar, 1985; Uryu, Okumura, Shibasaki, & Sakanaka,
1992). Such influxes are associated with anxiogenic effects. Substantial research 
indicates that fear responses are attenuated in many species by the introduction locally of 
GABA or GABA agonists, opiatergic agonists, benzodiazepines, and glutamate 
antagonists, among others (e.g., Gallagher, Kapp, McNall, & Pascoe, 1981; Gallagher, 
Kapp, & Pascoe, 1982; Helmsetter, 1993; Roozendaal, Wiersma, Driscoll, Koolhaas, & 
Bohus, 1992; Shibata, Kataoka, Yamashita, & Ueki, 1986; Sullivan, Henke, Ray, Herbert, 
and Trimper, 1989; Takao, Nagatani, Kasahara, Hashimoto, 1992). Thus, a failure to 
inhibit glutamate may result in hyperstimulation of key areas of the amygdala involved in 
emotion regulation, in turn resulting in decreased stability of neuronal activity in this 
structure. Decreased stability of neuronal activity may result in decreased overall 
regulation of emotional behaviors.
As the above discussion of neurobiology pertains to emotion dysregulation and 
NS1 etiology, it is possible that a lower threshold for emotional dysregulation in self- 
injurers exists. If this is the case, such a lower threshold may be related to higher 
densities of CRH receptors in the amygdala, more frequent pulses of CRH released into 
the amygdala, poor inhibition of glutamate, or a combination of these factors. To date, 
no known research has addressed any of these questions in self-injurers.
It is also important to note that, while the aim of this study was to provide 
evidence of convergence between physiological and self-report modalities of emotional 
regulation measurement, there is ample stress-induction literature to suggest that similar
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discrepancies are commonly found in this type of research design. Linden’s (2004) 
extensive treatment of the stress research literature accurately notes that it is generally 
rare for biomarkers of stress to be synchronous with self-report measures. Indeed, the 
majority of studies find a correlation between subjective ratings and physiological 
measures of r < .3, with subjective stress ratings accounting only infrequently for over 
10% of variance in physiology (Linden, 1987). Earlier work by Pennebaker (1982) found 
substantial differences in research participants’ willingness and capacity to identify and 
disclose changes in their physiological states. The subjective-objective index 
discrepancies are likely related to a combination of such reluctance with people’s reliance 
on situational cues for information about their internal state, and the fact that there are 
very few connections between consciousness and the functions of the central nervous 
system (Linden, 2004). The aggregate findings from the stress response literature fit with 
the biopsychosocial model of NSI in that they portend interactive, yet differentially 
weighted, effects of biology/physiology, social dynamics, and psychological processes.
In short, stress research indicates that there are several biological, psychological, and 
contextual factors that, in concert with each other, determine an individual’s stress 
response; and the relative importance of these factors is likely to be idiographic.
Alternatively, some models of the stress response (Cox & McKay, 1978), or stress 
regulation, posit that a stress response to a “demand situation” is mediated by one’s 
cognitive appraisal (i.e. perception) of the demand-to-coping resources ratio. This is also 
amenable to a biopsychosocial approach in that the same three components are 
represented, required, and interactive in such a model. Here, an imbalance in this ratio in 
which there are more demands than resources to deal with those demands results in
133
stress. Thus, “demand”is comprised of actual demand characteristics of the environment 
plus one’s learning history and idiographic differences of the individual; resources for 
coping are comprised of a similar combination of factors (i.e. actual resources plus 
learning and personal history differences). This model is akin to information-processing 
models of stress responses (Hamilton, 1980), where stress is defined based on the 
individual’s evaluation of the personal significance of the stress-inducing stimulus and 
learning history with available coping strategies (e.g., have the resources been sufficient 
in the past?).
Accordingly, the stressor in the present study may have been judged to be 
insignificant or meaningless by participants for multiple reasons. First, the stressor was 
brief and singular, rather than protracted and chronic. The duration of this stressor may 
have thus been insufficient to engender salience for participants, resulting in a cognitive 
appraisal of the stressor as non-threatening, or simply not stressful. Additionally, the 
stressor may have lacked direct personal relevance because the rejection did not originate 
from a personal acquaintance or a friend. Another consideration here is that almost 50% 
of the sample suspected that they had been deceived in some way, which had the 
potential to impact these participants’ stress response.
Alternatively, this stressor may have been consonant with the expectations of self- 
injurers who were rejected for typical outcomes in social scenarios. Essentially, it is 
possible that rejected self-injurers have either simply habituated to rejection or have such 
low self-esteem that they anticipate such rejection. This possibility is supported 
theoretically by Linehan’s (1993a) concept of the invalidating environment (which is 
often characterized by rejection) as a spawning pool for self-destructive behaviors. The
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possibility that poor self-regard played a role in the cortisol secretion changes would be 
supported peripherally in work by Scarpa and Luscher (2001), which revealed that self­
esteem mediated the relationship between depression and cortisol reactivity. In this 
study, Scarpa and Luscher found that low self-esteem was associated with decreases in 
cortisol response to an uncontrollable laboratory stressor in depressed participants, while 
the reverse was found for high self-esteem. Applied to these results, it is possible that 
lower self-esteem in NSI participants affected cortisol reactivity by producing decreases 
in cortisol secretion in response to stress. However this would not account for the same 
pattern being observed in Control participants. Future research involving similar stress- 
induction may benefit from having a longer-lasting, more personally relevant, and more 
effectively deceptive stressor; however, this must be balanced with ethical demands.
Despite the lack of support for Hypothesis 1, partial support was found for other a 
priori predictions. Among those hypotheses that were at least partially supported was the 
hypothesis that NSI participants would report significantly more difficulties with emotion 
regulation. This hypothesis was partially supported in that between-groups differences 
were significant for most DERS subscales. Specifically, participants in the NSI group 
reported significantly greater difficulties with emotional clarity, accessing emotion 
regulation strategies, acceptance of emotional responses, and emotional awareness than 
Control participants. These results suggest that self-injuring participants in this study 
perceived themselves as struggling with these aspects of emotion regulation more so than 
non-self-injurers did, and are accordant with the psychological aspect of the 
biopsychosocial model. This feature may suggest a psychological substrate for NSI. If 
individuals who engage in NSI believe they have fewer coping skills in general (or that
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they lack the requisite coping skills for a given situation), then they may be less likely 
attempt to use adaptive coping strategies that are not self-destructive. Again, from and 
informational processing perspective, if the cognitive appraisal of the demand resources 
ratio suggests that one’s skills are insufficient for the situation, then distress and self- 
destruction may ensue. Over time, a general lack of self-efficacy for coping with distress 
may develop and create a perpetually self-fulfilling prophecy (i.e. “I couldn’t cope with 
X before, I still don’t have what it takes to get through X now, so why try anything 
different when nothing will change.”).
Conversely, NSI participants did not report significantly more difficulties with 
engaging in goal-directed behavior. Given that such behaviors can be instrumental to 
emotion regulation, it is unclear why this may be. One potential explanation for a lack of 
a significant difference in difficulties with goal-directed behaviors is that NSI may be 
viewed by the self-injurer as a goal-directed behavior in and of itself. So, for example, 
when someone who self-injurers endorses “When I’m upset, I have difficulty thinking 
about anything else,” as applying to them 0-10% of the time, this may be because they 
know that they have their self-injury to focus on. This is supported by both emerging 
quantitative research (e.g., Himber, 1994; Whitlock, Muehlenkamp, & Eckenrode, in 
press) and more qualitative, literary depictions of NSI (Miskec & McGee, 2007; Strong, 
1998) suggesting that this behavior may be ritualistic, involving extensive planning for at 
least some people who self-injure. From the quantitative perspective, Whitlock et al. (in 
press) report that, among college self-injurers, a subset (16.4%) of more severe injurers 
reported having a regular self-injury routine. About one-third (31.6%) of this same 
subset also reported NSI characterized by multiple phases, further suggesting a
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systematic approach to NSI, even if only inadvertently. However, such an explanation is 
only one extrapolation borne out of the behavioral-functional models of NSI (e.g., Nock 
& Prinstein, 2004, 2005), and is based on speculation rather than any extant empirical 
evidence.
Another possible explanation for a lack of a significant difference in goal-directed 
behaviors is that self-injurers may lack acceptance (or even acknowledgement) of their 
emotional states and emotional awareness, both of which were significantly more 
difficult for NSI participants in this study. In this vein, someone who engages in NSI 
may not see themselves as having difficulty with “getting things done” when they are 
“upset” because they are not attending to the “upset” emotions in the first place. Thus, 
emotional nonacceptance and lack of emotional awareness may theoretically mediate 
self-reported difficulties with goal-directed behavior or a perceived lack thereof. This 
would also be supported by the recent work of Whitlock et al. (in press) which found that, 
at most, less than half of those who engage in NSI may see it as life-interfering behavior. 
Further research will be needed to establish the validity of any of these possible 
hypotheses.
One interesting aspect of the DERS data presented here is that difficulty with 
impulse control was not clearly significantly different (p=.045) in NSI participants, which 
is discordant with some models of NSI and consonant with others (Klonsky, 2007).
Some researchers (e.g., Favazza, 1995; New et al., 1995; Welch & Linhan, 2002) have 
proposed that NSI is a behavior primarily based on problems with controlling one’s 
impulses (i.e. to self-injure), while others have posited that NSI (especially in BPD) is a 
“manipulative” strategy, primarily aimed at extracting what is needed/desired from the
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environment and those in it (e.g., Adams et al., 2001). Some empirical support exists for 
the former of these positions, although no clear evidence has been found for the latter. 
Simeon et al. (1992), for example, found that all participants in their sample of self- 
injuring and non-self-injuring personality disordered patients had elevated levels of 
impulsivity, with self-injurers reporting more aggression than non-self-injurers. Other 
researchers have found that individuals with one impulsivity-based form of 
psychopathology (e.g., substance abuse, eating disorders) are more likely to meet criteria 
for other forms of psychopathology that have impulsivity features (Evans & Lacey, 1992; 
Fitcher et al., 1994). Other work examining clinical correlates of different subtypes of 
NSI, has recently emerged to show high levels of impulsivity as a characteristic of self- 
injurers (St. Germain & Hooley, 2008). The current data seem to suggest a modest role 
at best (d=.55) for difficulties with impulse control in NSI. It is possible that this role is 
mediated by other domains of emotion regulation, and further research will be required to 
more adequately address this question.
The analyses indicated that Hypotheses 3a and 3b were mostly not supported. 
However, a modest significant relationship was found between difficulties engaging in 
goal-directed behavior and cortisol level differences from baseline at 35 minutes post­
stressor in NSI participants. Although this relationship was only modest (r=.427; p=.03), 
this relationship was not found in the Control group. Interestingly, analyses of 
correlations between raw cortisol data and DERS scores indicated a modest, but 
significant inverse relationship (r=-.394; p=.038) between goal-directed behavior 
problems and T3 cortisol levels in the Control group, indicating that as cortisol rose in 
Controls, these difficulties decreased, and vice versa. This finding is also ironic in that
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this domain was the only DERS subscale that did not evidence significant between group 
differences.
Why the relationship between cortisol differences and goal-directed behaviors 
was significant 35 minutes post-stressor, but not at any other point, and not for Controls, 
is unclear. Moreover, it is unclear why T3 cortisol levels were significantly related to 
this same emotion regulation difficulty but not others, not at other measurement points, 
and not in the NS I group. Nonetheless, these data suggest a relationship between 
biological and psychological indices of emotion dysregulation in self-injurers that may be 
mitigated by time. It is possible that following activation of the HPAA, an absence of 
directed or engaging activity (as was part of this study’s design) is associated with further 
increases in HPAA activity. If one assumes that being shut in a relatively small (in some 
cases windowless) room for two and a half hours is distressing (as is qualitatively 
supported by the comments noted earlier), then it is possible that this stress interacted 
with a potentially lower threshold for distress in NSI participants, which in turn activated 
the HPAA in absence of access to the persons typical method of coping using NSI. The 
time at which this occurred may represent a critical juncture at which NSI is more likely 
to occur, meaning that there is perhaps a vulnerability window, within which NSI is 
more/most likely to occur. Future research must seek to replicate this finding, as doing 
so may prove to be valuable in translating a phenomenological understanding of NSI into 
treatments for this behavior.
Finally, the lack of support for Hypothesis 4 indicates that no relationship was 
present between self-report measures of negative and positive affect (i.e. PANAS scores) 
and cortisol responses in any of the cells in this study. Considered in the context of the
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other findings (or lack thereof) in the present study, this finding adds a further complexity 
to a pattern of discrepant data. In aggregate, these results suggest that self-injurers in this 
study were more likely than Controls to report global difficulties with emotional 
regulation; however, these problems were not related to ecological momentary 
assessment of affect in either group in either condition. This is consistent with previously 
discussed research, which has indicated that such a discrepancy is common for a variety 
of reasons. Post-hoc ANOVAs of PANAS PA and NA difference scores nearly mirrored 
cortisol level difference ANOVA results, in that no interaction effects were found; NA 
initially increased following exposure to the stressor, and subsequently decreased 
throughout the rest of the study; and PA progressively decreased across all measurement 
intervals. The pattern of results was indeed convergent, i.e. NA changes converged with 
cortisol changes, only not in the predicted direction and not to a statistically significant 
degree. It is possible that researcher demand effects generated the initial differences in 
cortisol and affect, but that these effects were short-lived, thus resulting in an inconsistent 
pattern of relationships among physiological and psychological variables. Regardless, 
evidence for an unreported extant effect of the stressor was not found, and it seems likely 
that no relationship in this regard exists among this sample of self-injurers.
Study Limitations and Strengths 
Limitations
Although the results of the present study were not supportive of the main 
hypotheses and revealed no significant differences in HPAA functioning between self- 
injurers versus controls exposed to psychological stress, several potentially mitigating 
limitations of the study must be acknowledged. First, despite designed and purposeful
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efforts to recruit a heterogeneous sample, the sample for the present study was comprised 
entirely of college students, many of whom were enrolled in undergraduate psychology 
courses, which is a psychosocially idiosyncratic subset of a larger unique subset (i.e., 
college students) of the population (King et al., 2004). There is a strong possibility that 
different results may be found in clinical samples of self-injurers (e.g., inpatient or 
outpatient), because more severe psychiatric impairment is associated with more distress 
(Coyne & Schwenk, 1997) and could hypothetically be associated with a greater degree 
of biological emotional dysregulation than evidenced in this study. Thus, these results 
will likely not be generalizable to populations outside of a university setting.. As Foot 
and Sanford (2004) note, it is questionable at best to assume that college student samples 
are representative of the general population.
On the other hand, it is reasonable to assume that college students, regardless of 
major, are somewhat higher functioning than individuals of a similar age who have never 
been college students. Thus, it is likely that this study examined a relatively higher 
functioning population than that which is typically seen in outpatient and inpatient 
facilities. Nonetheless, 57.7% (n=15) of the NSI participants reported a history of
■y
“counseling or psychotherapy,” compared to only 7.1% (n=2) of controls (y [1, 53]==
15.97\p <  .001). This dynamic of the sample seems to suggest that, although the sample 
was likely to be higher functioning in general, self-injurers may be more likely to have 
psychological difficulties requiring treatment than psychologically healthy individuals.
Another limitation of this study is that the sample size was relatively small. This 
was a pilot study, and a priori power analysis suggested that moderate effect sizes could 
be detected if present. It is possible that there were small effects not detected due to the
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power restrictions based on the current sample size. Nonetheless, additional participants 
may have strengthened these results by adding further power with which to draw 
conclusions. Future studies must seek to extend these findings by employing larger 
samples.
Connected to the above sample limitation was this study’s lack of comparably 
sized gender group subsamples. While the inclusion of male self-injurers is a strength, 
the gender imbalance in the Control group limits the strength of any conclusions 
regarding the relationship of gender to NSI and emotion regulation. Although this 
imbalance occurred inadvertently, and in a design aimed at randomly sampling the 
population from which it was drawn, it is clear that matching Control and NSI groups on 
this variable would have strengthened the power of the study’s design. Some of the weak 
but significant interaction effects found for gender may have been strengthened by larger 
cell sizes.
Also related to the limitations of the sample was the definition of study groups. 
Participants met criteria if they had engaged in NSI at least two times in their life with 
one episode occurring in the past 12 months. This means that someone could have 
reported a single episode of NSI at age 12 and then a second episode 11 months before 
the screening and have met criteria for the study just as easily as someone who reported 
cutting themselves daily for the past four years would have. Therefore, the heterogeneity 
of the severity of NSI in the sample is also a potential limitation. Someone who received 
intensive treatment for their NSI and was abstinent for several months could still have 
participated in the study as a NSI participant, despite the fact that they may have been 
more likely to have developed better emotional regulation skills through treatment than
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others. Qualitatively, four NSI participants reported taking psychotropic medications, 
while none of the control participants did. Thus, there may be some indication in these 
data that treatment of some form had a mitigating effect on emotional dysregulation.
Additionally, participants were not excluded based on mood or anxiety disorder 
history as long as the diagnosis had not occurred in the past month, which allowed for the 
possibility that people meeting full mood disorder criteria could have been included and 
that people in remission from a mood or anxiety disorder could have been included. 
Either of these would be supported by the fact that four participants reported currently 
taking either selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors or selective norepinephrine reuptake 
inhibitors. Simultaneously, this exclusion criterion also limited some otherwise eligible 
participants who had reported a more severe history of NSI (i.e. more methods, higher 
frequency). Thus the inclusion/exclusion criteria may have contributed to a restriction in 
the full range of self-injurers available within this population because people in the acute 
stages of mood symptomatology were not allowed to participate. Designers of future 
research in this area may consider foregoing such restrictions in favor of a better 
representative sample, despite the risk of confounds to cortisol data. After all, the 
emotion dysregulation model of NSI directly implies impairment in emotion regulation, 
which can manifest in a variety of forms of psychopathology.
A further limitation of the study is the inherent variability of cortisol. The 
sensitivity of cortisol to stress induction and emotion made it an excellent candidate as a 
biomarker of HPAA functioning, but this glucocorticoid is affected by a variety of 
factors, including the time of day, physical activity, brain activity, pregnancy, mood, 
environmental factors, and even posture (Hennig Friebe, Ryl, Kramer, Bottcher, &
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Netter, 2000). The design of this study was aimed at maintaining as much control of the 
quality of the cortisol data as possible through restricting use of certain substances and 
participation in activities that are known to affect cortisol secretion. However, these 
measures relied almost exclusively on “the honor system” of self-report, and adherence 
cannot be determined definitively. Qualitatively, a number of the participants contacted 
the principal investigator to inquire about whether certain behaviors or substances would 
disqualify them from the study, or to provide notification of a potential lapse in 
adherence. Nonetheless, the individual variation in cortisol secretion patterns and the 
number of potential confounds for this data limits the tenacity with which conclusions 
may be drawn.
This study was also limited by its reliance on self-report NSI data, which is 
known to be somewhat unreliable (Klonsky, 2007). While the two week test-retest 
reliability data for the DSHI (a=.68; r=.92) are strong, they are also indicative of 
variability in reporting the same behaviors across a short period of time. A variety of 
factors can influence whether or not a participant accurately reports their NSI history, 
including perceived experimenter demands and prior learning history related to disclosure 
of NSI. In the present experiment, for example, the compensation component of the 
study design also provided an incentive for participants recruited via advertisements to 
embellish or even fabricate their history of NSI to receive financial compensation that 
they otherwise could not obtain. While there is neither quantitative nor qualitative data 
generated in the present study to support such a contention, this possibility highlights the 
concerns inherent in relying on self-reported NSI data, and beckons for more innovative 
and accurate approaches to NSI assessment.
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A final limitation of this study was the technique used for the experimental 
manipulation. This technique has been previously used effectively in several studies to 
experimentally produce a cortisol/stress response (cf. Blackhart et al., 2007), and it is 
founded on a large body of literature (see Dickerson & Kemeny, 2004). Nonetheless, the 
effectiveness of this technique is contingent upon several factors in its implementation. 
First, the appropriate wording of feedback must be used. This study used feedback that 
was based on work by Blackhart et al. (2007) in their study of cortisol response in social 
anxiety. One modification was made to the Rejected feedback to increase the harshness 
and impact of the wording, which included adding the statement. “This is kind of 
unusual, and it’s never happened before.” It is possible that this variation actually 
decreased the believability of the feedback. Use of the original, unaltered feedback script 
for future research may be advisable to reduce the risk of such iatrogeny.
Second, the delivery of feedback must be effective, involving minimizing 
emotive behavior and changes in facial affect (i.e. “keeping a straight face”). Although 
some research personnel associated with this project reported and exhibited initial 
difficulty with delivery of feedback effectively, delivery improved substantially during 
the training process. Nevertheless, it is possible that behavioral drift occurred over the 
course of the experiment, resulting in a diluted impact of this stress-induction technique. 
It will behoove future researchers employing a similar design to conduct regular ongoing 
training of research personnel throughout the duration of the study.
Third, environmental factors within the experiment must be conducive to the 
believability of this feedback. Most experiment groups consisted of four participants. 
Although participants were told that they would get to work with “at least one of the
145
other participants” during “the second half of the experiment” depending on whom 
picked whom to work with, it is possible that a group number in which pairs could be 
matched up evenly made this less believable (i.e., participants perhaps “did the math” and 
disregarded the “at least one other person” statement). Moreover, although all 
participants remained in their respective lab rooms before and after the conversational 
task and had no other potential opportunities for interaction with other participants, the 
only noise of people moving around outside of the lab rooms was likely to be easily 
identifiable as the research personnel. Anecdotally, during debriefing one participant 
commented, “I knew something was up- everyone went back to the same rooms, and I 
never heard anyone else walking around or getting together in a group.” The lab rooms 
used in this experiment were also poorly insulated for sound and were close together, in 
some cases adjacent. Therefore, it is possible that participants overheard some 
interactions between research personnel and other participants, thus contributing to 
disbelief (among Rejected participants) that other participants were gathered together 
working in a group. Future studies involving social rejection stressors must control such 
environmental factors that potentially degrade the believability of experimental 
deception.
Finally, the deception used for participants in the Neutral condition may also have 
had an iatrogenic effect, especially for the nearly half (48%) who suspected deception. 
Instead of having a null effect as anticipated, it is possible that this deception resulted in 
annoyance or other negative emotion, which in turn produced a cortisol response 
comparable or higher than that of Rejected participants. This is also consistent with 
qualitative data from the experimental manipulation check, in which some participants
146
appeared not to have believed this deception either, as denoted by one Neutral condition 
participant’s response, “You made ‘a mistake?’ Yeah, right.” Future research using this 
stressor must be designed to control for this possibility.
Strengths
While the aforementioned limitations must be considered, the present study was 
also characterized by several methodological strengths. First, this study was the first 
known research to employ both biological and self-report measures of emotional duress 
in the study of emotional regulation in NSI. Cortisol is a well-known proxy measure of 
HPAA functioning, which in turn is a well-established neurological component of 
emotional regulation. However, studies of NSI have typically used only paper-and-pencil 
assessments for mood, affect, or emotional state. This study is among the first to employ 
biological measures in the study of NSI, and no known studies have used cortisol as a 
measure of emotional dysregulation following stress induction in this population.
A second key strength of this study that merits discussion is the demographic 
composition of the sample; specifically, in the NSI group, males were included, and 
nearly equally represented. Older individuals were also included in the NSI group. This 
feature of the present research is a movement away from the long-held, and misconceived 
stereotype of the mid- to late adolescent (or very young adult) female self-injurer (e.g., 
Strong, 1998). Recent work by Gratz (2001) and a variety of others (e.g., Nijman, 
Dautzeberg, Merckelbach, Juang, Wessel, & Campo, 1999; Nock & Prinstein, 2005; 
Stanley et al., 2001) indicates that NSI is a problem in males, but that this behavior may 
develop for different reasons and may have different manifestations (e.g., different 
methods, different body parts; Whitlock et al. [ in press]). Such work has established that
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the aforementioned stereotype is passe, has resulted primarily from sampling bias, and 
has served mainly to hinder progress in the study of NSI. While NSI is becoming more 
widely recognized and documented as an equivalent problem in males (Gratz, 2001; 
Klonsky, 2007), self-injuring men remain an understudied population. This study makes 
a purposeful step forward in this regard, especially by its inclusion of males.
The setting for this study is also one of its strengths. Research in both Europe 
(Lehtinen et al., 2003) and North America (Mueser, Essock, Drake, Wolfe, & Frisman, 
2001) suggests that there may be differences in the prevalence of psychopathology across 
different types of national regions. Clearly, there are differing sociocultural caveats and 
dynamics in different regions of North America that potentially alter reporting rates and 
manifestations of behaviors such as NSI. Whereas prior research on NSI in college 
students has been primarily conducted at larger, urban-based universities in western or 
eastern North America, the present study examined a sample drawn from a medium­
sized, rurally based university in the North American Midwest. Thus, the present 
research provides NSI data on an understudied subset of the general North American 
population. Thus, the generalizability of these results to similar populations may have 
been higher than prior research in different regions.
Some aspects of the experimental design employed in this study may also be 
considered strengths. First, the stressor that was used in this research was based on 
decades of research examining the biology of stress responses in human. The 
characteristics of this stressor (uncontrollability and social evaluation) have been 
demonstrated to produce the strongest cortisol response in research participants when 
combined together as they were in this experiment. Thus, there is strong research support
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to indicate that this method was highly likely to produce a strong cortisol response 
(Dickerson & Kemeny, 2004). Additionally, the stressor used was social in nature, and 
relied on social exclusion to produce stress. It is likely that this stressor presented a more 
realistic context than an abstract stressor task (e.g., performing mental calculations out 
loud for a mock or real audience) because actual or perceived social exclusion is 
something that people, self-injurers included, are likely to experience. This stressor was 
also designed to appear as a non-routine and unexpected part of the participant’s 
experience during the study, thus making it more difficult for participants to actively cope 
with any resulting stress by attributing the manipulation to meaningless or arbitrary 
research demands.
Future Directions
This research represents an important initial step toward examination of potential 
underlying biological components of NSI. While the limitations of this study do not 
inherently portend invalidity of the results, and must be balanced with the strengths of 
this research, they do merit some caution when extrapolating these findings. Future 
research must seek to replicate these results before any firm conclusions may be drawn or 
applied from them. It is incumbent upon future researchers to examine other facets of 
emotion regulation in self-injurers.
The lack of significant findings in the present study both furthers and frustrates 
the advancement of our understanding of NSI etiology. The pattern of results points 
toward some potentially fruitful lines of inquiry that may be addressed in future studies. 
First, other indices of emotion regulation in the brain must be evaluated in self-injurers 
under stressed and non-stressed conditions. Investigations of receptor density in the
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amygdala may provide support for a hypo-threshold model of emotion dysregulation in 
NSI, whereby higher densities of CRH in the central nucleus of the amygdala could 
theoretically (1) lower the threshold for emotional reactivity; (2) increase the amount of 
stimulation of the amygdala; and/or (3) protract the chronicity of negatively valenced 
emotional responses in self-injurers, such as fear.
Second, subsequent investigations in this area must evaluate the role of other 
potential mitigating factors such as severity of NSI pathology (e.g., frequency, duration). 
Regardless of the model that is used to explain NSI, higher frequency, higher 
dangerousness, and chronicity are likely to suggest disruption in the person’s life at some 
level. It is possible that these factors bare some unique relationship to the function of 
NSI in a self-injurer’s life. As suggested by Klonsky (2007), it is possible that the 
function of NSI changes over time for people, and these changes may be associated with 
lesser or greater levels of risk for other forms of psychopathology, as well as greater or 
lesser applicability of psychotherapeutic interventions. For example, evaluation of 
different durations of NSI history, ages of onset, and different severities of NSI as 
predictors of initial readiness-to-change may facilitate a better understanding of the 
chronic nature of much NSI. However, it is the determination of the role of these factors 
that is the first step in this direction.
Third, in lieu of the null results of this study, future research must turn attention 
toward the expansion of alternative extant models of NSI. The behavioral model 
proposed by Nock and Prinstein (2004) was indicative of emotion or affect regulation as 
a function of NSI in adolescent self-injurers. However, it is also quite possible that NSI 
develops primarily through a process of chaining, paired association, and contingencies
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of reinforcement inadvertently initiated by either the individual who engages in NSI or 
his/her environment. Although self-damaging behavior would seem to be a “failed 
mutation” in an evolutionary sense, it is possible that behavioral principles combined 
with a conducive environment make this behavior more functional for the self-injurer 
than is commonly assumed by either the pedestrian general public or the seasoned 
clinician.
Fourth and finally, it is clear from this study that the relationship between gender 
and NSI has yet to be elucidated. Clarification of the way in which one’s interpersonal 
and intrapersonal experience of gender is needed. It is imperative for future research 
designs to incorporate balanced gender subsamples, in an effort to better understand this 
relationship. Future research examining emotion regulation and NSI especially must seek 
to address questions pertaining to the role of gender in these psychological phenomena. 
Doing so will ideally develop an empirical background against which new, targeted 
treatments for NSI may be developed.
These proposed directions are but a few of the myriad avenues yet to be pursued 
in NSI research, many of which are beyond the scope of this discussion. In general, 
research on this behavior remains relatively nascent at this time, given our limited 
understanding of it. Substantially more work is required for a useful and comprehensive 
model of NSI to be advanced. The findings of this study are merely a small step in a long 
road of empirical discovery yet to be traveled by behavioral science.
The pattern of differences presented in this paper is important and amenable to a 
biopsychosocial understanding of NSI. The primary hypothesis regarding cortisol was 
not supported, but self-injurers in this study essentially stated that they have significant
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problems with emotional regulation, thus supporting the psychological component of this 
model. Although it appeared that NSI participants’ bodies told a different story 
biologically, it is possible that what was uncovered in this experiment is a unique 
neurobiology requiring further exploration with more sophisticated techniques in future 
research. As Carl Sagan (1994) once noted, “Absence of evidence, is not evidence of 
absence.” Indeed, the discrepancy between biological and psychological measures of 
emotional regulation seems to point toward some important, yet unexplored, avenues of 
empirical inquiry. It is imperative for future researchers in this area to continue to 
advance our understanding of the biological component of the biopsychosocial model of 
NSI, in an effort to provide a more complete understanding of and more effective 
treatments for this behavior.
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APPENDICES
APPENDIX I
Inform ed Consent Form
This study is being conducted by Patrick Kerr. I am a graduate student in the psychology department and 
am coordinating this research project. My advisors for this project, are Dr. Jennifer M uehlenkamp, and 
assistant professor in the Departm ent o f  Psychology, and Dr. Alan King, an associate professor in the 
Department o f  Psychology, both o f  whom are supervising this research. The psychology department 
supports the practice o f  the protection for this project o f  human subjects in experimental research, in 
accordance with the Ethical Principles for Psychologists put forth by the American Psychological 
Association.
The purpose o f this research is to study certain biological factors associated with non-suicidal self-injury 
(NSSI). Both individuals with and without a history o f  NSSI have been invited to  participate in this study. 
The experimenter conducting the study with you today has not been informed about which group you are in
This experiment has been approved by the University o f  North Dakota Institutional Review Board. Your 
participation in this research is entirely voluntary. Y ou were invited to participate in this study based on 
your responses on the questionnaires administered in the group testing session at the beginning o f  this 
semester, in which you participated. The following information is provided so that you may decide whether 
o r not you w ish to participate in this study. Y ou are free at any time during the experiment to  withdraw 
your participation for any reason. Also, if  you decide not to participate in this study, your decision will not 
affect your course grade or your relationships w ith psychology faculty members. You will receive four (4) 
hours o f  extra credit to be used toward a psychology course, o r $20 for participating today. I f  you 
discontinue your participation early, you will be compensated at a rate o f  0.5 hours o f  extra credit and $2 
for every half-hour or part thereof that you participate.
In this study, you will be asked to engage in conversational tasks w ith other participants. These other 
participants are also unaware o f what group you are in. These tasks will require you to discuss certain 
topics indicated by the experimenter. The time required for any conversational task that you participate in 
will not exceed 15 minutes. Prior to the conversational tasks, you will be asked to  complete a questionnaire 
pertaining to your recent activities. The questions on this questionnaire will determine your eligibility to 
participate, and will inquire about the following activities:
1) Caffeine intake
2) Drug use
3) Prescription medication use
4) Food consumption
5) Physical activity and exercise
Prior to the conversational tasks, the experimenter will ask you to engage in a relaxation activity involving 
listening to music and reading through some magazines. This will last for 20 minutes. Following this, the 
experim enter will ask that you provide samples o f  saliva at designated times. The experim enter will 
provide you with the necessary materials to do this. You will then engage in a second task involving 
drawing with selected members o f the group. A fter all conversational tasks have been completed, the 
experimenter will ask that you provide additional samples o f  saliva at designated times. The experimenter 
w ill provide you w ith the necessary materials to do this at this time as well. Each tim e you provide a 
sample o f  saliva, you will be asked to complete a b rief questionnaire. A t the conclusion o f  the experiment, 
you will be asked to complete two more questionnaires. One questionnaire will inquire about your
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thoughts on this experiment, and the other will inquire about thoughts related to self-injury. Finally, you 
will be asked to copy some statements on a page provided by the experimenter.
The criteria for participating in this study a re  th a t you are a t least 18 years of age, tha t you are  not 
currently  pregnant, th a t you are not currently  taking oral contraceptives, tha t you have complied 
with the requirem ents for pre-experim ental food and drug  intake and physical activity, tha t you have 
not been diagnosed with any form of mood disorder (i.e., M ajor Depressive Disorder/Clinical 
Depression, B ipolar Disorder, Dysthymia, Cycolthymia) or anxiety disorder (i.e., Generalized 
Anxiety D isorder, obsessive-Compulsive D isorder, Posttraum atic Stress Disorder, Panic Disorder) 
within the past m onth, and th a t you have not been diagnosed with an eating disorder at any time in 
your lifetime. Verification of this compliance will be made when the samples a re  analyzed.
Y our course grade will not be affected by a decision not to  answer any item on these questionnaires. I f  you 
have not complied with the pre-experim ent instructions regarding food and drug intake, and physical 
activity, you may not participate in this study research today; however, you may elect to  reschedule your 
participation in this study for another day, with no consequence to you.
This experiment should last no more than two and a  h a lf  hours, for which you will receive a total o f  four 
hours o f  extra course credit, or $20. I f  you discontinue your participation prior to com pletion o f  the 
experimental session, you will still be com pensated based on the time you have contributed. Specifically, 
you will be provided with ten dollars or two hours o f  research participation credit for every full hour that 
you have participated (e.g., for 1 or 1 'A hours o f  time spent, you would receive $ 10 or 2 hours o f  extra 
credit participation).
All data collected in all experimental testing sessions will rem ain confidential and will be used for research 
purposes only. Random identification numbers w ill be assigned to each participant so that your responses 
and data (including salivary sample data) w ill not be identified by either your name or your student number. 
This random  number will not be your social security num ber or your student number, but rather an 
unassociated random  number. All biological samples w ill be analyzed by Salimetrics, Inc.; however, your 
identity w ill not be linked with your individual samples in any way or at any time. This consent form will 
be stored separately from the data collected in the experimental sessions, m eaning that your data will not be 
connected w ith any identifying information at any time. However, w e will include your random num ber on 
this consent form in case you have questions about this research or would like to discuss your responses 
with us. The data from this experiment, which includes the questionnaires you complete and the biological 
analysis reports generated by Salimetrics, Inc., as well as the consent forms will be stored in locked 
cabinets for a period o f  three years following the completion o f  this study. A fter three years, all data will be 
destroyed using a paper shredder.
There may be no benefits for participating in this study beyond gaining experience in scientific research.
O n a larger scale, it is expected that this study will benefit the larger field o f  clinical psychology because it 
will yield data that w ill be important in understanding new aspects o f  certain behaviors in humans. It is 
expected that the tasks used in this procedure will provide useful information that can one day be used to 
develop new psychological treatm ent approaches for certain behaviors.
Potentia l risks to  in d iv id u a ls  w ho  partic ipate  in  th is  study m ay inc lude em otiona l d isco m fo rt o r distress due 
to  certain components o f  the experimental procedure, and discomfort in rating behaviors pertaining to 
situations that may elicit fear o r worry in some individuals. I f  you experience such discomfort, please feel 
free to contact me to discuss your experience in the study. A t the conclusion o f  your participation in this 
study, you m ay be provided with, o r may request, a  list o f  comm unity and campus resources where you can 
receive psychological services either at no cost (e.g., University Counseling Center) or on a  sliding fee 
scale (e.g., Psychological Services Center).
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Another potential risk in this study is providing data that might be linked with your name. A s stated above, 
a number o f  steps will be taken to  maintain confidentiality. M oreover, all o f  the personnel associated with 
this study have gone through a confidentiality workshop, which includes a review o f  the ethical principles 
published by the American Psychological Association. Only the researcher (Patrick Kerr), the research 
advisors (Jennifer M uehlenkamp, Ph.D. and Alan King, Ph.D.), and people who audit IRB procedures will 
have access to the data. However, please be aware that if  at any time during the experim ent you express any 
desire or intent to harm yourself in any way, the experim enter will be obligated to  breach your 
confidentiality as a research participant and take appropriate measures to  ensure your safety. This may 
include contacting one o f  the clinical psychologists supervising this study (Jennifer Muehlenkamp, Ph.D. 
and Alan King, Ph.D.), the University o f  North Dakota Crisis Response Team, or other emergency 
personnel.
You will be given a thorough debriefing o f  the rationale behind the study, expected results, and the manner 
in which this study might benefit individuals with certain behavioral tendencies at the end o f  the 
experimental session. It is expected that results from this study will be presented at conferences and 
published in a peer-reviewed journal. All data will be presented as means and standard deviations, and no 
individual data set will be published.
If  you have any questions or concerns about this research, please do not hesitate to call me at (701) 777- 
4348. You can also contact Dr. Jennifer M uehlenkamp at (701) 777-4496 or Dr. Alan King at (701) 777- 
3644. I f  you have other questions or concerns, you may call U N D ’s Office o f  Research and Program 
Development at 777-4279. The experimenter will provide you with a copy o f  this form to  keep for your 
own records. Your signature below indicates that you have thoroughly read this consent form and 
voluntarily agree to  participate. Thank you.
Partic ipan t Signature D ate
APPENDIX II
Debriefing Statement
Now that you have completed your participation in this study, we would like to explain 
its purpose. The main purpose of this study is to study the biological responses of individuals 
who engage in non-suicidal self-injury to emotional distress. It is theorized that individuals who 
engage in non-suicidal self-injury do so for a variety of reasons, one of which may be to help 
moderate negative feelings and emotions. The feedback that you were given by the researcher 
today was pre-selected prior to the experiment based on your random assignment to either the 
“neutral group” (if you were told we made a mistake and were assigned to the wrong group) or 
the “stressed group” (if you were told that no one chose to work with you). Therefore, any 
feedback you were given by the experimenter regarding whether or not you were selected by 
someone else to work with during the second part of the experiment was fictional. In fact, it is 
likely that some of the other participants in today’s study were given the same feedback that you 
were. This is referred to as a “social rejection technique.” It was part of the experiment, and was 
aimed at eliciting an emotional response from you which could be measured using biological 
indicators in your saliva. This was a deceptive technique and we sincerely apologize for using it. 
Unfortunately, this is one of the most consistent techniques used in research for eliciting 
emotional responses in research participants. By studying the way in which self-injurers and 
those who do not engage in self-injury respond biologically to stress, we can better understand 
both the reasons that people engage in self-injury and how to treat this behavior more effectively.
It is possible and may even be expected that you felt uncomfortable while engaging in the 
conversational task, and when given feedback about who had supposedly selected to work with 
you. The feelings that you felt curing this experiment may have ranged from completely neutral 
to sad, angry, anxious, or disturbed. Any and all of the feelings you experienced are normal 
reactions to this procedure and are shared by many others who go through this experiment. 
Moreover, there is ample research suggesting that these are very typical responses to this 
procedure. The discomfort associated with this experiment is expected to be temporary; however, 
the exact duration is unknown. If, for any reason, you would like to discuss these feelings with 
the primary investigator of this experiment or my supervisors, we will be available to speak with 
you. All office numbers, telephone numbers, and email are listed below. If these feelings persist, 
it is also strongly suggested that you speak to a mental health professional.
As mentioned at the beginning of this study, all of your responses and all of your data 
will be kept strictly and completely confidential. None of the data that you have personally 
submitted will be used on an individual basis in any way, and all of the results gathered from this 
study will be compiled, presented, and reported as group statistical averages. Likewise, while it 
is understandable and appropriate that you may want to discuss your experiences today with a 
mental health professional or other supportive person, we request that you do not discuss this 
experiment with other undergraduate students so as to avoid biasing responses obtained from 
future participants.
We sincerely appreciate your participation and cooperation with our study!
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Patrick Kerr, Primaiy Investigator 
Office: 113 Corwin-Larimore 
Phone: 701.777.4348 
patrick.kerr@und.nodak.edu
Alan King, Ph.D., Research Supervisor 
Office: 339 Corwin-Larimore 
Phone: 701.777.3644 
alan king@und.nodak.edu
Jennifer Muehlenkamp, Ph.D., Research Supervisor 
Office: 337 Corwin-Larimore 
Phone: 701.777.4496 
iennifer.muehlenkamp@und.nodak.edu
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APPENDIX III
My E xperiences
In your own words, what was the present study about?
Did you believe, at any time, that the experiment dealt with anything other than 
what the experimenter had described to you (circle one)?
Yes No
If yes, what?
Did this affect your behavior in any way (circle one)? Yes No
If yes, how?
Were you given any information about the experiment by anyone other than the 
researchers prior to coming here today (circle one)? Yes No
If yes, what?
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APPENDIX IV
Positive Self-S tatem ents
Directions: Please read each o f the following statements to  yourself now, and copy 
each statem ent on the  line below it. This page is yours to keep, so you may take it  
w ith you if  you choose and use it  as o ften  as necessary.
"I am an intelligent person"
”1 can succeed at anything I  se t my mind to"
"I have special talents and abilities"
"It's okay to just be me"
"My opinion is just as important as the next person’s"
"I am not stupid"
"I am smart and can figure things out just as easily as others"
"It's okay not to be perfect"
“I  am competent at many things"
"I am a strong person"
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"I can achieve anything I  se t my mind to"
”1 have many strengths"
”1 have much potential"
”1 am worthy of a happy and fulfilling life"
"I am a person of value"
”1 am a likeable person"
"It’s okay to take care of myself"
"I am important"
"I am just as important as the next person"
"I am worthy of being loved"
“I  am okay"
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APPENDIX V
Risk Screening
A. Express concern regarding some of the responses. Let the participant know you just 
want to speak briefly to see how they are doing. Briefly establish some rapport.
B. Assess risk for risk factors:
i. Recent loss or frustration/failure
ii. Mood state or current distress (depression, anxiety, agitation); have them 
rate depressed mood on a scale from 0-10.
iii. Assess degree of hopelessness
iv. Review BSS for history of suicide attempts and level of desire to die
C. Assess suicide and NSSI factors (PIMP)
i. Plan: “Have you thought about what you might do (to self-injure, end 
your life)?”
ii. Intent: “How upset would you say you are right now?”
“How strong is your desire to hurt yourself right now?”
iii. Means: “Do you have what you would need to______ (plan)?”
“Are you thinking about how to get what you need?”
iv. Past: “Have you attempted suicide/self-injured in the past?”
a. “When was that?” (if within past month consider HIGH 
RISK.
D. Assess resources
i. Treatment: “Are you seeing anyone for treatment or therapy?”
a. If yes, “Do they know how you’ve been feeling?”
ii. Supports: “Do you live with anyone?”
“What are you doing next?”
“Is there someone you can go hang out with?”
iii. RFL: “What keeps you going right now”
E. Determine Level of Risk and Required Action
i. LOW: No past attempt or recent/current SIB, low ideation w/o plan.
1. Required Action: validate participant’s feelings and provide 
referral/recommendation for therapy
ii. MODERATE: Past attempt OR recent/current SIB, low ideation w/o plan
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1. Required Action: help participant articulate a brief safety plan 
(i.e., what to do if thoughts/urges increase, distraction, call 
friends); If the client is unable to identify a plan to remain safe, 
contact the UND crisis response team.
iii. HIGH: Recent attempt, current suicidal or SIB ideation w/ plan and no 
intent or access to lethal or injurious method
1. Required Action: encourage participant to immediately contact 
support system via telephone while you’re in the room; request 
that another RA contact Dr. Muehlenkamp while participant 
does this
iv. IMMINENT: Current suicidal or SIB ideation, access to method, some 
intent
1. Required Action: Call/find/track down Dr. Muehlenkamp
a. ask participant to remain in lab, send another RA to get 
Dr. Muehlenkamp
b. help participant contact support system to inform of risk; 
enlist help of support system in getting participant to a 
clinician
c. DO NOT let participant leave lab alone; have friend, 
family member meet them OR walk participant to 
counseling center or PSC.
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APPENDIX VI
Short Health History Form
At what time did you last eat/drink?____ a.m./p.m.
What did you eat/drink?________________________________________________
Have you consumed any alcohol and/or caffeine within the last 24 hours? Yes No
If yes, please list below day and time, what was consumed, and how much:
Have you engaged in any physical activity/exercise that made your heart beat faster and/or your 
breathing rate increase for 20 minutes or more within the last 24 hours? Yes No
If yes, please list below day and time, what physical activity you engaged in, and duration:
Do you smoke cigarettes or regularly use other tobacco/nicotine products? Yes
No
If yes, at what time did you last smoke or use another tobacco product?____ a.m./p.m.
Have you experienced any illness within the last 48 hours? Yes
No
If yes, what were your symptoms?________________________________________
Please list any prescription medications or over-the-counter medications you routinely take or 
have taken in the last 5 days (including birth control, cold or allergy medication, 
migraine/headache medications, antibiotics, etc.).
Have you been diagnosed with any of the following within the past month (please check all that 
apply)?
_Major Depressive Disorder _Bipolar Disorder _Cyclothymia
_Dysthymia
_Generalized Anxiety Disorder _Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder __Panic
Disorder
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder
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Have you been diagnosed with or received treatment for any of the following in vour lifetime 
(please check all that apply)?
Anorexia Nervosa _Bulimia Nervosa _Binge Eating Disorder
Females Only:
Are you currently taking birth control? Yes No
Are you currently pregnant? Yes No
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APPENDIX VII
Conversation Task Topics
The best ways that people meet new people and 
new friends on campus
1. H o w  do students at U N D  m eet n ew  p eop le  on  cam pus and m ake n ew  
friends?
2. W hat are som e o f  the w ays that you  have m et n ew  p eop le  on  cam pus 
and/or m ade n ew  friends?
3. W hat is the best w av  to  m eet n ew  peop le  and m ake n ew  friends at 
U N D ?
The best places in town to spend free time
1. W hat are som e p laces in tow n  to  spend leisure/free tim e?
2. W hat are the best p laces in tow n  to  spend leisure/free tim e?
3. W hat is the best p lace in tow n  to spend leisure/free tim e?
The most interesting classes available on campus
1. W hat are som e interesting c la sses  that are availab le  to students at 
U N D ?
2. W hat c la sses  at U N D  do m ost students seem  to like m ore than others?
3. W hat is the m ost interesting c la ss  that any student can take here at 
U N D ?
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APPENDIX VIII
Experiment Selection Form
In the sp aces b e lo w , p lea se  list the tw o  individuals that you  w ou ld  m ost like  
to  work w ith during the secon d  part o f  the experim ent. R em em ber that these  
are not rankings (e .g ., “I w ant to w ork w ith Sa lly  m ost, so  I w ill list her 
first!”), so  it d oes not m atter w h o you  list first or second .
Person 1.
Person  2.
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